ARCHIVED: Commentary No. 27: Central Asians: Recruits for Revolutionary Islam?

Commentary No. 27 has been archived.

Drs. Kagedan & Millward

November 1992
Unclassified

Editors Note: What are the chances that the five newly independent states of Central Asia, in struggling to define their distinct regional and international roles, could become five fundamentalist Irans?

In their analysis, the authors identify a number of issues that appear to pre-empt, at least in the short term, fears of Islamism in the region: economic suffocation, environmental pollution and political instability. Ironically, these are the very issues which, in the medium term, "could produce conditions favourable to fundamentalism". The exception is Tajikistan, where a worsening situation already threatens the security of its neighbours.

Dr. Allan Kagedan and Dr. William Millward are Strategic Analysts with the Analysis and Production Branch of CSIS.

Disclaimer: Publication of an article in the Commentary series does not imply CSIS authentication of the information nor CSIS endorsement of the author's views.

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The Soviet collapse has pushed the little known Central Asian states-Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan-into the headlines. Worried commentators have raised the prospect that the new states could become five additional fundamentalist Irans, with access to nuclear arms. The good news is that near-term Islamic revolution is unlikely; the bad news is that economic and political stability is equally improbable and over time could produce conditions favourable to fundamentalism.

Economic Albatross

Central Asians must grapple with a terrible legacy of 70 years of communist, colonialist rule. The Central Asian republics fell victim to Moscow's obsession with producing cotton ("white gold") for domestic and foreign consumption. Extensive irrigation of the cotton fields depleted water resources and caused desertification. In fact, the Aral Sea, which once boasted a fishing industry, is drying up. As the Central Asian states faced stiffer competition from Chinese cotton and from synthetic fibers in the 1980s, the international demand for its cotton plummeted. In the future, natural resources-oil and gas reserves in Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan-as well as agricultural production may compensate for the misplaced emphasis on cotton. Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan lack even these assets.

At the moment, the economies of these states are suffocating (WHO, Report of a Unicef/WHO Collaborate Mission, 17 February - 2 March 1992). Since August 1991, Central Asian food prices have soared between five and twenty times, while salaries, up only three-fold, trail behind. Except for Kazakhstan, the republics must import three- quarters of their foodgrain requirements. Furthermore, the Soviet system of "milk kitchens" that supplied milk and food to infants and young children has disappeared.

The severe economic situation provides an excellent breeding ground for the expansion of narcotics cultivation and trafficking. Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan are the main sources of illegal morphine and other opium-related drugs in the former Soviet Union.

Environmental Pollution

Compounding their poverty, Central Asians lack access to safe water. Pesticides used to protect the cotton crops have poisoned the region's soil and contaminated its water supply. Because of poor maintenance, pipelines are carriers of such water-borne diseases as Hepatitus-A, and wasteful irrigation practices have led to waterlogging, salinity and mineralization of both surface and underground water supplies.

Demography

Despite a high infant mortality rate, (in Ukraine, the rate stands at 12.9 per thousand; in Central Asia, it ranges from 26.4 to a startling 45.2), Central Asian states possess the fastest growing and youngest populations in the former Soviet Union. In 1990, the natural population growth rate in the five Central Asian states ranged between 14.0 per thousand for Kazakhstan to 32.6 for Tajikistan; in Russia, the rate of increase was 2.2. In Tajikistan, 44% of the population is under 15; in Kyrgyzstan, the number is 36%. In the coming decade, millions of Central Asians face unemployment, in itself a potential cause of social unrest.

Political Perils

The economic problems of Central Asia are matched by political difficulties. Nearly all the Central Asian leaders (the exception being Kyrgyzstan's Askar Akayev) are former members of the Soviet communist élite, known as the nomenklatura. Chosen for their subservience to Moscow, the Central Asian élite was riddled with corruption and patronage of family members, and linked to organized crime. As scions of the Communist Party, their understanding of economic or social matters is limited; their main aptitude is personal political survival.

Inter-ethnic rivalry poses another challenge. The Kazakhs and Kirghiz, historically nomadic and less Islamically pious peoples, resent the populous, more pious and sedentary Uzbeks. One flashpoint for conflict between the Central Asians is the fertile Fergana Valley, shared by the Uzbeks, the Kirghiz and the Tajiks who fight regularly over land and water resources. In 1990, hundreds died in fighting in the city of Osh, an Uzbek area within Kyrgyzstan, which the Kirghiz wanted exclusively for themselves. Uzbekistan has designs on Kudzhand, the largely Uzbek, northern region of Tajikistan.

The problems facing the Central Asian republics would daunt even the most capable leaders; unfortunately, the republics have reason to lack confidence in theirs. Reluctant founding fathers, Central Asian leaders were Mikhail Gorbachev's staunchest allies in his doomed quest for a renewed Soviet federation. Unlike the Baltic leaders, who rode to independence supported by a rock-solid political consensus, or even the Ukrainian leadership, which capitalized on the support of longtime nationalists to win independence, the Central Asian leaders are captains without a crew.

