ARCHIVED: Commentary No. 4: Future of Ex-Eastern Bloc Intelligence Personnel

Commentary No. 4 has been archived.

Dr. R. D'A Henderson

July 1990
Unclassified

Editors Note: This issue of Commentary was written by Dr. R. D'A Henderson, a Strategic Analyst in the Analysis and Production Branch (RAP) of CSIS.

Disclaimer: Publication of an article in the Commentary series does not imply CSIS authentication of the information nor CSIS endorsement of the author's views.

---

Following the collapse of the East European communist régimes in 1989, their domestic and foreign intelligence services have been either disbanded or re-structured, with a substantial "retirement" of personnel. What are the future options for those intelligence officers who have specialized skills in information collection, analysis and asset protection and in clandestine operations skills, when their services are dismantled? Do former intelligence service personnel constitute a threat to Western countries?

What Threat? Recent Examples From The Western Experience

The question above was posted in the early 1980's by an investigative writer while researching the background and clandestine activities of a renegade ex-CIA contract agent, Edwin P. Wilson. Wilson is now serving a 52-year sentence in the U.S.A. for illicitly providing the Qaddafi government in Libya with military weapons, plastic explosives and instructors. But he is by no means the only publicized example of a former intelligence operative who went "off the reservation".

On 21 August 1989, NBC Evening News showed a videotape of an Israeli instructor providing paramilitary training to alleged security forces of the "drug lords" in Colombia. He was subsequently identified as Arik Afek, an Israeli citizen who had earlier "claimed to have worked for Israeli military intelligence and boasted often of his derring-do", according to his Miami-based business partner. Five months later, Afek was found shot and dumped into the trunk of his car at Miami International Airport, although no motive for the killing has been reported [The New York Times, 27 January 1990].

Another recent example is the long-serving Israeli Mossad operative, Mike Harari, who come out of retirement in 1980 to assume the post of regional Mossad representative in Central America. From that post he developed close links with Panamanian intelligence chief Manuel Noriega. When Noriega came to power the following year, Harari maintained their relationship while establishing substantial business activities within the country, retiring from Mossad a second time in 1985. But he reportedly was also involved in a number of clandestine activities, including arms trafficking, recruiting teams of Israelis to train Noriega's personal guard, establishing a special operations battalion of the Panamanian Defence Force, and re-organizing Panama's intelligence establishment. Following the 1989 American invasion into Panama, Harari reappeared in Israel, but U.S. officials are now concerned that he will become involved in re-organizing the Nicaraguan intelligence services [The Washington Times, 27 April 1990].

These examples demonstrate the degree of disruptive activities that maverick ex-intelligence operatives can generate. As the national services in East Europe are being curtailed, radically transformed, or even terminated, a large number of former intelligence officers (both domestic and foreign sections) are currently at large-out of sight and largely unemployed. It has been estimated that in East Germany alone 85,000 full-time personnel lost their jobs virtually overnight when its Ministry of State Security (Stasi) was disbanded.

Few defectors to the West have been reported-a mere trickle rather than the stream forecast initially by foreign commentators at the end of 1989. The majority of former intelligence personnel would appear to have gone to cover within their rapidly changing societies while awaiting a clearer picture of the future. However, with the reduction if not collapse of many of the former régimes' ministries and state-run enterprises, and rising unemployment, these former operatives are facing sharp discrimination on job opportunities, not to mention any future legal charges arising from their former activities. This situation has encouraged some maverick intelligence operatives to market their specialized skill abroad.

This phenomenon raises four basic questions:

1. Are such "defectors" desirable?
2. What type of work would maverick operatives do?
3. Is there a market for the skills of former intelligence personnel?
4. Who will hire them?

Problem of Undesirable Defectors

Within the dismantling-or at least removal of the controlling strata-of the national services in East Europe, there have been some defections to the West. Generally they have been in the Cold War tradition of offering secrets in exchange for sanctuary. In this current period of changing threat concerns, the primary secret of ongoing value from the Cold War period is the names of moles in Western governments and intelligence services and of currently operating espionage and subversion networks in the West. All other "old" intelligence secrets are likely to have value only in assessing the extent and validity of Western intelligence analyses of traditional targets.

Defectors who are fleeing criminal or human rights charges would constitute a major issue as cooperative East/West relations are being developed. Since a majority of them risk the likelihood of being perceived as personae non gratae in the West from the outset, they may seek potential sanctuary elsewhere.

