ARCHIVED: Commentary No. 8: Post-War Iraq, Gulf Security, and a "New World Order"

Commentary No. 8 has been archived.

Dr. W. G. Millward

February 1991
Unclassified

Editors Note: This issue of Commentary was written by Dr. W. Millward, the Strategic Analyst on the Middle East within the Analysis and Production (RAP) Branch of CSIS, as part of an on-going series on problems in the region.
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Disclaimer: Publication of an article in the Commentary series does not imply CSIS authentication of the information nor CSIS endorsement of the author's views.

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The Post-War Iraqi Government

In the early days of the Gulf war, it is impossible to predict with certainty how it will finish. Two main possibilities emerge. The anti-Iraq coalition will ultimately prevail, Iraq will be driven from Kuwait, defeated and subdued. Or Iraq may prove able to absorb a good deal of punishment and prolong the conflict for several months, and emerge with some of its military intact, thus enabling Saddam to claim that stalemate is again a kind of victory. Whether he himself survives such an outcome, he could conceivably achieve a degree of distinction as a hero of the Arab cause and martyr for Islamic ideas.

In the more likely outcome that Iraq is defeated on the battlefield, and obliged to accept the victors' terms, the key question will then be, in whose hands will the reins of government be held. Much will depend on whether Saddam Hussein himself survives a defeat, and how humiliating that defeat may prove to be. Since the removal of Hussein as leader of Iraq is not one of the declared aims of the UN authorized coalition assault, and since he is so well protected by personal bodyguards and the state security apparatus, his chances of survival are fair even if his military is ultimately defeated.

It cannot be assumed that if Saddam survives personally, he will be thoroughly discredited as a leader and be removed from office by other members of the party of government, the Ba'th, or by a military junta. In the wake of costly and punishing defeat, along with widespread collateral damage and civilian casualties from massive bombing, the Iraqi people would be inclined to react as the Egyptians did towards their leader, Gamal Abdel Nasser, in 1956 following the debacle of the Suez crisis, which turned him into a national and pan-Arab hero. Much will depend on how far the war is prosecuted and how the peace process is managed.

The most likely outcome of an Iraqi defeat, assuming it is swift and costly to Iraq, but not punishing to the general population, will be the general disillusionment of the Iraqi public with the ruling Ba'th Party as a legitimate vehicle of political authority. But since the influence of the party cadres is so pervasive in all sectors of society, and other parties have long since been outlawed or eliminated, it may be difficult to field a new government without a substantial role of the Ba'th.

The same sense of disappointment toward the armed forces will perhaps be tempered by the realization that the military odds against them were excessive in all categories. Since many of the ranking military commanders and party chiefs are relatives of Saddam, it would be reasonable to conclude that they will also be discredited along with him. Some sources have speculated that Barzan al-Takriti, the Iraqi UN ambassador in Geneva, would be a prime candidate to succeed Saddam as Iraq's head of state. How much credibility he could retain in the aftermath of an Iraqi defeat remains uncertain. It would seem more likely that Iraqis generally would wish to start anew and relieve themselves of the burden of Saddam's Takrti clan. How they could achieve this without significant outside help is unclear.

The shape of a post-war Iraqi government may well depend on ultimate allied war aims. Because of their tremendous advantages in military and technical power over Iraq, the range of options open to the United States and its coalition allies in relation to Iraq's future will be considerable if they choose to exercise them. Clear decisions will be required on how far to push the choice of options before the shooting stops. The removal of Iraq from Kuwait is a minimal objective. The destruction of Iraq's offensive military capacity, and of its nuclear, chemical and biological weapons programs, was announced by President Bush as part of the declared aims of Operation Desert Storm. The question for the coalition leadership and the U.N. remains: how far to carry the bombing campaign.

It is obvious that the total obliteration of Iraq's military capacity to defend itself would create a dangerous and destabilizing power vacuum in the region. The notion that Iraq could be made to disappear by carving it up and dividing the parts amongst its covetous neighbours can be dismissed on the grounds that it would create more problems than it would solve and would defeat one of the declared aims of the UN-sponsored coalition. Even excessive bombing and destruction in Baghdad and other urban centres, especially the sacred shrines of Shi'ism (Karbala, Kazimayn and Najaf), would create serious problems and antagonize Arab/Muslim opinion. Built in the eighth century, before Cairo, to serve as the administrative centre of the Abbasid caliphate, the "Round City" or the "City of Peace", became the intellectual and cultural capital of the Arab and Islamic world and remained so for ages. The Arabian [Thousand and One] Nights, though probably composed in Cairo, was situated in Baghdad. The city represents a major focus of the cultural heritage and patrimony of most Arabs, and its destruction would leave a bitter legacy in the Arab world.

