Canadian Security Intelligence Service
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2002 Public Report
The primary investigative mandate of CSIS is defined in Section 12 of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service Act, which states:
"The Service shall collect, by investigation or otherwise, to the extent that it is strictly necessary, and analyse and retain information and intelligence respecting activities that may on reasonable grounds be suspected of constituting threats to the security of Canada and, in relation thereto, shall report to and advise the Government of Canada."
Table of Contents
- Foreword
- Part I: Global Security Environment
- Part II: Counter Terrorism
- Part III: Counter Proliferation
- Part IV: Counter-Intelligence
- Part V: Security Screening
- Part VI: Research, Analysis and Production
- Part VII: Managing the Risk
Foreward
This twelfth annual Public Report of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service reviews the global security environment in which CSIS operates, with particular attention to the way the Islamic extremist threat has altered CSIS's response to terrorism. The report discusses the operational programs which CSIS undertakes and examines CSIS's internal management approach.
CSIS operates in a continuously evolving global environment and must remain vigilant and adaptable to the challenges that it faces. Advances in communications and transportation, increased trade and expanded migration have made the world seem like a much smaller place. Corporations have operations and market products around the world. People move between countries with great ease. Many Canadians have family or friends in other parts of the world and can communicate with them easily. The 2001 Canadian census reported that 18.4% of Canada's population was born outside the country, the second-highest proportion of any nation in the world. In this environment, it is not surprising that terrorists have attempted to exploit the global movement of people, trade goods and communications.
Thus, it is as important to understand what is going on half-way around the world as it is to understand what is happening in Canada. This means that threat assessment has to be coordinated with international allies. This coordination already exists and is particularly applicable to the relationships CSIS has with agencies of the United States. At a March 2002 conference in Whistler, BC, Louis Freeh, former director of the US Federal Bureau of Investigation, noted, "with respect to the Canadian and US partnership.in the areas of terrorism, cross-border crime, espionage, there is actually no stronger relationship that exists in the world, at least in my experience, than between the law enforcement (and) intelligence services of both countries, and I know from a first-hand position."
Rapid technological advances also remain a challenge. Technological change has made it easier for those who would threaten Canada's national security, to do so. The emergence of technologies such as encrypted electronic communications and satellite telephones has enhanced the ability of terrorist groups to plan and coordinate attacks. Technological progress has also made people more vulnerable, because computer networks that help manage the daily lives of Canadians are themselves potential targets of attack. The Service must understand how technology can be used by its targets and how it can apply new technologies to combat the threats posed by these targets. The need to stay on the leading edge of the technological curve is therefore vital to the success of CSIS operations.
Since 1974, lawful access to private communications has been part of the Canadian law, enabling law enforcement and national security agencies to intercept communications in the case of CSIS, with the approval of both the Solicitor General and a Federal Court judge. The government is reviewing this legislation, and consulting widely, to ensure that such agencies continue to have access to the information Parliament intended and which they need to carry out their mandates. It is necessary to update the laws that provide for lawful access in order to reflect developments in modern communications technology.
CSIS has not changed the way it works since the events of September 11, 2001. Security intelligence is still collected, analysed and reported to government according to essentially the same methods and procedures laid down in the legislation that created the Service as a separate, civilian security intelligence organization nearly twenty years ago. However, the war on terrorism has intensified the pressures and demands on the Service.
In response to the changes in threat activity, CSIS research and analysis are now used in listing terrorist entities as provided for under the Anti-terrorism Act. CSIS intelligence is used in moving against terrorist financiers. CSIS is now responsible for Front End Screening of all refugee claimants to Canada, to identify and filter potential security and criminal cases from the refugee claimant stream as early as possible in the determination process. Certain government departments and agencies have increased their demand for security screening services, which CSIS provides to all federal government departments and institutions, except the RCMP. CSIS has also increased its exchange of intelligence with security intelligence organizations of friendly nations, supporting Canada's commitment to fighting international terrorism.
In 2002, the Service formed a new Counter Proliferation Branch, combining the expertise of both the counter-intelligence and counter-terrorism fields to address a growing threat that extends beyond national boundaries to include non-state actors. The creation of this unit is a tangible sign of Canada's participation in the international effort to stem the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.
In December 2001, the federal government allocated additional funding to the Service over a six-year period. While it takes time to train needed personnel, these funds have helped the Service meet the additional demands placed upon it over the past year.
