ARCHIVED: Commentary No. 25: A Change of Government in Israel: New Promise for the Peace Process?

Commentary No. 25 has been archived.

Dr. Wm. Millward

September 1992
Unclassified

Editors Note: Despite a new mood of relative optimism attending the resumption of talks on the Middle East, the peace process still remains vulnerable on a number of fronts: the contentious Israeli settlements; the strength of Mr. Rabin's coalition; the extremist enemies of peace on both sides; and of course, the results of the American presidential election in November.

In his continuing series on the Middle East, Dr. Wm. Millward, a Strategic Analyst in the Analysis and Production Branch of CSIS, weighs each of these factors and draws his conclusions as to the most credible scenario for the future of the peace process.

Disclaimer: Publication of an article in the Commentary series does not imply CSIS authentication of the information nor CSIS endorsement of the author's views.

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An important factor behind the revival of the Middle East peace process last October in Madrid was the radically altered political and geo-strategic reality in the region following the Gulf War. Broader changes in the international environment with the disappearance of old East-West animosities seemed to indicate that a new atmosphere had developed in which even the bitter and long-standing Arab-Israeli dispute could be usefully revisited. At the time there was no shortage of cynics and pessimists to argue that the Middle East dispute was a special case, that it was impervious to resolution regardless of dramatic changes around the world, and there was therefore no real point in wasting energy and resources trying to jump-start the process of Arab-Israeli negotiations, which had failed so often in the past that they could be aptly described as "futile diplomacy".

But for many good reasons the peace process was revived in Madrid with high hopes following the Coalition victory against Iraq. There were five separate sessions of talks from the Madrid opener to the final round at the end of May this year. They nonetheless failed to produce anything even approaching serious discussion of, let alone agreement on, issues between the two sides: armistice and troop withdrawal agreements, future mutual security arrangements, definition of borders, and broader regional issues such as water-sharing, non-proliferation and the right of return for refugees. The key issue is the question of land and who controls it; how much of the land won by Israel on the battlefield since 1948 is it now prepared to cede back to the Palestinians, Jordanians, Lebanese and Syrians in exchange for assurance of peace, backed by international guarantees?

The Middle East peace process has been hobbled for years by many obstacles, including the need to accommodate itself to the exigencies of national elections, either in Israel itself, or in the United States, still the chief sponsor and arbiter of the process. A further round of talks, the first since the installation of the new Israeli government, began in the last week in August in Washington. Unless the negotiations produce unanticipated progress, they are unlikely to be followed by more serious discussion until after the U.S. elections in November.

Considered historically, the democratic ritual of elections and the changes they entail have seemed to many observers to be an excuse for postponing action on resolving the basic dispute for more than 40 years. But the American election of 1976 produced new leadership that made the Camp David talks and accords possible. In view of its essential role as sponsor of the talks, the results of the U.S. presidential election in November could have a dramatic impact on the future of the peace process.

Canada's Role

As good friends and trading partners of people on both sides of the Middle East's most divisive and persistent dispute, Canadians have a long history of involvement in mediation efforts, peacekeeping activities and the creation of forums and mechanisms that facilitate communication and advance the chances for eventual reconciliation. The instinctive Canadian predisposition to compromise as the best method of resolving disputes has long been expressed, in the case of the Arab-Israeli conflict, through the medium of the United Nations and its agencies and the international consensus they represent. This tradition was reflected in Canada's role as host in Ottawa in mid-May of the Refugee Working Group, a meeting of 35 countries to discuss issues such as family reunification, vocational training and job creation, public health and a complete data base on refugees [Ottawa Citizen, 16 May 1992]. Provided there is sufficient interest and willingness to attend, Canada will no doubt continue to serve as host to the next meeting of this group sometime in November.

A New Government in Israel: Labour replaces Likud

The results of the recent Israeli election have increased optimism about the prospects for serious peace negotiations in the near future, and an eventual agreement, nine months to a year hence, on "some sort" (hitherto undefined) of autonomy for the Palestinians in Gaza and the West Bank. Deservedly or not, the Likud party under Yitzhak Shamir had established itself in Israeli and international public opinion as the cause of rigidity and immobility in the peace process by its reluctance to discuss real autonomy for the Palestinians in the occupied territories, and of alienation in American-Israeli relations by its policy of aggressive settlement construction there.