One problem in using ex-intelligence personnel from Eastern Bloc services is that their organizational structures and procedures are different from those in Western intelligence services. While they may be able to provide excellent briefings on past operations and methods of their former services, the differences in corporate cultures prevent their rapid assimilation into a Western service even if they were to be offered such an opportunity. Rather, with the exception of sought-after technical expertise, the primary area for using such new recruits would be as country or regional experts. Even in this role, the longer they are away from their homeland, the less value their interpretation and evaluations will have.

In counterpoint, there is the case of retired East German spymaster Markus Wolf who, when faced in early 1990 with possible legal indictment initially in connection with an arms export scandal, made two quick trips to the Soviet Union. Although he appears to remain in residence near Berlin, he has generated a major concern with regard to ex-intelligence personnel for Western intelligence services: did Wolf take his records of East German's foreign espionage networks to Moscow? Did he attempt to trade those foreign networks for a Soviet "sanctuary" and fail? Or, as one theory based on his original Soviet training suggests, has he in fact been a Soviet KGB agent within the East German Stasi intelligence service for years and was simply ordered to return "west" to East Germany and await political developments there?

It is reasonable to assume that Wolf possessed something of value to exchange for sanctuary, although the reasons(s) for his return to East Germany remain unclear. But what about other former Eastern Bloc intelligence officers with knowledge, operations files and skills to trade to a foreign government, e.g. to the Soviet Union, Cuba, a Middle East country or elsewhere in the Third World?

Ex-Intelligence Personnel as Skilled Tradespeople

The skills of intelligence tradecraft are not easily acquired, and usually only from a state-controlled intelligence service. These acquired skills could include, for example, the ability to strengthen or penetrate secure signals traffic, deploy effective surveillance or counter-surveillance, forge passports and other documents, establish false front companies and bank accounts, cross borders undetected, co-opt government officials, avoid the scrutiny of hostile security services and recruit foreign nations as "agents in place".

Transferring such abilities from a highly-skilled intelligence service to one with less capacity is obviously beneficial. Any such infusions of expertise into the Western services-if it happens-would not be expected in increase their overall capabilities significantly. Nonetheless, the Soviet Union will be seeking to replace the intelligence production previously provided by its former East European allies. Although there are indications that East Bloc intelligence transfers to Moscow may have slowed down even before the dramatic events of late 1989, it is suspected that present intelligence exchanges are being carried on in a more discriminating manner due to the restructuring of the East European services and to heightened considerations of national interest in each country. Soviet decision-makers will want intelligence assets which either qualitatively improve Soviet gathering capabilities or provide capabilities where gaps currently exist in their own gathering operations, especially those dealing with European affairs and economic issues.

Within the North-South context, such an infusion would amount to an intelligence technology transfer. Traditionally, Third World intelligence services have sought military intelligence regarding state security threats and armaments. However, leaders of these countries, in general, have increasing intelligence needs, particularly regarding economic intelligence. They are already seeking to improve their defensive abilities to block foreign intelligence gathering. At the same time, they will also seek to obtain better offensive capabilities with regard to locally-based foreign targets, principally Western government assets and multinational corporations' communications. Some Third World intelligence services will even seek to improve their abilities to penetrate the distant and culturally-distant industrialized countries in the West, perhaps via the substantial foreign émigré communities there. In addition, a number of these intrusive skills are adaptable to commercial and industrial espionage, or conversely as an aid for devising enhanced protection of their own secrets.

Marketing Their Acquired Skills

In the case of Western services, former intelligence personnel have made themselves available on the open market. Perhaps the single largest number to become available at one time was the 1977 "Halloween Massacre" in the CIA's Espionage Branch, when 147 were forced to retire early and a further 17 were dismissed. Yet there is no evidence of these "retirees en masse" offering their Agency- acquired skills to hostile intelligence services or to criminal elements. Rather, a number began "second careers" in the private sector, based upon their experience and usually linked to the support needs of U.S. government departments or corporate contractors to those departments.

In attempts to market their skills, ex-Western personnel have done business in the private sector by trading on self-declared informal connections to their former intelligence communities. They have also sought to use overseas contacts made during previous service to obtain consultancy/supply contracts or employment with foreign client countries and even a few with the intelligence services of those countries.

A number of factors would encourage or force ex-intelligence personnel in the East Bloc to leave their countries. First, all the East European services have either been dismantled or have undergone large cuts in their personnel, a large number of whose former members are presently believed to be unemployed. Further, a sizable number are also being actively sought for human rights abuses and criminal charges. Among the ex-members being especially sought are those previously responsible for domestic security due to the repressive nature of their work for the former communist regimes. Similarly, though to a lesser extent, those involved in the headquarters' direction of foreign covert operations-particularly activities involving financial transactions and profit-related arms and equipment dealings-have also been sought. A third factor is that there will be a small number of former operatives, because of their personal nature or greed, who will actively seek to market their skills abroad.