Debate will continue on whether the coalition forces in the prelude to defeating Iraq on the battlefield should push the campaign inside Iraq and attempt to determine the nature and make-up of a new governmental structure. There may well be sound military reasons for taking Baghdad in the campaign to defeat the Iraqi regime of Saddam Hussein, but the task of picking up the pieces would best be left to the Iraqis themselves.

The risks involved in this course of action could be offset by the removal of grounds for any accusations of interference in the internal affairs of the vanquished, or the installation of a puppet regime. It is unrealistic to imagine that foreign or western political structures could be imposed on a country like Iraq even in the wake of a decisive defeat. Popular resentment toward the victors would be unnecessarily exacerbated by an imposed successor regime. And yet, some say in the determination of a new ruling authority in post-war Iraq should be available to the winning side, if only to preclude anarchy and guarantee that a revitalized Ba'th party government does not re-emerge in six months time. The best long-range prospect for dealing with future Iraqi regimes is by the balance-of-power/deterrence approach within the framework of a new regional security system.

The Opposition Role

Since the emergence of the Gulf crisis in August 1990, the Iraqi opposition groups in exile have been struggling to find ways of co-operating on plans for an alternative to the present Ba'th Party government. The opponents-in-exile have met several times since early October in Damascus, where their hosts were the rival Syrian Ba'th Party faction and the Iranian Embassy's agents and supporters. The dissident groups are: 1) The Islamic Front (consisting of six Muslim parties, led by Hizb al-Da'wa); 2) The Kurdistan Front (an alliance of six Kurdish parties including the Kurdish Democratic Party and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan); 3) The Communist Party; and 4) an assortment of former nationalist politicians and Ba'th Party dissidents. Should Saddam Hussein's regime fall in war, the alliance of these groups would like to be considered as a serious contender to replace it.

The hope that such an alliance could offer a viable alternative to the present government has never been great. Some faction leaders have not even bothered to attend meetings, and built-in friction arises from inherited differences in point of view and contending claims to dominant leadership roles. The Islamic component claims, plausibly, to represent a majority of the Iraqi population, but the secular groups are suspicious that what they would like to establish is an Islamic state on the pattern of their co-religionists in Iran. As long as Muhammad Baqir al-Hakim, head of the Supreme Council of the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI) resides in Tehran, this suspicion cannot be easily dispelled. The Islamic groups, for their part, are fearful that the Kurdish alliance partners want initially to achieve autonomy and eventually break away fully from a post-Saddam Iraq.

These disparate groups have had difficulty reaching agreement on common principles and policies. A declaration issued in Damascus in December affirmed their commitment to a multi-party Iraq; an interim government of all parties to draft a new constitution; guaranteed political and religious freedoms; respect for human rights; and autonomy for Kurds in the north. While basic positions are agreed there are differences over details. The al-Da'wa faction, under the leadership of Sa'id Hussein al-Sadr, wants a provisional government which lasts six months before elections are held; Kurdish groups on the other hand favour an interim government lasting two years. One of the basic polarization's inside this alliance is between Shi'i religious groups and the communists, which makes full agreement on a common program unlikely [FBIS, January 16, 1991].

The Iraqi opposition to Saddam Hussein includes other groups which are not formally part of the above-mentioned alliance. One of these is the Iraqi Umma Party formed under the leadership of Sa'd Salih Jabr in London in late October. Purporting to be an independent political movement believing in human rights, individual and social freedom, respect for the sovereignty of neighbouring countries, and for international law, this group has emphasized its opposition to Saddam's brutal treatment of the Iraqi people generally but especially the way he has humiliated the military.