There are many ways of interpreting the Israeli election results and the reasons for the significant, if not revolutionary, shift in voter motivation. After 15 years of Likud dominance, alone or in paralysing national unity coalitions, many voters may have felt it was time for a change for change's sake. With the economy relatively stagnant, unemployment at an all-time high, especially amongst new immigrants, immigration slowing and emigration rising, a critical housing shortage, a rising level of friction with the Palestinians, whose intifada had crossed the Green line into Israel itself, and a peace process obviously going nowhere, there were many good and sufficient reasons for voters to conclude that Likud had simply been in office far too long. The time had come to put an end to the complacency and indecisiveness that inevitably surround the prolonged exercise of power.

A New Leader-New Priorities

Before the recent election the new Israeli leader-Mr. Rabin-presented himself and his party's program as offering Israelis a new deal, a new set of positions, policies and domestic priorities. First on the list was a commitment to a continuous process of negotiation with the Palestinians in an attempt to reach a political solution as rapidly as possible. The major elements of the Labour offer in this regard were to facilitate the holding of elections amongst West Bank and Gaza Strip Palestinians, leading to a form of limited autonomy. By encouraging the election and entrenchment of a local leadership that is more sensitive to Israeli psychological and security needs, the new government could further marginalize the role of the PLO in the daily affairs of Palestinians enjoying a limited form of self-government. But this autonomy would not amount to an independent Palestinian state, to which Mr. Rabin is apparently opposed on principle. The Israeli government would not cede control over East Jerusalem, the Jordan Valley, the Golan Heights, or the passes up to the West Bank watershed.

On the subject of the contentious Israeli settlements on Palestinian land, Mr. Rabin proposed a halt to what he called "political" settlements, and a diversion of the funds to infrastructure development and the creation of more jobs for new immigrants. "Security"settlements would continue, however, or be expanded as the need arose. The distinction between the two types of settlement may turn out to be crucial. It could be argued that a "security" settlement is a contradiction in terms. Land which has to be secured militarily and strategically requires military outposts and ordinance emplacements set up by the Ministry of Defence, but not population centres implied in the word settlement. The so-called "bedroom communities" in the West Bank, Elon Moreh and Kfar Adumim for example, which have no military or religious rationale, may fit the category of "political" settlement in everyone's lexicon. The semantic pitfalls of the term "political" in relation to settlements are not merely an issue in Israeli domestic ideological battles. The pejorative connotation of "political" as "a settlement that does not involve any economic benefit or security purpose, and the point of which is none other than to create facts in the field", is a definition that many doctrinaire Zionist Israelis will be unable to accept. [Shmu'el Schnitzer: "Petah Tiqvah Was a Political Settlement" -FBIS-JPRS-NEA June 10, 1992. p.2] But Mr. Rabin's real challenge will be to reach agreement on the meaning of a "security" settlement with the Palestinians, in the first instance, and the Americans as well.

Many observers of the Israeli political stage view the future of the peace talks as contingent on the character and leadership qualities of the new Prime Minister. As a long-time Labour insider, former Prime Minister and Minister of Defence, the new leader is a familiar figure in Israeli public life and a known quantity. Although he may not talk about the Jews having an historical and moral right to Eretz Israel, he may well believe it without feeling a need to say so. Be that as it may, he is security conscious and believes that a return to Israel's pre-1967 borders would complicate its defence.

Much has been made of the personal role of Mr. Rabin in the campaign and the extent to which he himself can be credited with the Labour victory. Israel watchers appeared to agree that the Labour leader is a gruff, taciturn, no-nonsense individual, essentially lacking in the attributes of political charisma that frequently dominates elections in the West. But this was no disadvantage in comparison with the Likud leader. Some supporters even made a virtue of his stolidity. It showed that he was serious and unwilling to play to the galleries. Instead he was portrayed as a wise, experienced, dependable and trustworthy figure, even if not telegenic and charismatic. He could be trusted to steer the ship of state through its problems and difficulties without giving away the store.