Fear of Islamism

The condition of Islam in Central Asia is a complex matter. Outwardly the region seems ripe for an encounter with fundamentalism, the radical, militant brand of Islam which uses religion as a stepping-stone to political power. In Central Asia, the communist economic system has failed and the region is deep in economic crisis; religion may benefit. Like the other Semitic monotheisms, Judaism and Christianity, the Islamic faith helps believers endure individual and group hardships. As a source of inspiration and determination it can be ignored until the time is ripe for a resurgence. Thus, fundamentalism emerged in other Islamic societies that suffered economic decline-like Algeria, where socialism failed, and Iran, where royal government and controlled rentier capitalism fizzled. But these were societies in which Islam was firmly rooted, even thriving. Similarly, fundamentalists have been moderately successful in selling the populations of Egypt, Jordan, and the West Bank and Gaza on their programs' social benefits.

However, in Central Asia, Islam has been suppressed and marginalized by 70 years of Soviet communism. Central Asians want to reclaim Islam and, with some help from external sources, they will be able to fill gaps in knowledge related to the evolution of Islam during the past century. But until Islam is firmly re-established-especially in the population's consciousness-fundamentalists will be unable to achieve a massive following.

Indeed, Central Asian leaders are doing everything in their power to fuel doubts about fundamentalism's economic promises, to blunt Iranian fundamentalist influence and to block the entrance of the Islamic Revival Party into political and electoral life. The leaders of Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan can count on the assistance of the traditionally subservient, established Muslim clergy. A leader of Turkmenistan's Religious Affairs Council noted in April 1992 that although "the emissaries of neighboring states" are pressing for the formation of pro-Islamic parties, the president has stated that Turkmenistan will remain secular and that "the teaching of religious dogma in the system of education is prohibited." (FBIS, Central Eurasia, 29 April 1992.)

Fundamentalism faces another hurdle. Although Central Asian populations profess Islam (indeed, historic centres of Islamic civilization such as Bukhara and Samarkand dot the region's map), their religion competes with nomadic traditions, historically antagonistic to religious devotion.

Foreign Fundamentalism?

Fundamentalism has its champions, chief among them Iran. In addition to sharing a border with Turkmenistan, Iranian language and culture have been a part of Central Asian life since antiquity. However, Iran will likely not succeed in exporting its political version of Islam there; Turkey stands a better chance of influencing the region. Central Asia is Sunni Muslim like the Turks, not Shiite like the Iranians; furthermore, all the Central Asian states except Tajikistan speak a Turkic language, not Farsi. Apart from this, Iran has serious economic and political problems and it is often at odds with the West. Turkey, a more secular state, is more stable economically, closer to the West and a more attractive pole of imitation for Central Asia. Thus, Dedehan Hassanov, a leader of the Islamic revival party in Uzbekistan, believes it is too early to create an Islamic state, criticizes the Iranians for being too radical, and feels the focus should be on education over the next few years (FBIS, Central Eurasia, 4 May 1992).

In the critical economic sphere, Turkey and Iran are negotiating to sell satellite-based communications systems to the Central Asian states, and are competing to establish new air links; a Turkmenistan-Iran rail link is planned to be operational for late 1993 (Olcott, Foreign Affairs, Summer 1992). But in economic terms, Saudi Arabia, which so far has been active in providing religious texts and supporting mosques, has much more capital to invest than cash-strapped Iran.

Other Influences

Economic and political concerns are opening Central Asia's doors to other players. The American Chevron corporation concluded a multi-billion dollar deal with Kazakhstan in the summer of 1992. China shares a border with three Central Asian republics and has trade interests; the Chinese are also concerned lest religious fundamentalism or ethnic nationalism spill over from Central Asia into their northern territories, populated in part by Central Asians. Israel is looking to provide technical assistance to Central Asia, and hopes the region will follow the lead of friendly Turkey rather than of hostile Iran.

Where does Russia fit in? The relationship of Central Asians to Russians is the familiar one of post-colonial dependence and hostility. After 1917, Russian communists lorded over the backward Central Asian region, controlling the local Communist Party branches, the security ministry, and industrial concerns. Believing nomadism to be retrograde, during collectivization Bolsheviks decided to "sedentarize" the nomadic Kazakhs, leading to the decimation of 30% of the Kazakh population.

This unfortunate history has left Central Asians hostile toward Russians, as echoed by Kazakh journalist who describes how Kazakh children, forced to study in Russian schools, "have been beaten up and abused, forced to smoke tobacco, have had the money stolen from their pockets, and have been excluded from cafeterias and lavatories." (FBIS, 4 May 1992). Hostility and poor economic conditions have driven 170,000 Russians out of the region since 1989. Emigration will continue with the possible exception of the well-rooted Cossack population in Alma-Ata, the Kazakh capital, and the Russians in the northern region of the state, who would sooner take their portion of Kazakhstan with them than simply cross the border to Russia.