These opposition groups were scheduled to meet in London on 18 January 1991 with the intention of announcing a provisional government there, and awaiting an opportunity of returning to Iraq. For a variety of reasons, high-level meetings among all these groups did not take place. A communiqué issued in Beirut on 17 January announced that urgent contacts were being held between the opposition and some Iraqi Army commanders to form a national salvation government in Iraq. The international community was urged to differentiate between the Iraqi people and the dictatorship clique responsible for the current disaster [FBIS, January 18, 1991]. It remains to be seen what kind of welcome the opposition will find in post-war Iraq. Any putative alternative to the present government will need to keep its pedigree pure and free from the taint of unsavoury associations. The fact that these movements have been hosted by states who are full members of the Multinational Force and co-belligerents against Iraq will not help their credibility with the Iraqi public.

Redrawing the Regional Power Balance

The first casualty of the Iraqi invasion and annexation of Kuwait was the Arab inter-state system. The move revealed in dramatic fashion all the rivalries, contradictions and conflicts of interest in the Arab world and the region as a whole. The veneer of consensus on regional security rules was shattered by the not-quite unprecedented conquest and takeover of one Arab country by another. Despite the existence of various co-operation schemes and mutual defence pacts, and a declared common enemy, fundamental differences abound and are now out in the open for all to see. All the old alliances and unions have been visibly weakened; some completely destroyed.

The Arab League summit in Cairo on 10 August 1990 was a dramatic failure in the sense that it polarized existing divisions even further, and alienated countries like Yemen by the use of intimidation and high pressure tactics to ram through resolutions and deny dissenting views a hearing. The old relationships of the Arab Co-operation Council and Gulf Co-operation Council are in tatters, while the Arab League and the Arab Maghreb Union have been severely strained. The Palestinian cause has suffered a severe setback in the aftermath of the crisis, and Lebanon is on the verge of economic collapse. Jordan is politically and economically in a precarious position.

In whatever way the war is concluded, because of its role in support of the UN resolutions on Kuwait, Egypt's post-war fortunes depend very much on its outcome. President Mabarak's credibility in the Arab world after the war will be diminished if Iraq is left a smoking ruin. As with a number of other countries in the region, the war has placed a strain on Egypt's already fragile economy and may oblige the Gulf states to revise their favourable estimates of Egypt's economic future. Algeria, Jordan, Yemen, Tunisia and the PLO now have reason to reconsider their confidence in Egypt, under Hosni Mubarak's leadership, as the defender of regional Arab interests.

Several Middle Eastern political observers and commentators have noted that the Saudi government's recourse to U.S. aid for its own defence sets a dangerous precedent for the region. Reaction in Islamic circles in both Saudi Arabia and elsewhere toward the admission that King Fahd, the defender of Islam and the haramayn (the two holy sanctuaries-Mecca and Medina), is dependent on the kuffar (unbelievers) for the performance of his duty has been generally negative [Crescent International, January 16-24, 1991 - Editorial]. This move also proves beyond doubt the inadequacy of previous inter-regional security plans and the pressing need for a redefinition of regional strategic issues and power relationships. It raises the crucial question of the role which outside powers and interests should/will play in the new regional alignments. The views of important non-Arab players such as Iran, which are known to be inimical, will also play a central role.

The crisis and its war finale present the West and the world as a whole, and particularly the U.S. as the dominant world power, with a dilemma; whether to be content with the retention of power by the Iraqi leader, in the event he survives "the mother of battles", and try to live with an Iraq capable of renewing its power by containing its ability to use that power for aggressive ends through some new regional security pact; or, to insist on Saddam Hussein's total defeat and unconditional surrender, his removal from power in Iraq, and the destruction of the country's military resources and industrial power base. However the war is resolved, a new regional security arrangement will be urgently required. With or without Saddam, Iraq will need to be centrally involved in its formulation.

Historical Reprise

One of the obvious weaknesses of the pre-crisis regional system was Iraq's disproportionate isolation relative to its power and potential. Historically the problem of regime legitimacy in Iraq derived chiefly from its external (colonial) origins. "A pariah from the times of Nuri al-Sa'id and the Baghdad Pact, even the post-revolutionary Iraqi regimes have been hard pressed to find friends, much less partners". [Michael C. Hudson, Arab Politics, Yale University Press 1979, p. 279]. Although it has seen itself as the vanguard state in the cause of Arab unity, Iraq was paradoxically the only Arab oil exporter not to participate in the 1973-74 boycott.