Voters turned to Rabin and Labour in such numbers because of the centrist values he is said to epitomize. "Rabin is a competent and trustworthy man, a soldier and a diplomat, who understands the security needs of their country, and who will calculate the requirements of that security without reference to ideology. He is a sabra [a Jew born in Palestine], a national hero [whose] roles in the 1948 War of Independence and the 1967 Six Day War are part of Israel's folklore as well as its history." [Michael Neiditch, Christian Science Monitor, July 2, 1992].

Other features of Rabin's character much emphasized in assessing the reasons for Labour's rout of Likud are his capacity for realism and willingness to cut a deal. As an old soldier he has an eye for the strategic advantage. In the peace negotiations "Rabin is more likely to be galvanized, where Shamir was paralysed, by the Arab's arrival-following Egypt's earlier lead-at an American-set peace table. He'll deal." [Stephen S. Rosenfeld, Guardian Weekly, July 5, 1992]. Many analysts stressed the important advantage Mr. Rabin, as Israel's former ambassador in Washington, held over his rival in a much more subtle understanding of Americans and their social and political systems.

The other dimension of Mr. Rabin's character vital to his success as Israel's leader in critical situations is his attitude to the job of Prime Minister as chief executive officer. While in theory the Israeli political system promotes a collegial leadership where the first minister, in relation to his cabinet colleagues, is first among equals, in practice Israel has had a succession of strong and independent-minded Prime Ministers, from Ben Gurion to Begin to Shamir, who have tended to dominate their cabinet and insist on the primacy of their own views. After the poll on June 23 which showed a Labour victory forthcoming, Mr. Rabin told his supporters there could be no responsibility without authority first being granted to those who assume such responsibility. "Therefore I will handle the coalition negotiations as soon as the final election results are known. I will decide who will be ministers. There will be no horse trading". [FBIS, June 23, 1992]. Having already assumed personal responsibility for the success or failure of the Labour cause in the election, Mr. Rabin was setting the stage for the resumption of an imperial or presidential style of Prime Ministerial leadership. Without this approach the new Israeli leader might find it difficult to practice the flexibility he will need in cutting a deal with the United States, and the Palestinians.

The Coalition of Forces: Reconciling the irreconcilable.

In a 120-seat legislature, an Israeli government must hold, or control through coalition agreements, 61 or more seats. The revitalized Labour party won 44 seats in its own right. It was therefore obliged to seek partners for a coalition where this could be done without compromising basic principles. Even before the election Mr. Rabin had declared himself and his party in favour of as broad a coalition as possible should they be asked to from a government.

As late as July 5, Labour's goal was to set up a government with Meretz, Tzomet, the Ultra-orthodox parties, and perhaps also the National Religions Party (NRP). Since these groups represent the far left and far right of the political spectrum, some of whom favour cessation of settlement construction while others oppose it, it would be difficult to conceive of an accommodation that would include all of them without special riders or backroom understandings; in short, the kind of skulduggery and horse trading the new Prime Minister had already ruled out. In any event, he signed agreements quickly with the left-wing Meretz movement and the SHAS religious party, giving him control over 62 of the Knesset's 120 seats. Two Arab parties were also expected to support the new coalition, even though they would not be asked to join the government. In addition Yitzhaik Klein, an Israeli public affairs analyst, has stated that it would be impossible to reach a national consensus on the issue of peace without the consent and participation of the Likud [Jerusalem Post, International Edition 18 July 1992, p.7].

Arab-Palestinian and other reactions

Spokespersons for the West Bank and Gaza Strip Palestinians, and the PLO, also expressed cautious optimism that the new government and leadership in Israel could provide a welcome change of tone and mood, and give a boost to the momentum for peace. Hanan Ashrawi, Faysal al-Husayni, Yasser Arafat and other prominent figures welcomed the change and opined that it could make a real difference at the negotiating table, provided the new leadership in Israel adhered to its promise to halt the settlements program. Nabil Sha'th (a PLO official) was quoted as saying that this would bring a Palestinian response in the form of a halt to the violent aspects of the intifada.