Despite anti-Russian sentiment, Russia is still a significant economic and military presence in the region. The Central Asian republics remain within the ruble zone and thus are hostages to Russian monetary policy. Key communications and transportation links tie these states to Russia, as does the largely Russian industrial labour force. Militarily, Russian troops are stationed in the Central Asian states, and Turkmenistan and Tajikistan have formally ceded to Russia the duty of controlling their external borders. Russia will maintain its security role until the Central Asians decide to develop their own militaries-a move some skittish leaders, fearing internal coup by a rival power-centre, may be reluctant to take. Besides, Central Asians traditionally were excluded from the Red Army's officer corps, and it will take some time before Central Asians can field a significant military force. Russia may live to regret its continued military presence in the area as local conflicts, like the one in Tajikistan, draw Russian troops into being participants in, or victims of, hostilities.

Tajik Turmoil

It is not surprising that Tajikistan is the Central Asian state which has experienced the most turmoil since August 1991. Tajik regional consciousness associated with the localities of Garm, Pamir, Kulyab and Khudzhand often erupts in the form of "local wars" and "inter-district conflicts" for power and influence. Added to this is the Tajiks' resentment over the loss to Uzbekistan of the ancient Iranian cities of Bukhara and Samarkand. Beyond this, as many or more Tajiks now live in Afghanistan, riven by factional warfare.

The Tadjik civil war, which began in the spring of 1992, has seen the ouster of Rahmon Nabiyev, whose power base is the northern Kulyab region, and the seizure of power by Akbarsho Iskandarov in September. Nabiyev, a northern Tadjik whom the Kremlin had ousted in the early 1980s on corruption charges, but who was popularly elected to lead an independent Tadjikistan, was disliked by poorer and more Islamically pious southern Tadjiks. Opposition to Nabiyev's neo-Communist authoritarian rule came from the Alliance of Popular Forces of Tajikistan, consisting of the Tadjikistan Democratic Party, the Islamic Revival Party, and the Rastakhiz (Renaissance) cultural movement. However, the labels "democratic" and "Islamic" are more often than not convenient weapons in the quest for personal power.

Southern Tadjikistan is coming to resemble neighbouring Afghanistan, with its ample supply of weapons and guerilla fighters. Indeed, weapons are flowing in both direction between Afghanistan and Tadjikistan. By the end of October, pro-Iskandarov and pro-Nabiyev forces were fighting pitched battles in Dushanbe, the capital, leaving hundreds dead. The leaders of both Uzbekistan and Kyrgystan are monitoring the fighting closely, fearing that they will be drawn into the conflict. Meanwhile, Russian troops find themselves trapped in the middle, attempting to protect local Russians and encourage peace talks, but without much guidance from a Russian government itself engaged in internal political conflicts.

There can be little doubt that if the situation in Tajikistan worsens, the conflict could assume geopolitical dimensions and threaten the security of neighbouring countries. It is conceivable that emergency developments might require a UN peacekeeping force in Tajikistan.

Chaotic Tajikistan is the leading candidate for recruitment to fundamentalist Islam. Traditional social values associated with the rural way of life are still predominant, even among first- generation urban migrants, and Islamic norms are strictly observed. The authority of the traditional clergy, itself beholden to the neo-communist power elite, has been virtually unlimited among the rural masses. Concepts associated with democracy and change are alien to the Tajik peasants, who are poor and barely educated. This large majority of the population will prove to be a barrier to the politicization of Islam in Tajikistan, unless economic conditions undergo a further radical decline. Religious conservatism also benefits from the support of the government which decreed that the newly independent state would have no parties which mixed religion and politics.

Though the official clergy of Tajikistan has supported Nabiyev's opponents, this does not mean that all its members advocate the installation of an Islamic republic. The Qadi of Tajikistan, Haji Akbar Turanzhonzoda, when asked if the state would become an Islamic republic, replied, "Even if all the mullas wanted that, it is impossible today. The republic has travelled far down the secular path, and people won't given up their habits and way of life easily.... Religion must be separated from the state so that society's sins will not be attributed to Islam, as was the case with the Communist Party." (CDSP, no. 40, 1991.)

The other states of Central Asia have avoided internal strife, but it is less certain that this can be sustained over the next decade. One negative side-effect of the turmoil in Tajikistan has been the tendency of Uzbek President Karimov and Kazakh President Nazarbayev since June 1992 to crack down on political opponents by harassing and jailing them-setting democratic prospects back further.

The Central Asian states face enormous economic, social and political hurdles in carving out distinct national futures. Political oppositions will press for an improvement of conditions, perhaps under an Islamic umbrella. If Central Asia's current leadership proves to be ineffective or corrupt, and loses its popular credibility as an agent for modernization, fundamentalism will be the beneficiary.

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