The Baghdad Pact was called into being in 1955 as a response to the perceived military threat of the Soviet Union and the declared communist aim of world domination. The regional states whose security was most at risk from this threat were those of the so-called "northern tier"-Iran, Iraq, Turkey and Pakistan-who were joined as member states by a non-regional and former imperial power, the United Kingdom. The alliance, basically a military and strategic defence agreement, had headquarters in Baghdad. The United States agreed to assume an observer status but in practice became a full member of most committees and took an active role in the affairs of the alliance. Following the revolution of 1958 in Iraq and the fall of the Hashemite monarchy, Iraq formally withdrew from the Baghdad pact, which was subsequently renamed The Central Treaty Organization (CENTO), based in Ankara and still committed to its original aims. Many Iraqis, and other Arabs, will recall with some irony that the two principal forces lined up against Iraq in the gulf today are its former non-regional allies in the Baghdad Pact.

Other factors have contributed to Iraq's inability in recent years to assert a role in the region commensurate with its resources and potential. A preoccupation with national priorities and domestic issues such as power-sharing has tended to separate Iraq from its natural partners in the pan-Arab cause, Egypt and Syria. Questions of ideology and political philosophy (Ba'th Socialism) have proven a barrier to closer relations with more conservative regimes in the Arabian peninsula. Long-standing rivalry with non-Arab Iran was a further impediment to Iraq's asserting a larger role in regional political and security counsels. The Islamic revolution in Iran in 1978-79 and the departure of Iran's Pahlavi monarchy, seen by many as a bulwark for western interests in the region, changed all the cold calculus and seemed to offer Iraq and its leaders an unexpected chance to claim its "rightful" position in future deliberations.

The Iran-Iraq war of 1980-88 put a new strain on the already fragile and lopsided regional balance of power. The relative weight of Iran in the region, which unlimited arms transfers authorized in the early 1970's by the Nixon administration had created, was reluctantly accepted by the pragmatic Saddam Hussein of the time, in the Algiers agreement of 1975. But Iran's Islamic revolution presented new opportunities to the Iraqi leadership to assert a larger regional role at Iran's expense. In the process Saddam Hussein could pose as the champion of Arab unity against the challenge of Aryan (non-Arab) Iran, and at the same time, the defender of Sunni Islamic orthodoxy against the scourge of aggressive Shi'i Islamic fundamentalism. Despite a consistent policy of opposition to territorial adjustment by military means, in the early stages of the Iran-Iraq war the United States departed from its established position and opted for a stance of "neutrality" in relation to Saddam Hussein's attack on his eastern neighbour [Richard Falk, "America's Pro- Iraqi Neutrality", The Nation, October 25, 1980]. There was of course the undeniable fact that the existence of the American hostages then being held in Tehran made Saddam's aggression seem less reprehensible.

Partly as a response to the threat of forces set in motion by the Islamic Revolution in Iran in 1978- 79, and partly out of panic at the prospect of an escalating war on their doorstep, the Co- operation Council for the Arab States of the Gulf (GCC) was established on May 25, 1981, by six Arab peninsula states: Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. The Constitution of the GCC describes the purpose of the organization as providing "the means for realizing co-ordination, integration, and co-operation" in economic, social and cultural spheres. Economic co-operation was clearly a cornerstone of the new body's activities, but the security of the member states and their petroleum industry was the primary concern. The Defence Ministers met in January 1982 to discuss a common security policy including joint air defence systems, joint service exercises, standardization of weapons, and a central command structure for a rapid deployment force against external aggression.

The GCC states approved UNSC resolution 598 urging Iran and Iraq to settle their differences through negotiation, but could not agree on a common policy to improve relations with Iran. When the first serious threat to the collective security of the GCC came from another Arab state, rather than Iran, the facilities and arrangements in place were totally inadequate to counter it. In August 1990 the Ministerial Council issued a statement condemning Iraq's invasion of Kuwait and demanding its withdrawal. The rationale and viability of the GCC as a regional security structure has been called into question by the Gulf war.

As the Iran-Iraq war continued inconclusively, and Iraq's indebtedness to its wealthy Arab neighbours grew astronomically, progressive disenchantment with Iraq as guarantor of regional security requirements set in. With Iran's acceptance of the cease-fire agreement sponsored by the Security Council resolution 598 in July 1988, the basic sources of rivalry and conflict with Iraq were left unresolved. Saddam Hussein and his government have repeatedly claimed that the war ended in a virtual victory for Iraq. Viewed from a less biased perspective, the war ended in an effective stalemate, but a net loss for both sides.