It is probable that under 200 former East European intelligence personnel would be strongly motivated by a combination of these factors to go into exile. The more crucial question would be:; of this estimated number, how many could qualitatively improve a foreign intelligence service or other potential employer?

Potential Employers For Ex-Intelligence Personnel

Although senior intelligence officers would have more to offer in trade, potential employers will prefer ex-intelligence personnel with technical skills: security systems planners, operations organizers, systems analysts, service administrators, communications experts, cryptologists, forgery specialists, etc. Their potential employers will include the following governmental and non-governmental groupings.

WESTERN INTELLIGENCE SERVICES might use a small number of those with technical skills. The remainder would be debriefed for information which still retained real time value-most likely in exchange for financial remuneration but without provision for re-settlement or even identity documents. This employment possibility will probably exist only in the short-term (measured in months), unless there is a major halt to the present trend of political evolution in East Europe.

The response of the SOVIET INTELLIGENCE SERVICES is likely to be very similar but with two differences. One would be that of offering residence-in-exile for those ex-intelligence officers who had spied for the Soviet Union within their own intelligence services. The other would be Soviet willingness to accept ex-intelligence personnel where it would assist its efforts to assume active East Bloc espionage networks in Western countries. Such personnel would be returned to the field if they had fled, or ordered to remain in place if the had not. While it has been reported that a number of for Stasi members fled to sanctuary in the Soviet Union and Cuba (Manchester Guardian Weekly, 17 December 1989), reports in the West German media suggest that the Soviet KGB may already have taken over East Germany's covert agents in West Germany and elsewhere [Die Welt, Hamburg, 6 April 1990].

These efforts are likely to have been accorded a high priority, due to the recognition by the Soviet leadership under Mikhail Gorbachev of an ongoing need for foreign intelligence gathering-especially economic intentions and technological developments-in relation to West European integration in 1992. This intelligence requirement will become even more important with the absorption of East Germany into West Germany (and within the European Economic Community in effect) and the creation of an outer economic constellation formed by the other evolving East European countries.

THIRD WORLD REGIMES also have intelligence interests and security needs which can be served by hiring foreign intelligence personnel. "Foreign recruits" to a national intelligence service in the Third World would be expected to enhance its internal security system and possibly extend the capabilities of its external intelligence collection as well. But both of these functions would be characterized by the nature of the régime being served.

For authoritarian rulers, the primary objective for hiring foreign expertise would be to increase the level of internal security afforded to the ruling leader or élite and for disrupting opposition factions in exile. As foreign intelligence consumers, they also would be seeking enhanced intelligence on neighboring states perceived as threatening, on intrusive activities by major powers, commercial activities of foreign governments and companies, etc.

For newly-industrializing countries (NICs), the rapid changes in East Europe coupled with the creation of major regional trading blocs such as the EEC and the North American free trade area have resulted in the need for greater amounts of technical and commercial intelligence-intentions of the major powers as well as future policies of the regional economic blocs. This has led to increased efforts to develop primary intelligence sources within the Western countries themselves. Further, the continuing technological gap between the NICs and the West has created a perceived need to obtain advanced technology as quickly as possible, even to the extent of industrial espionage and clandestine acquisition.

WESTERN AND JAPANESE MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS will seek East Europeans with extensive local knowledge, particularly of the new government leaders and the evolving political culture, including previous dissident personalities and organizations. Ex-intelligence personnel - at least those not wanted for human rights abuses - may be able to trade on their knowledge of local affairs and contacts by acting as "contract finder" agents or even "government liaison" consultants. Such "guides" would be able to assist a commercial entry into the emerging national markets in the region either unilaterally or as part of a joint venture. According to a member of the East German citizens' committee overseeing the breakup of the Stasi, the committee was surprised at the accuracy of the Stasi in evaluating trends and moods within the fledgling opposition groups, although the former communist régime had not capitalized on the intelligence it was receiving [Washington Post, 31 March 1990].

Despite their relative eagerness to gain entrance to the projected markets of East Europe, Western companies will not wish to tarnish their image by being seen to employ such former security service members. Further, concerns about such intrusive activities have helped convince the new governments in East Europe to re-constitute internal intelligence services to protect government assets and to prevent foreign influence on their internal decision-making.