Safeguarding the public against the threat of terrorism remains the Service's first priority, with Islamic extremism being at the top of the list in the Counter Terrorism Program. The threat posed by weapons of mass destruction, Canada's economic security, cyberthreats to critical infrastructure and safeguarding the confidential information of the Government of Canada from foreign governments and others that might threaten the security of Canadians also remain operational priorities for the Service. The response to these competing demands is risk-managed so as to ensure that resources are always applied to the highest priorities.
Since its creation in 1984, CSIS has been subject to all federal legislation which protects the rights and privacy of Canadians. As well as the ministerial responsibility exercised by the Solicitor General, who answers to Parliament for the direction of CSIS, the Service is also subject to two independent review mechanisms. The Inspector General of CSIS is responsible for monitoring compliance with operational policies, reviewing the operational activities of CSIS and certifying to the Minister his satisfaction with the Director's annual operational report. The Security Intelligence Review Committee (SIRC) reviews the Service's performance of duties and functions, and investigates the complaints of any person with respect to any act performed by the Service, and those individuals denied security clearances by the Government of Canada. SIRC provides analysis to the Solicitor General on an ongoing basis and produces an annual report that is tabled in Parliament.
Since the attacks on New York and Washington, the introduction of new laws and increased budgets for national security have resulted in unprecedented interest in CSIS and other organizations in the intelligence community. A number of government and parliamentary institutions are examining the implications of these new measures. For CSIS, already subject to review by SIRC and the Inspector General, and to operational pressures at a time of heightened threat levels, coordinating and meeting these additional demands are a challenge.
The pages that follow give a more detailed description of the security environment and the response of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service.
Part I
Global Security Environment
Events derived from the actions of Islamic terrorists have put Western security resources, including those of CSIS, under pressure as the war on terrorism has moved from Afghanistan into a new and more troubling phase. The escalation of tensions has increased demands from allies and heightened the effort required to meet national security requirements.
Over the past decade, Canada has become increasingly involved in the campaign against Islamic extremism, including active participation in peacekeeping, in the fight against terrorism, and in supporting UN resolutions combatting terrorist financing. At the national level, high-profile legal cases seeking the deportation of persons considered security threats, the terrorist entity listing process and other measures have all demonstrated Canada's commitment to fighting terrorism. This has not gone unnoticed. For example, in November 2002, the media reported widely on a statement allegedly made by Osama Bin Laden in which he included Canada amongst countries deserving retribution for supporting the war on terrorism. This acknowledgement that Canada is directly threatened by terrorism is central to such a perspective.
The Service is aware of emerging terrorist threats and tactics that could have severe consequences for Canadians. The possibility that a weapon of mass destruction-chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear (CBRN)-could be acquired and used by terrorist groups must be given serious consideration. After the September 2001 attacks and with intelligence gained as a result of the Afghan war, new information has come to light indicating that Osama Bin Laden's search for CBRN weapons was even more assiduous, and in some respects had progressed further, than previously believed. In particular, Al Qaida was found to be pursuing a sophisticated biological weapons research program focussing on such agents as anthrax, ricin, and botulinum toxin.
A serious and related issue is the possibility that state sponsors of terrorism could facilitate the acquisition of material for weapons of mass destruction or directly provide such weapons to terrorist groups. The proliferation of these types of weapons to countries seeking to acquire nuclear, biological or chemical weaponry, and related delivery systems, continues to be a leading international concern. Countries with no indigenous capability of developing and producing their own arsenal have attempted to procure critical components, technology and expertise from developed countries of the West. Canada's prominence in technological fields makes it fertile ground for the acquisition of proprietary information and technology by certain countries. Canada participates actively in the international cooperation to interdict and counter the threat posed by the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, or to prevent the use of such weapons by terrorist groups.
The situation in the Middle East continues to deteriorate. This increases the possibility that violence and instability could spread beyond Israel and the Palestinian territories. Terrorist groups which had previously concentrated and localized their efforts in Israel may become more active over a broader area.
The uneasy security environment in South Asia emanates from several areas. First, the troubled India-Pakistan relationship remains a major concern. Pakistan continues to provide low-key support to insurgents across the border in the Indian state of Jammu and Kashmir. Any escalation of terrorist attacks within India would reinforce the Indian government's resolve to undertake "limited action" across the Line of Control in Kashmir. Secondly, although recent peace talks are a promising sign, the insurgency in Nepal could link with other communist movements in the area and destabilize the region. Further, the terrorist bomb explosions at two nightclubs in Bali, believed to have been the responsibility of the Sunni Islamic extremist group Jemaah Islamiyah (JI), with Al Qaida's assistance, forced the Indonesian government to accept international claims that terrorist organizations are present in Indonesia. Finally, violence, bombing and kidnapping continue to plague the Philippines. Various extremist organizations have been blamed by Filipino authorities for recent incidents, and cooperation between the groups regarding the planning of future attacks appears to be increasing. Threats to Canadian interests, such as the bomb threat which caused the temporary closure of the Canadian embassy in Manila, will remain constant, meaning the security situation could deteriorate rapidly without notice.