As the means of consolidating his pan-Arab strength and reinforcing his claims against Iran, President Saddam Hussein of Iraq joined with the leaders of Egypt, Jordan and North Yemen in the formation of the Arab Co-operation Council (ACC) in Baghdad on February 16, 1989. This move was widely regarded as a further step in Egypt's re-integration into the Arab world after a long period of isolation for having signed the Camp David agreements. With a population of roughly 80,000,000 the ACC became the largest of three Arab groupings in population terms, but the smallest in terms of total gross domestic product.

Although the ACC aimed to achieve gradual economic integration, and membership was open to all Arab states, the four founding leaders also agreed to establish a joint defence pact to allow the armed forces of the other members to come to the aid of any state that might be attacked. Egypt, Jordan and North Yemen had all assisted Iraq in its long war with Iran. The Iraqi attack on Kuwait on 2 August 1990 and its aftermath have illustrated the failure of the regional security expectations engendered by this alliance, which is now in ruins.

Due to the pressures of the Gulf crisis in its early stages, Saddam Hussein found it expedient to accede to all Iran's demands in a final settlement of the war. But this action in itself underlines the prospect that any new Iraqi government that might succeed Saddam will have to deal with the unresolved issues between the two countries by accepting his concessions or insisting on re- negotiating. It was this consideration that urged the Iranian authorities to seek a formal written settlement with the Iraqi government on all outstanding problems before a war could begin. Such an arrangement would also guarantee Iran a larger say in the post-war deliberations over any new security structure for the gulf region.

A New Regional Security System: The Shape of Things to Come

The shape of a new regional security system will depend on several contingencies. Differences of opinion among the members of the multilateral coalition on how far the war option should be carried if pursued in the post-war period will pose problems in establishing any new regional order. While the Saudis seem to insist on total war, including military occupation by the victors, the Egyptians are very wary of any military activity beyond Kuwait's borders. Several recent statements from French officials appear to take the same position. Without careful military co- ordination, the conduct of the war could prejudice the final settlement and future security arrangements. The Saudi concept of dealing with Iraq after the war in the way the reconstruction of Germany after World War II was handled will complicate post-settlement relations amongst the Arab forces presently aligned against Iraq.

What appears to worry many observers in that the United States, as the leader of the Multinational Force, does not have a blueprint for what comes after the shooting stops, or if it has, it has not been forthcoming about its content [Guardian Weekly, January 20, 1991, p.21]. It is a truism that wars have unintended consequences that cannot be foreseen before hostilities begin, but without clear agreement on allied objectives, including a plan for post-war reconstruction, the chances of such consequences are increased. Once the war option has been exercised the goal of any post-war plan should be to remove the political, economic and security causes of the instability that let to the fighting. Contrary to what happened in Europe after World War II, that aim in the Middle East region after the Gulf War will not be as easy to accomplish. Winning the war will be difficult enough, but winning the peace will be even more so. The temptation remains to blur the distinction between a war to liberate Kuwait from annexation and a war to subjugate Iraq.

Gulf security is the concern of all the regional parties in he first instance, and of certain international interests as well. One of the basic difficulties in finding a satisfactory post-war formula for security in the region is the fact that (at least) one of the principal players does not admit the legitimacy of international interests to an extent that would countenance a continued foreign military presence in the region for security purposes. The Islamic Republic of Iran has adopted the view that the security of the gulf region is the business of the gulf states and no one else. According to this view, the regional states are the only ones capable of defining and providing for their security needs. Outsiders should keep a respectful distance. This position is in direct conflict with the expressed views of some western governments, especially in Europe and Japan, where dependence on Gulf energy is highest.

International and regional concerns with Gulf security are clearly not identical. Each party naturally defines the problem from the perspective of its own special interests. This suggests that perspectives on the concept of security, whatever its particular object, are relative and changeable. While American and Western interests in Gulf security may emphasize stability and safe access to oil supplies, it will be necessary to consult broadly with all the regional states to arrive at harmony of interests. The goal should be to identify a common core of basic values and interests vis-à-vis the larger question and try to build an international consensus which emphasizes symmetry and congruence. Differences should be minimized and compromises may be called for. In this regard, the United States will have to convince the regional parties that it has not been enlarging its military presence in the Persian Gulf in the hope of establishing a permanent presence there.