The hesitation in Palestinian perceptions of the new Israeli leader is induced by direct experience of him as Prime Minister from 1973 to 1977, and again as Defence Minister in the Labour-Likud coalition after the emergence of the intifada in the fall of 1987. As the author of tough, literally bone-crushing tactics to deal with their protests, the Palestinians fear that Mr. Rabin, the hawkish old soldier who made his reputation fighting Arabs rather than conciliating them, will be an unlikely peacemaker and may feel the need to show he can be as repressive as his predecessor. There is little room for doubt that Yitzhak Rabin is a firm believer in law and order, and rigid application of repressive police tactics to any form of protest from the Palestinians can only serve to stifle confidence and confirm their worst fears. The incidents at al-Najah University in Nablus on July 14 -17 are a case in point. These, fortunately, were resolved without bloodshed.

Other Arab leaders responded to Israel's change of government in accordance with their long-standing positions on the Arab-Israel dispute. As the only Arab country to have signed a peace treaty with Israel, Egypt's leaders generally welcomed the change and were enthusiastic about chances for progress towards a more comprehensive peace. The Jordanian spokesman, Kamel Abu Jaber, allowed that a change from deadlock could only be for the better, but cited several reasons why the Arabs and Palestinians ought to be wary of an Israeli government led by Mr. Rabin, including his long history which showed him to be far from a conciliator, and the internal political pressures that would likely be brought to bear on his leadership to preclude compromises for peace. The Syrian Foreign Minister, Faruq al-Shara, said his country would reserve judgement on the result of the Israeli election and the policies of the new government until there was more evidence on their practical application.

In international circles generally, the Labour electoral victory was greeted with a loud sigh of relief. At least it delivered the peace process from the impasse it had reached and offered hope of new movement in a positive direction. European Community leaders declared their view that the Labour Party victory in Israel's general election would help the Middle East peace talks but that Israel would have to trade land for peace (based on UNSC resolutions 242 and 338) to achieve a lasting settlement. The international dimension of the terms of reference for a fair and lasting settlement of the Arab-Israeli dispute continue to be emphasized in European political circles.

The American Connection

Perhaps nowhere else was the satisfaction with the Israeli election outcome more palpable than in official American government circles and among major American Jewish organizations. Relations between the United States and Israel had grown tense and strained during the final year of the Likud government, due primarily to the difference of opinion over the issue of Jewish settlement on occupied Arab land, and whether it constituted an obstacle to peace. The dispute culminated in the Bush administration's refusal to accede to an Israeli request for $10 billion in loan guarantees for new immigrants without Israeli agreement to halt settlement activity.

The Israeli election result is widely believed to have opened the way for rapid steps to improve relations between Israel and the United States, facilitate the loan guarantees, and revitalize the Middle East peace process. The American Secretary of State has recently visited the area again and held further talks with both sides. The new Israeli Prime Minister, for his part, has visited the U.S. and succeeded in renewing the old `special relationship' [of strategic partners] between Israel and the United States. President Bush announced on August 11 that he would recommend the provision of $10 billion worth of loan guarantees to the new Israeli government, and declared his willingness to maintain Israel's `qualitative military superiority' over its neighbours. [Le Monde, 13 août 1992]. Although the peace talks have resumed in Washington, they face another hurdle of uncertainty: the up-coming U.S. presidential election on November 3.

However much officials may downplay the subject, there is little room for doubt that the United States played an important role in the outcome of the Israeli election. According to Ehud Sprinzak of the Hebrew University [Reuter, 24 June 1992], the U.S. played a larger role than ever before, not just in regard to the loan guarantees, but by creating a sense of unease among Israelis. The fear that Israel might have to cope in a dangerous world without the usual level of support from its traditional superpower patron was no doubt an important factor in the minds of Israeli voters, whether or not it was deliberately fostered by official U.S. policy.