Africa will continue to require significant assistance from the international community, both with respect to humanitarian/developmental aid and peacekeeping actions. A food shortage in southern and eastern Africa is expected to peak in early 2003, threatening more than 30 million persons with starvation. This situation will be exacerbated by the escalating HIV/AIDS pandemic, which undermines all efforts at sustainable economic development. Ongoing civil strife and instability in several sub-Saharan states could degenerate into ethnic-based mass killings. Famine and military conflict in the continent will continue to displace large segments of the population, some of whom may seek refuge in Canada.
An increasing number of countries within the Caribbean, Central America and South America are facing significant challenges to their economic and/or political stability and national security interests. In some Latin American countries, popular discontent has led to the creation of organizations seeking political change through serious violence, criminal activities (e.g., drug trafficking and kidnapping), and, on occasion, cooperation with foreign and even extra-regional counterparts. In other cases, illegitimate or repressive government measures are fuelling frustration and confrontation. As intra-state conflicts rise, the flow of displaced persons and political, economic, and religious refugees also grows, bringing with it socio-economic and political issues which can develop into security concerns whose reach may extend to Canada.
Transnational criminal activity affects Canada's national and economic security. Organizations involved in crime can detrimentally affect the integrity of Canadian financial institutions, key sectors of the Canadian economy and other public institutions. Migrant smuggling is a lucrative activity for transnational criminal organizations. As legitimate mechanisms to enter countries come under greater scrutiny, the covert avenues utilized to smuggle illegal migrants may also become a conduit for terrorists and facilitate their entry. The Service participates in the G8 Lyon Group, the Cross-Border Crime Forum and the National Coordinating Committee on Organized Crime, as well as other inter-departmental activities supporting broader government objectives.
The reliance of modern countries on critical information infrastructures has triggered national and international security concerns. The increasing dependency upon these infrastructures provides possible avenues of exploitation by foreign intelligence services, extremists with political, ideological or religious motivations, criminals or a variety of other individuals and groups. Moreover, the use of technologically advanced telecommunications by terrorists and intelligence services has rendered the threat environment more complex and hindered the international security community's lawful capacity to intercept communications and gather intelligence.
Part II
Counter Terrorism
Terrorism Today
The initially promising geopolitical developments of the 1990s saw the end of superpower rivalry and led to changing power and influence structures throughout much of the world. However, ethnic and religious conflicts accompanied these changes, producing instability and the creation of a climate favourable to terrorism. The nature of terrorism today has fundamentally changed from that of even a few years ago and continues to evolve. While the world has seen a reduction in the number of terrorist incidents during the last decade, the incidents now occurring are becoming more deadly and indiscriminate.
Terrorism in Canada can be divided into four categories: religious extremism (with Islamic extremism being the most serious threat at present); state-sponsored terrorism (exemplified by the current regime in Iran); secessionist violence (for example, Sikh extremism and separatist movements in Sri Lanka, Turkey and other countries); and domestic extremism (including, but not limited to, certain elements of animal-rights, anti-globalization and white supremacist groups).
Most terrorist-related activities in Canada support actions elsewhere, and are linked to homeland conflicts. These activities include efforts to use Canada as a base for fundraising, lobbying through front organizations, providing support for terrorist operations in Canada or abroad, procuring weapons and matériel, as well as coercing and manipulating immigrant communities. A number of groups or individuals associated with international terrorist organizations have a presence or are active in Canada.
Terrorist Threat
Sunni Islamic extremism remains the primary focus of the CSIS Counter Terrorism program. The September 11, 2001 attacks on the United States clearly demonstrated the threat that Sunni Islamic terrorist networks pose. Incidents in 2002, such as the bombing of a nightclub in Bali, Indonesia, and the targeting of American soldiers in Kuwait, indicate that the threat has not diminished. Sunni Islamic extremist groups generally aim to establish Islamic states which follow their extreme interpretation of Islamic law. Consequently, it is also the stated goal of many of these organizations to eliminate Western and secular influences in their countries. As a result, citizens and symbols of the Western world become legitimate targets in the minds of some of these groups.