Preserving the physical safety of the people of the region, and their property, from attack and destruction, guaranteeing their territorial integrity, protecting their natural wealth from plunder and waste, and assuring their economic well-being, cultural integrity, and political independence in the world system, are some of the key elements of an Arab concept of security [Dr. Usama al- Ghazali Harb, al-Ahram al-Duwali, September 26, 1990, p.9]. Most Western states and other members of the United Nations would find little if anything to quarrel with in this definition. There could well be here a common core of congruent interests amongst Arabs and other members of the world community on the concept of security as it applies to the Persian Gulf region. But this could only be established after extensive bilateral and multilateral consultations. What is undeniable is that this definition was threatened and violated by the Iraqi invasion and annexation of Kuwait.

Once Iraqi forces have been expelled from Kuwait and practical steps have been taken to restore its legitimate government, a peacekeeping force will be needed to preclude an Iraqi return and guarantee Kuwait's continuing integrity. These forces would replace the USA-led MNF and should consist primarily of Arab and other Muslim units. Since the combined military forces of the peninsula states themselves would not be adequate to perform this task, Egyptian and Pakistani troops are the most likely candidates to fill this role, although there will be some objections raised to such an arrangement. In September last year the interim government in Pakistan proposed the creation of a pan-Islamic force that could include troops from as far away as Indonesia. A spin-off benefit of this arrangement for the Pakistanis and Egyptians would be the badly needed foreign exchange which the Kuwaitis, Saudis and other peninsula states would provide. Such an arrangement would permit an early withdrawal of foreign forces either to their home bases in Europe and North America or to offshore stations on ships in the Arabian sea, and Diego Garcia.

Future Gulf security discussions and colloquies, whether in bilateral talks or through Gulf Co- operation Council and Arab League meetings, will be likely to feature several basic principles and premises. One of these is bound to be the notion that in achieving Gulf security and stability the initiative should rest with the Arab and other Gulf states themselves. What they might decide to do in the event of an emergency, in the framework of calling on external help, should be discussed and settled in advance. Detailed long-range planning is a sine qua non. Since it is improbable that a massive deployment of foreign forces could be staged each time the Gulf states' security is threatened, forces provided by the Arab and other Gulf states themselves, or by outside parties acceptable to all, should be the main line of defence.

Another principle will be the need to address the question of gulf security in relation to security in the region as a whole. After the war, dealing with the larger question of Israeli-Palestinian and Israeli-Arab relations will become an urgent priority for the world community. Canada could play a leading role in bringing this issue forward at the United Nations and in other international forums. In the absence of a final resolution of these outstanding disputes, including agreements on arms reductions, arms supply controls and the principle of parity, the Arab and Gulf states will continue to regard Israel as the main threat to their security.

A third principle that will engage the attention of those involved in the creation of a new Gulf security structure is the broad issue of political and social change in the region. The western participants in the MNF will have an exceptional opportunity, once a settlement is achieved, to advocate the introduction of measures to modernize the political systems of the peninsula and broaden participation in the decision-making process. Steps should be taken to promote pluralism and liberalize the rules governing nationality, and the status of foreigners or guest workers. The days of the feudal emirs and shaykhs cannot be prolonged unchanged without adverse effects on the process of political development, which in turn would contribute to stability and security. This is not a case for the uncritical transplantation of western democracy. There can be no doubt that reforms will have to be finely tuned and proceed slowly, but some evidence of movement in this direction will be needed to satisfy the emerging educated bureaucratic and professional intelligentsia in many of the Gulf states.

A more practical plan to provide a framework for these changes has been suggested by the Qatari writer and intellectual, Dr. Ali Khalifa al-Kawari. In his opinion, the first step should be the creation of a Federal Constitutional Union of the states of the Arabian peninsula, using the model of Europe in 1992, the basis for which has already been provided in the preamble to the political charter of the Gulf Co-operation Council. In declaring a federal union the High Council of the GCC could draw on the Kuwaiti Constitution of 1962 and the Bahraini Constitution of 1972, with suitable revision, for a new constitution that would provide legitimacy and legality for the new political structure. Within this framework it would then be possible to address the need for political, economic, social and cultural change in order to prepare the region and its people for the twenty-first century and the post oil era. The formative agents of change would be the insistence on the democratic method, as implied in the Islamic principle of shura (consultation), and on human rights as the guarantor of equality and social justice. Only in this way can the peninsula states provide for their own collective security and development. [al-Ahram al-Duwali, December 20, 1990. p.6].