A further area where multinational corporations may be interested is in hiring those personnel with technical expertise for encryption and decoding. With the escalating need for secure global communications, these international entities are both vulnerable targets for economic intelligence gathering and increasingly interested in intelligence collection in their own right. The acquisition of even a few world-class cryptologists could qualitatively enhance their access to the secret communications of their commercial competitors as well as of some foreign governments.

CRIMINAL SYNDICATES, such as drug cartels, would be interested in acquiring the skills and contacts that some ex-intelligence personnel have to offer. These would include paramilitary instruction, arms and explosives procurement, clandestine movement of financial assets and money-laundering, creation of dummy companies and postal addresses. The most highly sought-after will be those who can qualitatively improve the communications, financial transfers and security systems of hose syndicates.

To date it appears that Western intelligence services have either not been able to penetrate the communications linkages of the drug cartels or have not allocated the necessary human and technical resources to do so [The New York Times. 25 March 1990]. Such an objective could become even more difficult and resource costly in near term if highly skilled communications and encoding personnel, recruited from amongst those leaving East Europe, are employed to further secure the communications systems of foreign drug lords.

Impact Here?

Under current Canadian immigration criteria, all citizens from Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union are being considered under "normal immigration processing" rather that the previous self-exiled persons classification [Vancouver Sun, 20 August 1990]. As such, any former intelligence personnel would be refused entry into Canada if they had been involved in human rights abuses in either their homeland or in a third country. But to ensure this necessitates closer security screening of all potential immigrant applications from that region despite a substantial backlog.

This, in turn, would probably place a priority upon gaining some access to the former intelligence services' records, or at least those of members wanted for or suspected of committing human rights abuses. Despite their present "liberal" orientation, the new governments in Eastern Europe increasingly seem unlikely to grant such security screening liaison for two reasons. First, because it would be seen as an infringement upon their nations sovereignty-except where those governments are already actively seeking former personnel abroad and require such documentation to attempt extradition. Second, these governments themselves are experiencing concerns over reviewing their former services' records due to the potential for further disruption of their societies.

If such former personnel manage to settle in Canada, whether by clandestine entry or by not reporting their former activities in their immigration application, a complex situation will evolve. While either action would require their extradition, there are no extradition treaties between Canada and the East European countries at present. Yet it is probable that there would be diplomatic pressure as well as domestic Canadian demand to return such "refugees" to their homelands for criminal prosecution. Extradition could be possible under either Canadian War crimes legislation or international anti-terrorist conventions to which Canada has subscribed. However, if the East European criminal penalties included capital punishment, Canada would be precluded by it own legislation from carrying out such an extradition.

The Canadian government has afforded residence to a large number of exiled opposition groupings as well as individual immigrants from a variety of Third World countries. As many of these countries experience human rights abuses and civil and regional strife, this pattern of political asylum and "open door" immigration can be expected to continue. Any enhanced capability by the intelligence services of their former homelands is likely to enable those governments to heighten their clandestine activities abroad, including harassment of exiled communities and even the use or threatened use of violence.

Similarly, Canada-as well as Canadian assets abroad-would be among the Western countries increasingly targeted for clandestine acquisition of economic intelligence and technology by the enhancement of some Third World intelligence services.

In view of the increasing international drug trade, any improved capability to penetrate Canada's borders and evade criminal investigations by groups involved in drug trafficking constitutes a substantially enhanced threat to Canadian society as a whole.

Into the 1990s

The East European countries have dealt with their inherited intelligence services in at least three different ways: violent ouster (the Securitate in Romania), structural dismantling (the Stasi in East Germany), and dissolution by decree (the Statni Bezpecnost in Czechoslovakia and the SB security police in Poland). But, in each of these cases, the new national governments have subsequently acknowledged the need for some form of state intelligence service(s) responsible for protecting government assets and preventing foreign interference in their national affairs.

Most ex-intelligence personnel in those countries are faced with a lack of domestic employment opportunities-including within the "new" intelligence services-as well as pending arrest and prosecution in many cases. As a result, they have made one or more of the following choices, probably in this order:

TEMPORARY COVER-According to foreign media reporting, members of the former intelligence services have gone underground within the country itself, hiding their past connections to avoid public reprisals. Some have obtained alternative employment under false identity-though living in fear of detection-or by using former records to blackmail the new governments.