Al Qaida, headed by Osama Bin Laden, functions as an umbrella organization of Sunni Islamic extremist groups, and has proven to be the most lethal amongst these. This type of terrorism transcends national and organizational boundaries and is best described as a network. Bin Laden has repeatedly vowed to use Al Qaida to strike against US civilian and military interests and their allies, including Canada. Al Qaida's global links make its activities unpredictable and challenging for the security and intelligence community. Adding to this challenge are the significant numbers of individuals who have passed through Al Qaida training camps and who are now dispersed throughout the world representing Al Qaida's potential to undertake terrorist action. The investigation of this network is labour-intensive and difficult given that it operates in autonomous cell-like structures, uses sleeper tactics and generally remains very security-conscious.
Disturbing Trends
The trend of spectacular and indiscriminate terrorist attacks has been widely acknowledged. Intense ethnic and religious conflict is at the root of much terrorist activity and will likely continue in the future.
Today's terrorism is complex and fluid. While some terrorist groups operate without a formalized structure, others have more rigid organizations. Terrorist groups no longer hesitate to forge alliances of convenience with other factions or even with rivals, in pursuit of their objectives.
An increasing number of terrorist groups have taken advantage of opportunities derived from advances in the fields of technology, communication and transportation. Wireless communication, the Internet, encryption and financial wire transfers are some of the means used by terrorist organizations to covertly communicate and maintain relationships. Western technological dependency also provides opportunities for cyberterrorists to disrupt information infrastructures and inflict mass damage.
On December 24, 2001, the Anti-terrorism Act was brought into force. Amongst other powers, this Act provides the government with the ability to create a list of individuals and groups which can be referred to as terrorist entities. The process of listing begins with intelligence reports on an entity disclosing that there are reasonable grounds that the entity has knowingly carried out, attempted to carry out, participated in or facilitated a terrorist activity; or the entity is knowingly acting on behalf of, at the direction of or in association with an entity involved in a terrorist activity.
CSIS contributes to the listing process by preparing Security Intelligence Reports which assist the Solicitor General in making a recommendation to the Governor-in-Council to place an entity on the list.
Specifically, under the provisions of the Criminal Code, the Governor-in-Council may, on the recommendation of the Solicitor General of Canada, establish a list of entities. As of 2002, the Government has listed some 16 entities under the Anti-terrorism Act.
Cooperation
CSIS maintains an aggressive Counter Terrorism program. Under Section 17 of the CSIS Act, the Service is authorized to, with ministerial approval, enter into cooperative agreements and relationships. CSIS maintains cooperative relationships with departments and law enforcement agencies at all levels of government in Canada, and with more than 230 foreign agencies in over 130 countries. These foreign relationships put CSIS in a unique position of access to information that might otherwise be unavailable to Canada's intelligence community. Since the September 11, 2001 attacks, CSIS has considerably increased its exchange of information with foreign security and intelligence agencies. This trend is continuing, particularly with the United States, given the common interest in maintaining a secure and open border.
In 2002, information obtained from CSIS intelligence operations was for the first time used successfully during a prosecution under American anti-terrorism law in a United States District Court. CSIS provided information from electronic intercepts to the United States government for use in its prosecution of members of a North Carolina Hizballah cell accused of being engaged in material support to terrorism. These activities included cigarette smuggling, credit card fraud, money laundering, and the distribution of some of the proceeds of these crimes to Hizballah, a designated foreign terrorist organization in the United States. In testimony before a US Senate committee in November 2002, the US Attorney for the Western District of North Carolina, Robert Conrad Jr., noted this significant milestone in the cooperative efforts between the security intelligence agencies of Canada and the United States. In its 2001 report, Patterns of Global Terrorism, the US State Department noted that "overall anti-terrorism cooperation with Canada is excellent, and stands as a model of how the US and another nation can work together on terrorism issues."
The war on terrorism will continue and undergo continuous transformation as both sides in this conflict adapt to new world realities. While recent events have underlined the fact that Canada is not immune from acts of terrorism, CSIS will continue working with partner agencies toward disrupting support of terrorist financing networks in Canada, and denying refuge in this country to members of terrorist organizations.
Part III
Counter Proliferation
Weapons of Mass Destruction and State-Sponsored Terrorism
The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and their delivery systems poses a significant threat to international peace and stability. The spread and potential use of WMD have been issues for many years, but the news of 2002 confirmed that proliferation of these weapons is now taking centre stage among the world's geopolitical tensions.