Breathing life into a new regional political system will not be an easy task. Much of the difficulty stems from the unavoidable reality that the social and political values of the peninsula states are in a process of transition between ideal/traditional standards and the practical/modernizing norms required for life in the contemporary world. The deserts of Arabia are not the plains of Picardy, nor the fertile fields of the Egyptian delta, and the only boundaries that Arabia's nomads acknowledged were written on men's hearts in response to the needs of leadership, allegiance and human authority. The primary determinants of boundaries in Arabia of 1920 were tribal solidarity ('asabiyya) and the leadership of a strong chief named Abdul Aziz ibn Abdul Rahman Al-Sa'ud, who united much of the peninsula under his own rule long before he died in November 1953.

The discovery of oil in Saudi Arabia in the early 1930's foreshadowed a world where such natural resources would necessitate the definition of precise national boundaries. But there are still no precise boundaries in many parts of the Arabian peninsula and many unresolved disputes. It is by now a cliché that the old ways of the essentially pastoral nomadic society of Arabia are gone. But it is also true that they have not gone completely, and the values that supported the old ways are still widely respected, even if not fully observed. In the meantime, Arabians have to accommodate themselves to the demands of the old and the new side by side, and make their own individual adjustments.

A further element in the broad spectrum of concerns related to a new security structure for the Gulf region is the economic question. This has two principal dimensions; the obvious need faced by some countries in the region for economic aid to compensate for losses sustained as a direct consequence of the crisis. Jordan alone will need massive aid to help rescue it from further stagnation and possible collapse. The United Nations has already underwritten the additional costs that Jordan will incur from the probable influx of more refugees from the war zone. Further guarantees will have to be provided by the wealthy Arab states, which will no doubt require them to forget their resentment over Jordan's position during the crisis and the war. [Words have special power to wound in Arabic and the gulf crisis name-calling has left many injured egos that will have to be healed by reconciliation]. The other dimension is the need that some observers have identified to distribute the mineral wealth of the Arab world more evenly among all its members.

What is really required is a full-scale Arab version of the Marshall Plan to assist in the process of economic recovery and reconstruction, and the promotion of broader economic justice for all. In 1983 the General Secretariat of the GCC submitted a brief to its Planning Commission which was designed to serve as a broad strategy of development for the whole region. Such a program is desirable to help promote social stability and security, and would also tend to pre-empt part of the appeal of the Islamic fundamentalist movement.

A viable security structure for the Gulf region would obviously have to be built on several layers of consensus by the states with direct or indirect interests in the area. The foundation layer will require agreement between the three main power centres bearing on the Gulf itself; Iran, Iraq and the peninsula states (separately or in some kind of federal union). These three groups will have to reach a clear agreement on the basic principles of what constitutes stability and security for all who live in the region. A precondition would be the need for all to forego their former or current hegemonic ambitions. Co-operation and interdependence would have to be the operative principles. A second tier of states with interests in the region would probably include Syria, Egypt and Turkey. The concerns of other regional powers and foreigners with commercial interest in the gulf would also have to be factored into any new balance of power arrangements for the region.

Post-crisis Gulf Security and a "New World Order"

Since the crisis in the Persian Gulf began on 2 August 1990, there have been numerous public references to the threat and the challenge it represents to an emerging "new world order". For most of those who have used this phrase, its primary reference is the new international environment made possible by the thawing of the Cold War, and the co-operation of the two superpowers in dealing with world problems, especially threats to regional security. According to US Secretary of State James Baker, the Gulf Crisis occurred at a defining moment in contemporary history, when the new spirit of co-operation between former adversaries made possible the reactivation of the United Nations as a vehicle for solving world problems and preserving peace. Giving an international spin to the doctrine of original intent, many observers were quick to point out that the United Nations might now finally be able to function the way its founders had initially hoped. For those who had been present at creation, the vistas conjured up by this phrase had great emotional appeal.

With the Soviet Union on side the United States was able to persuade nearly thirty nations, from a total UN membership of 159, to join in the job of giving effect to UN Security Council resolution 678, designed to roll back the Iraqi aggression and restore Kuwait to its former sovereignty by force if necessary. All the peninsula states except Yemen have forces participating in the multinational coalition against Iraq. All the continents are represented, but the absence of contingents from the USSR and the other populous nations of South Asia suggests that the war effort is not an entirely balanced UN undertaking. Other states who voted for resolution 678 are supporting the UN objectives morally and financially. China's approval of the resolution was widely hailed as a favourable omen for the future.