Some peace process participants are reportedly concerned about the possibility that the situation may now be reversed, with the U.S. administration vulnerable to electoral pressure from the new Israeli government. The leverage which a Rabin-led administration might wish to exert on its American counterpart will depend on several factors, including how far apart U.S. and Israeli goals vis-à-vis the peace process may be. In an electoral system which is so commercialized and beholden to the media, the polls and pressure groups like AIPAC, the leverage the new Israeli administration can exert in a particular election is considerable. Now that Mr. Perot has withdrawn, and Governor Clinton has surged to the top of the popularity polls, it could well be that most American Jewish (and some pro-Israel gentile) voters, who traditionally vote Democrat, will flock to his support. Mr. Clinton has been described as unqualifiably pro-Israel on every Middle East issue. Arab Americans are already calling Democratic policy on the Middle East "one-sided" in favour of Israel, and demanding it be made more even-handed. With only 40 Arab-Americans among the 4,928 delegates to the Democratic National Convention, it is unlikely they will be able to reduce significantly what they call the "political pandering" of the party's policy statement. The possibility of the Middle East peace process being hobbled by, or held hostage to, the democratic electoral process in the United States for the next three months has increased substantially since July 1. The most dramatic development in this connection was the resignation of James Baker as Secretary of State in order to direct President Bush's beleaguered re-election campaign. Despite official assurances of continuity of commitment to the process, most observers expect its momentum to be lost. Palestinian spokespersons are most dismayed by the departure of the one key figure who had succeeded in gaining their confidence.

The U.S. has never committed itself to an independent Palestinian state, but has never ruled it out, leaving it to the parties to decide between them at the negotiating table. On the other hand it has recently declined to support the Palestinians' right of return to their homes in the event of a settlement, and the new Israeli Prime Minister opposes a Palestinian state. The Meretz wing of the coalition, perhaps also a sizeable number of the rank-and-file, and new Knesset members (MK) in the Labour party, do favour an option for an independent Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza, in line with UNSC resolutions 242 and 338. But the new Prime Minister, imposing his wishes on the coalition as the main cause of its existence and the arbiter of its basic policies, will most likely override their views, and arguing the requirements of security, permit movement only in the direction of local elections and limited autonomy for the Palestinians, and ignore the concerns and interests of other Arab states such as Syria.

Mr. Rabin's Priorities

The new Israeli Prime Minister has never made a secret of his position on the Palestinians in the occupied territories. In his televised debate with Yitzhak Shamir prior to the election, he made it perfectly clear he did not want the 1.75 million Arab inhabitants of these lands as citizens of Israel. "I would not want the political process to culminate with 750,000 Gaza Strip residents becoming Israeli citizens, bearing Israeli identity cards, participating in our elections, and walking the streets of our towns". The addition of this large number of non-Jewish citizens would presumably dangerously dilute the exclusive Jewish character of the state. What to do with them then? Autonomy, as Mr. Rabin would define it, but not an independent state.

In this position the new Israeli leader will find himself at odds with the demands of another important goal he has set himself and his government. In the same pre-election debate he put it this way: "First preference should be given to us and the Palestinians. It is possible; it is the most important thing; it will change the world's political attitude toward us". [FBIS, 17 June 1992; italics added]. The same concern was expressed again more passionately in Mr. Rabin's July 13 speech to the Knesset. He implied that he believed the whole world was against Israel, that it needed to stress the principles of negotiation and co-operation, and that Israel should make more of an effort to join the new international movement and integrate itself more successfully into the international system.

Assuming the new Israeli leader is serious about bringing Israel into the mainstream of international opinion in the new world order, he will recognize that there is an international consensus on the Middle East dispute in favour of a Palestinian state. That consensus was expressed formally for the first time by the UN in 1947 in the form of a partition plan. It has been confirmed and revalidated several times since by various international forums, notably UN resolution 242 and the granting of diplomatic status to the PLO representative by many countries. The consensus has shown remarkable staying power since it was first formulated and seems unlikely to decline. The closer Israel can come to meeting the terms of that consensus, consistent with its security needs, the more it will be welcomed in the international community. The problem may well be that the national consensus in Israel is not now congruent with the international consensus, and may not become so for another generation. The Palestinians claim they have waited too long already.