After months of friction, by May 2002, relations between India and Pakistan over the disputed Kashmir region deteriorated to the point that the world was bracing for the possibility of its first bilateral nuclear conflict. In October 2002, a senior North Korean official admitted that his country had a uranium enrichment program, violating the 1994 Agreed Framework with the United States, under which North Korea agreed to stop development of atomic weapons. In the months that followed, North Korea announced the start-up of its old plutonium reactor, withdrawal from the Non-Proliferation Treaty and the expulsion of United Nations nuclear monitors, leading to further deterioration of relations between the United States and North Korea. In relation to Iraq's development of WMD and delivery systems, the United Nations, in the hope of avoiding war, continued to demand and pursue Iraq's compliance with UN resolutions. These episodes demonstrate how the proliferation of chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear weapons, commonly grouped as weapons of mass destruction, has the potential to undermine international peace and security.
Many of the same countries which are attempting to acquire or develop WMD also continue to support terrorism as an instrument of national policy. There is also evidence that some terrorist groups are seeking to acquire WMD. These threats also undermine international peace and security.
The Government of Canada is committed to countering the spread of such weapons. Canada is a party to various international agreements and treaties which seek to deter the proliferation of WMD, their delivery systems and components which can be used to produce such weapons or systems. As Canada is an internationally recognized leader in many high-technology sectors (such as the nuclear, chemical, pharmaceutical, biotechnological, electronics and aerospace sectors), it remains a frequent target for clandestine and illicit procurement activities by countries and organizations of proliferation concern, most of which lack the indigenous capability to develop and produce WMD.
While the immediate threat of Canada being directly targeted for an attack with WMD is low, Canadian troops serving in peacekeeping or peace-enforcement missions, as well as other Canadian citizens abroad, may be at higher risk of attack. As delivery ranges increase, some of Canada's allies are being rendered vulnerable to such attacks against their home territories. In the longer term, as proliferation increases, states potentially hostile to Canadian interests could use their capability to strike Canada directly.
The Service's Role
In response to these threats and the government's security intelligence priorities, the Service has refocused its operations to create a more intensive, strategic investigative effort against proliferation and ensure timely advice is provided to the government on this threat to national security.
The Counter Proliferation Branch fulfills its role within the CSIS mandate by collecting information related to biological, chemical and nuclear weapons development programs undertaken by foreign governments or terrorist organizations. Through exchange relationships with foreign governments and by working closely with federal government departments and agencies, including the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, the Department of National Defence, the Canada Customs and Revenue Agency, the National Research Council and the Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission, the branch is able to expand upon and share its knowledge about threats and emerging trends in the area.
The branch also investigates state sponsorship of terrorism. Countries such as Iran, Syria and Libya continue to provide terrorist organizations with training, arms, money, materials and logistical support. In addition, these nations monitor, infiltrate and attempt to influence expatriate communities throughout the world, including those within Canada, and target dissidents who actively speak out against their regimes.
The changing face of terrorism has made the potential use of chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear weapons in a terrorist attack a reality. A recent case involving ricin in the United Kingdom demonstrates how easy it is to produce biological agents. Instructions are readily available on the Internet. Anyone with an undergraduate knowledge of chemistry has the skill to produce it. Since the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, Service investigations into the terrorist use of weapons of mass destruction have been expanded. The Service monitors all information regarding terrorist interest in acquiring such weapons.
The primary objective of CSIS investigations is to forewarn government of threats to national security. With the information it gathers, the Service develops assessments of potential WMD threats within Canada or against Canadian interests, which are distributed to the broader security and intelligence community and to other federal government departments and agencies. In addition, the Service works closely with other government departments and law enforcement agencies to counter these threats.
Part IV
Counter Intelligence
Intelligence Activities
Many observers believed that the end of the Cold War, with the concurrent reduction in obvious adversaries, would significantly lessen the level of espionage activity directed against Canada, but this has not proven to be the case. While the threat is changing, traditional espionage and foreign interference continue to take place in Canada. Intelligence services of foreign governments continue to target information related to Canada's scientific and technological developments, critical economic and information infrastructures, military and other classified government information, putting at risk Canada's national security. Adversaries are utilizing new skills, specialized knowledge and cutting-edge technology to acquire their intelligence, challenging the Service to find new and innovative ways to counter these threats. Certain countries also continue to use intelligence services to monitor, manipulate and even threaten expatriates who reside in Canada, despite strong warnings from the Canadian government. Investigating traditional intelligence-gathering and foreign-influenced activities is subtle by nature and consequently resource-intensive, and the Service continues to dedicate substantial resources to countering this threat.