These facts indicate there is a broad international consensus of support on the intergovernmental level for the punitive aspects of the present campaign against Iraq. How far coalition action should be carried beyond removing Iraq from Kuwait was left unspecified. The vision of a brave new world remains somewhat cloudy and its ultimate goals have not been spelled out in detail, but the basic ideas that revolved around the messianic and apocalyptic phrase were widely shared. In the context of the Gulf crisis the implication was clear that in a new world order large and powerful states would not be able to simply swallow up smaller ones. Aggressively inclined dictators would not be able to get away with bully boy behaviour by relying on the Cold War to block remedial or restraining action. The strong would be obliged to respect the rights of the weak, and the rule of law would prevail over the law of the jungle. Brave words backed by strong action engender large expectations.

The broad consensus of the international community in condemning Iraq and the deployment of a large multinational military armada in the Gulf did not prevent both foreign and domestic criticism of the enterprise as an expression of new world order. Foreigners and some domestic critics of the war were quick to claim that the US was simply using the UN as an instrument of its own foreign policy in a highly volatile part of the world. The US initiative, it was argued, was proof that the bipolar world of the old order had been replaced by a unipolar world in which the United States was the sole remaining hegemonic power. This power would henceforth be used to achieve objectives which might not coincide with a UN majority. What seemed to bother some domestic critics was the lack of interest on the part of the USA in putting US troops under a UN command, because, it was alleged, this would mean surrendering American control over how they were used. "...the President seems to envision the United Nations somewhere between a fig leaf and a negotiating body, rather than as the organization that will guarantee the peace". [Trudy Rubin, Knight-Ridder Newspapers, The (Montreal) Gazette, 15 September 1990, p.B3].

Long before the war began, many western observers of the gulf crisis were calling attention to the dangers of the war option for the peace and stability of the region, and the threat it posed to the idea of a new world order. Recognizing the need to restrain Saddam Hussein, a leader who had grossly violated the fundamental rights of nations, did not prevent many from predicting that chaos would follow the exercise of the war solution. "Far from seeing a new world, we see the world familiar to a hundred generations simply being transferred to a new and quite unstable location". [Hugo Young, "Bush's global vision that a war could destroy", Manchester Guardian Weekly, September 23, 1990]. In Middle East wars, the larger the army the higher the casualties, and the longer they last the greater the political and cultural fallout. It is now conventional wisdom that the war must be brought to a rapid conclusion.

A basic given of the Gulf conflict has been the fundamental dichotomy of political perceptions and cultural parameters between the two sides. In the Arab and Muslim world there isn't much enthusiasm for the notion of a new world order so heroically heralded in the West. While it may not be dismissed out of hand as a red herring designed to conceal its true identity as an updated version of neocolonialism, there is great suspicion that the East-West rapprochement is being misinterpreted as a potential panacea and model for the future of North-South relations. The rules governing East-West rapprochement are portrayed as being universal in character, but the South is well aware that they are being formulated by those in the North who represent less than one quarter of humankind.

While most Arabs would not deny that Saddam's regime is one of the most repressive in the world, their perceptions of the "new world order" have been heavily conditioned by their frustration at apparent Arab impotence in confronting massive Soviet Jewish immigration to Israel. Applied to the context of the Gulf crisis, Saddam, as the apparent challenger of Western or Northern hegemony, becomes an automatic hero. A respected Egyptian columnist wonders why it should follow that the new international legitimacy, which categorically opposes the annexation of any member state of the United Nations by another, is binding on states which are not present at creation and were not consulted when it came to laying down the ground rules governing this new legitimacy. [Mohamed Sid-Ahmed, Middle East Report, January/February 1991, p.17].

The failure to condemn outright Saddam's annexation of Kuwait, and now the gathering support he is gaining from many Arabs as the champion of their cause, are conditioned by apprehensions that the military buildup in the Gulf cannot be explained primarily in terms of defending international legitimacy. It is widely believed that the real issue is access to oil at predictable prices, an issue which engages primarily Western or Northern interests. Support for Saddam suggests that the new world order has so far failed to offer the Third World a vision that it can believe in. The UN and its founding members have a very large selling job to do if they wish to include more of the Arab and Muslim states and their populations as committed participants in the new order.

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