Prognosis

The one undeniable reality of the Labour victory in the June 23 Israeli election is the fact that the peace talks have sustained a change of atmosphere. On both sides antagonists are talking about a new tone, a new climate now present for the next round of talks. Most Arab and Palestinian spokespersons have counselled against excessive euphoria until the details of the new government's positions and proposals are announced, but at least one member of the P.L.O. Executive Committee considers Mr. Rabin's commitment to the holding of early elections leading to autonomy in the occupied territories as a positive sign.

However, a new mood does not guarantee successful negotiations. There are many obstacles, in addition to those mentioned above. An important question at this stage for supporters of the peace process on both sides of the dispute is whether the dynamic of change can be maintained and made to serve the interests of an accommodation that majority Israeli, and Arab/Palestinian, opinion can accept and make stick. The peace process has enemies whose stands precede the recent election in Israel. Their opposition will likely escalate as the talks proceed.

The most credible scenario for the future of the peace process involves a continuous series of negotiations where some substantial issues are discussed but little or nothing is decided until after the American elections on November 3. If the current U.S. administration is returned to office, the pace and substance of the process will then increase with a view to achieving some limited form of autonomy for the West Bank and Gaza Palestinians under their own elected leadership. The question will then emerge for discussion whether the authority of this leadership arises by delegation from Israel or from the electoral procedure. Should the Democratic ticket carry the day, all previous commitments to the process will be subject to renewal or revision. The Palestinians sense that such a development would not be to their advantage.

In the meantime, those who oppose the process will be doing their utmost to sabotage it. In the region, the government of Iran does not distinguish between the policies of the new Israeli government and those of its predecessor. Through its surrogates in Lebanon-Hizballah-it will endeavour to poison the new atmosphere. Extremists in Israel and the occupied territories, Arab and Jewish, will not accept any progress toward an accommodation that does not square with their ideological positions and give them all they want. Hamas and Islamic Jihad on the Palestinian side, and the vigilante settlers of Gush Emunim and Ateret Cohanim on the Jewish side, are threatening to counter the talks with all their resources. The Israeli government, as the custodian of law and order, will have its work cut out to sell any even interim agreement on Palestinian autonomy to the right-wing Jewish extremist groups, and to prevent Palestinian/Islamic radicals from attacking Israeli targets or visiting reprisals on West Bank and Gaza leaders. By definition, violent protest seems a predictable adjunct to any forward movement on the road to a settlement of this most intractable dispute. To counter such developments the new Israeli government could resort to an old policy of "creating facts", not on land but on the political scene. Time will be of the essence. Quick action is needed to frustrate the ambitions of the Jewish radicals.

The need for quick and decisive action in Israel, and evolving conditions in the USA, suggests the possibility of an alternative scenario. For the Palestinians the current sixth round of negotiations could be crucial. After 10 months of fruitless negotiations, the Palestinian leadership needs to show tangible evidence of progress to justify its presence in Washington to public opinion in the occupied territories. Since many believe the U.S. administration intends to impose "some kind" of settlement of this long-simmering dispute sometime in the fall, and since it is taken as a given that they will accede to any terms and conditions, the negotiators may now decide to play what few cards they hold as best they can in the hope of attaining an acceptable minimum, which would fall short of their declared objectives but at least allow them to defuse the rising frustrations in the territories. If the Israelis, despite their announced intention, refrain from all settlement construction activity, and make some gesture on the Palestinians' human rights complaints, the current round of talks could produce the outline of an agreement in principle on the establishment of an administrative council for the Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza: in short, the first interim step on the road to an eventual full-fledged peace agreement.

In the circumstances the most probable course of action, barring any sensational or dramatic developments in the region, lies in gradual, incremental steps toward some limited form of autonomy for the Palestinians of the occupied territories, to be achieved over the period of one year or more. There will be no strategic break through to provide the Palestinians quick access to their dream of an independent state, or the return of captured territory to Syria, and the process will be attended by violent outbursts from ideologically embittered opponents. But the quicker the Israeli government acts, the less likely the opposition from Palestinian obstructionists will materialize as the Palestinian people start to reap the benefits of comparatively freer lives and more say in the determination of their own affairs.

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