Economic Security
Attempting to enhance their economic competitiveness and improve their standards of living, some foreign governments resort to economic espionage against technologically and industrially advanced nations such as Canada. Economic espionage can be described as illegal, clandestine or coercive activity by a foreign government in order to gain unauthorized access to economic intelligence, such as proprietary information or technology, for economic advantage. Several sectors of the Canadian economy are considered sensitive and likely targets of foreign interest, including: aerospace, biotechnology, chemicals, communications, information technology, mining and metallurgy, nuclear energy, oil and gas, and the environment. Certain foreign governments direct their departments, state-owned corporations and intelligence services to engage in economic espionage against Canada. Visiting foreign students and scientists, exchange personnel, delegations, business persons and members of émigré communities in Canada can be used for this purpose. The Service's Liaison Awareness Program is intended to raise awareness within industry and government departments so as to limit the loss of economic knowledge.
The mandate of CSIS relative to economic espionage is to investigate clandestine activities by foreign governments that are potentially detrimental to Canada's economic, commercial, foreign policy and defence interests. The Service seeks to forewarn government when the otherwise level playing field of free market competition is deliberately tilted against Canadian industry.
Information Operations
Advances in communications and information technology over the past several decades have revolutionized the efficiency with which goods and services can be produced and delivered. However, growing dependence on computer networks has also brought with it new vulnerabilities. Canada's critical infrastructure (transportation; oil and gas; water; emergency services; continuity of government services; banking and finance; electrical power; and telecommunications) is largely operated through the use of computer networks, which makes protecting these networks increasingly a matter of national security concern. Some adversaries might consider a nation's critical information infrastructure as attractive a target as its physical assets. Foreign countries, terrorists with political, ideological or religious beliefs and hackers with no cause except a determination to create mischief all represent potential perpetrators of cyberattacks, and geography serves as no barrier. The Service continues to focus on this growing risk and works with other government departments and allied intelligence services to advise government on the potential threat posed by information operations.
Transnational Criminal Activity
Transnational criminal activity is a growing international problem. Transnational crime involves the globalization of organized criminal activity such as drug trafficking, migrant smuggling, corruption, arms dealing and money laundering. Technological advances have made borders irrelevant to telecommunications and financial transactions, reducing the obstacles to organized criminal activities. Transnational crime organizations threaten law and order and attack the very fabric of life in a democratic, law-abiding society like Canada, directly affecting people's sense of security, trust, order and community. Transnational crime also poses a serious threat to the economic security of the nation since its basic activities serve to undermine the workings of a free-market economy. Many of the world's major transnational criminal organizations, from all parts of the globe, are represented in Canada.
The Service contributes to the broader governmental effort in fighting the threat posed by organized crime by providing the Government of Canada with strategic intelligence about the extent and nature of threats to the security of Canada, and with the provision of tactical information to appropriate law enforcement agencies. Liaison relationships the Service maintains with foreign intelligence agencies help CSIS in its investigation and analysis of this truly worldwide problem.
Part V
Security Screening
The Security Screening program is one of the most visible functions undertaken by CSIS and one of its main operational responsibilities. The goals of the program are to prevent non-Canadians who pose security concerns or risks from entering or receiving permanent resident status in the country and to prevent anyone of security concern from gaining access to sensitive government assets, locations or information.
The September 11th tragedy in the United States has refocused attention on the requirement for good security screening procedures throughout the Government of Canada. Part of the increase in CSIS funding announced in the December 2001 federal budget has been committed to the government and immigration screening programs.
Immigration and Citizenship Screening
The provision of security advice in immigration and citizenship matters is crucial to countering imported threats to the security of Canada. The screening program serves as a first line of defence against those who attempt to penetrate the country to undermine Canadian security. Consequently, CSIS attempts to ensure that all requests in this area are processed expeditiously.
Working closely with Citizenship and Immigration Canada (CIC), the Service's Immigration Screening program's primary task is to provide security-related advice to CIC. The objective is to prevent persons who are inadmissible under the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (IRPA) from entering or gaining status in Canada.
In the last year, the most important change, from a security screening point of view, was the adoption of Front End Screening (FES) for all refugee claimants to Canada. FES is a government initiative to ensure that all refugee claimants arriving in Canada are checked against CSIS records prior to Immigration and Refugee Board assessment. The initiative was implemented to identify and filter potential security cases from the refugee claimant stream as early as possible in the determination process. Prior to the introduction of this program, CSIS was not asked or mandated to screen refugee claimants.
For many years, the Service has also had responsibility for conducting security screening of immigrants and refugees who apply for permanent resident status both from within Canada and outside Canada. CSIS provides advice to the Minister of Citizenship and Immigration related directly to the security inadmissibility criteria contained in the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act.