It is possible some former intelligence personnel have sought temporary cover in a neighboring country. While close and convenient in geographic terms, there is the problem of differing ethnic and linguistic milieux, as well as the prospects of being arrested as a foreign spy. Even if this option were pursued, it would probably only constitute a "first refuge" to escape criminal arrest, and prior to attempting to enter a "country of choice" for clandestine settlement.

FOREIGN SANCTUARY-Depending on the extent of their "national crimes", level of their security service position and previous foreign links, some former members appear to have attempted to negotiate refuge in the Soviet Union, Cuba and possibly elsewhere when they have something of value to exchange. If such sanctuary in effect constituted a form of retirement, there is little prospect of heightened threat to other countries. But if these ex-intelligence personnel are used to enhance the capabilities of the existing intelligence services of the governments granting such sanctuary, it would generate increased concerns by traditionally targeted Western countries.

In view of the poor economic state of all the former communist countries, a number of ex-intelligence personnel will attempt to move to the West. Due to the political evolution in the region, however, Eastern Europeans in general are now viewed as "economic migrants" rather than "political refugees from communism" as was previously the case. As a result, former members will either attempt to disguise their past identity in order to apply for immigrant status or attempt a clandestine entry into a Western country-or possibly an offshore financial haven without extradition agreements and which offers them citizenship (and passport) in exchange for a substantial "local investment".

EMPLOYMENT IN THE THIRD WORLD-Over the past three decades, all of the former Eastern European intelligence services have maintained security relations at various levels of cooperation with a variety of Third World regimes, including Cuba, Vietnam, Libya, Syria, Iraq, Yemen, Algeria, Somalia, Sudan and Ethiopia. Those former personnel who participated in such bilateral relations-particularly structuring and training-will already possess domestic contacts and a good knowledge of local affairs. As these Third World services have been structured along similar lines to Eastern Bloc services, foreign "recruits" from Eastern Europe would be able to assimilate themselves in and enhance those services' capabilities.

Although media reports persist with stories of former Securitate members still conducting clandestine harassment within Romania, many fearing arrest and prosecution have fled. A number reportedly took refuge in Israel [Agence France Presse, 3 January 1990]. There were suggestions they obtained sanctuary in exchange for intelligence on former Middle East participants at paramilitary training courses conducted during the Ceausescu régime.

Among other Middle Eastern countries, Iraq and Syria, which both maintained intelligence links with the East Bloc services, are reported to have accepted some former intelligence personnel from Romania as well as East Germany. Syria and Israel are understood to be "offering less money but better fringe benefits" than Iraq [The Independent, London, 25 January 1990]. Even Saudi Arabia has been mentioned as expressing an interest informer personnel, despite being a regional target of their intelligence services. Further, as Iraq and Syria have been linked to international terrorist groups, it is possible to predict that, at the least, intelligence derived from such increased capabilities could be provided to such groupings.

Alternatively, other Third World countries including Angola and Mozambique, which similarly employed East Bloc services to train their domestic service, would find it counter-productive in terms of international perceptions to attempt such recruitment at present. As these regimes are actively pursuing Western commercial investment and development assistance, any reports as to recruitment of former intelligence personnel are likely to create perceptions of seeking enhanced domestic security and/or overseas intelligence capabilities. In addition to the negative impact on Western corporations as well as governments, such apparent intentions could lead to protests and counter-measures by their regional neighbours.

Although most Third World countries have not previously maintained security cooperation with the East Bloc services, some would be interested in acquiring skilled former members in an attempt to improve qualitatively the effectiveness of their own services. Such improvements could include more secure communications systems, strengthened domestic protection of government assets, or even enhancement of a foreign penetration capability. This would result in a "hardening" of possible sources available to foreign intelligence services as well as more intrusive targeting of foreign targets including exiled opposition groups.

EMPLOYMENT WITH INTERNATIONAL DRUG TRAFFICKERS-This employment possibility would be contingent upon the extent of prior contact with foreign drug cartels, such as in Europe, South and Central America, or South and Southeast Asia. It would also depend to what extent those cartels perceived it as beneficial to acquire the skills of ex-intelligence operatives, or whether those benefits are outweighed by the liability of permitting "outsiders" to penetrate their closely-knit organizational structures.

---

Commentary is a regular publication of the Analysis and Production Branch of CSIS. Inquires regarding submissions may be made to the Chairman of the Editorial Board at the following address:

The views expressed herein are those of the author, who may be contacted by writing to:

CSIS
P.O.Box 9732
Postal Station T
Ottawa, Ontario K1G 4G4
Fax: 613-842-1312

ISSN 1192-277X
Catalogue JS73-1/4