CSIS also provides CIC with security assessments on applicants for Canadian citizenship. CIC forwards all applications for citizenship to CSIS for review. The Service advises if any security concerns relating to a particular application surfaced in the course of its checks, and provides CIC with relevant security advice if such concerns come to light. In all immigration and citizenship applications, the Minister of Citizenship and Immigration has the ultimate responsibility of determination for the application.
In 2002, the Service processed about 144,900 citizenship application requests, with a median one day turnaround time. 63,100 requests were processed under the Immigration Screening program (31,400 from within Canada and 31,700 from outside of Canada, including 5,500 from the U.S.). The median turnaround time was 39 days for requests from within Canada. In addition, over 25,000 requests were processed under the new Front End Screening procedures for refugee claimants in 2002, with a median turnaround time of 37 days.
Government Screening
The Government Screening program provides security assessments for all government departments and institutions, except the RCMP. The Service also has a site access program for airports, the Parliamentary Precinct and nuclear power stations. These programs assist in enhancing security and reducing the potential threat from terrorist groups and foreign governments which seek advantage from gaining access to classified information or other assets and matériel.
The majority of Government Screening resources are devoted to federal government departments. Under the Government Security Policy (GSP), federal employees, members of the Armed Forces or persons under contract to a government department who in the performance of their duties have access to classified government assets or information, are required to hold security clearances. While the Service assists the originating department by providing an assessment of an individual's reliability and loyalty to Canada, under the GSP, all departments have exclusive authority to grant or deny security clearances.
In 2002, CSIS processed 62,800 requests for access to sensitive or restricted sites and facilities, plus 13,800 for special events and 54,400 security assessments under the Government Screening program. The average time required to process applications ranged from 29 days for Level I (Confidential) applications to 158 days for new Level III (Top Secret) applications.
Foreign Screening
CSIS has reciprocal screening agreements with the governments of foreign states, foreign agencies and international organizations under which it provides them with security assessments. All persons affected by this procedure provide their agreement in advance. Requests for foreign screening typically fall within two categories: database checks and enquiries on Canadian residents wishing to take up residence in another country; or checks and enquiries on former and current Canadian residents who are being considered for classified access in another country.
In 2002, the Service processed 1,740 requests for security assessments in its Foreign Screening program.
Screening of Visitors to Canada
Citizens of more than 140 foreign countries require a visa to visit or transit Canada and must apply at Canadian missions abroad for a visa prior to entering Canada. At the request of CIC, the Service screens those who apply for visas to visit, work or study in Canada. This screening service is an essential first line of defence against those who might enter Canada legally, but then through clandestine or overt means threaten the security of the nation. In 2002, the Security Screening Branch processed over 26,000 visa requests from visitors wishing to come to Canada.
New Initiatives
In the heightened security atmosphere since 9/11, various levels of government and the private sector have shown a strong interest in using CSIS's services in order to improve their security. Three new initiatives have emerged, each having an impact on the Service's workload.
First, the federal and provincial governments have recognized that the flow of critical information must be unimpeded during times of emergency. Consequently, federal security clearances are being made available to certain provincial officials and police officers so they will have immediate access to classified federal information when required.
Second, regulatory bodies for certain critical infrastructures are taking steps to enhance security. Transport Canada, for example, has recently announced a site access clearance program for Canada's marine ports.
Third, several provincial governments are expanding their own security programs to include a personnel clearance element. Alberta and New Brunswick have engaged the Service to provide security assessments on some provincial employees in their programs. Other provinces have indicated an interest in pursuing similar arrangements.
Part VI
Research, Analysis and Production
Reporting Responsibilities
The primary mandate of CSIS is to collect and analyze information, and to report to and advise the government on threats to the security of Canada. Working in close cooperation with the other operational branches of CSIS, the Research, Analysis and Production Branch (RAP) has the primary responsibility for the analysis, production and distribution of intelligence reports on security intelligence issues of relevance to senior federal decision-makers.
The Branch serves the role of a value-added intermediary between the collection of intelligence and its dissemination to the federal government and law enforcement authorities. RAP analysts utilize their knowledge of regional, national and global trends to assess the quality of collected intelligence and produce insightful security intelligence products. The Branch produces several types of reports, based upon a broad range of both open-source and classified information, which provide the government with assessments of threats posed by individuals and/or organizations involved in activities prejudicial to the security of Canada.
The Branch is also responsible for producing open-source material, such as the Commentary, Perspectives and Backgrounder series, which are posted on the CSIS Web site. These products use existing open-source information on security issues and distill it into a concise discussion of value to intelligence professionals, clients in other departments and to the general public.
Government Liaison
One of the Service's key challenges is to fully understand the intelligence requirements of other departments and agencies of the Government of Canada. RAP's Government Liaison Unit supports the Service's commitment to client-focussed service and the provision of timely, value-added security intelligence advice to other parts of government. RAP client liaison officers meet with security officials and program officers in other departments or agencies to ensure that individual security intelligence requirements are met and to maintain an ongoing exchange of information between the Service and its major departmental clients. This unit also provides advice to federal departments and agencies to assist in the preparation of Threat and Risk Assessments, as required by the Government Security Policy.
Part VII
Managing the Risk
Security intelligence is by its very nature a risk-management exercise. CSIS is constantly assessing the global security environment, identifying and prioritizing potential threats and allocating resources between the different threats to the security of Canada. Since CSIS is always monitoring threats and collecting intelligence and is continuously receiving information from its partners in the intelligence community throughout the world and in Canada, reallocation of priorities and consequent shifting of resources is a continual exercise both within and between the Service's operational programs.
The area of counter-terrorism illustrates the Service's efforts to manage risk and properly allocate resources. Early in the 1990s, terrorism began to emerge as the greatest threat to Canadian security. Recognizing the shifting threat environment, CSIS immediately moved resources into the Counter Terrorism operational program, focusing on Islamic extremism. Over the last decade, the resources devoted to counter-terrorism have grown with the scope and complexity of the threat.
Similarly, the area of counter-proliferation attests to the risk posed by the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, a growing concern as both state and non-state actors seek these deadly weapons and the power that accompanies them.
The management of the Service's human resources remains a prime consideration. The need to attract and retain highly skilled, well-trained and motivated staff is central to the ability of CSIS to carry out its mission. The December 2001 Federal budget has provided CSIS with the financial resources to increase its overall establishment to handle the Service's heightened security and intelligence requirements. Additional resources were dedicated to reinforcing various support and specialized areas. From an operational perspective, this also allowed the Service to increase the intake of intelligence officer recruits. It will take some time, however, before these recruits are fully trained as they must follow a five-year training and development program. In the meantime, the Service uses its risk management techniques and allocates resources where they are most needed.
For a number of years, the retention of highly-trained staff has been an issue for many security intelligence agencies around the world. A number of factors, including the remuneration available in the private sector, better promotional opportunities and opportunity for reward and recognition are cited for this problem. Since the September 11, 2001 attacks on the United States, the problem has been exacerbated by the increased demand for trained security intelligence personnel by government agencies and private sector companies that either specialize or have expanded their interest in security matters. Although the initial spurt of departures has slowed down, the turnover of employees due to retirements and sheer demographics remains a challenge for the Service.
In order to ensure that CSIS does the most it can within its budget parameters, modern technology is used wherever possible. While human intelligence capabilities are irreplaceable, technology can allow the Service to better manage the risk and balance its resources. The Immigration and Citizenship Screening program serves as an example. For several years, the Service has been receiving trace requests related to citizenship applications through an Electronic Data Exchange directly from CIC's Case Processing Centre in Sydney, Nova Scotia. Since November 2001, screening requests for immigrants applying to CIC from within Canada have been conducted electronically between the Service and CIC, greatly facilitating the Front End Screening process. Electronic exchange systems have been installed at selected posts abroad to reduce turnaround times on requests related to immigrant applications from outside of Canada, which have traditionally taken longer to process. All of these technological investments have greatly increased the efficiency with which CSIS can respond to these screening requests.
The Service is using technology to enhance its own administration as well. The planned introduction of electronic recruiting by the Service should enhance the efficiency of the recruitment process and reduce the time involved in recruiting new staff.
The current threat environment has dictated an increased workload for CSIS in several areas including immigration screening, security screening for government and research related to determining listed terrorist entities and combatting the financing of terrorist activities. The Government of Canada has recognized these increased responsibilities and the increased need for investigative resources by providing additional funding, as announced in the December 2001 budget. Over the course of a six-year allocation, the resulting increase will peak at 35% and will total $354 million. Projected expenditures for the 2002-2003 fiscal year are $256 million, an increase of 30% from just two years ago. CSIS increased its workforce to 2,290 in 2002-2003 from 2,097 in the prior year.
The charts that follow illustrate the financial and human resources that CSIS is putting to work to address Canada's national security threats. Both charts illustrate the increased resources provided by the Government of Canada to address the heightened threat environment starting in the 2001-2002 fiscal year.
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Figure 1 long description
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Public Contact
For more information, please contact:
Candian Security Intelligence Service
Communications Branch
P.O. Box 9732
Postal Station T
Ottawa, Ontario
K1G 4G4
613-231-0100 (Communications)
Cat No. JS71-2/2003
ISBN 0-662-67108-2