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2003 Public Report
This thirteenth annual Public Report of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) is a retrospective on the year that was for CSIS in 2003. It looks back on the 2003 global threat environment, its impact on Canada and CSIS' response. As well, the Report highlights some of the challenges faced by the Service in protecting Canadian security. The publication of a CSIS Public Report stems from a requirement identified in 1990 by the Special Committee on the Review of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service Act and the Security Offences Act to provide parliamentarians and the public with increased knowledge about the mandate and function of CSIS.
Foreword
The year 2003 was marked by a global security environment that was characterized by a level of instability not seen in years. The many tensions across the world, stemming mainly from terrorist activities, continue to have potentially serious consequences for Western nations and put their security resources, including those of CSIS, under great pressure. Terrorist capabilities and evolving operational methodologies, such as in the area of communications, together with the asymmetric configuration of modern terrorist organizations, make penetration of these groups extremely difficult and costly. Security forces must respond with unrelenting vigilance and creative cooperative responses in order to prevail.
One of the lessons learned following the events of September 11, 2001, was the increased need for information-sharing. In response, and as a means of ensuring that national security intelligence is shared, analyzed and disseminated to the broader security community in Canada, CSIS established the Integrated National Security Assessment Centre (INSAC) in 2003.
Historically, many threats to Canada's security have originated offshore and required foreign investigations in response. Today's threat environment is increasingly international and transnational in nature and more than ever, foreign sources of threat-related information constitute an essential part of CSIS investigations.
The Service continues to be aware of emerging terrorist threats and tactics that could affect Canadians. A significant proportion of the world's terrorist groups are represented in Canada, with Sunni Islamic extremism being the main concern within the Counter Terrorism Program. Canada also faces, to a lesser degree, domestic issues that may lead to extremist acts. Safeguarding the public against such threats remains the Service's first priority. Since September 11, 2001, the demands placed upon the investigative, analytical and liaison capabilities of the Service have substantially increased. Operational areas of notable growth include immigration screening, security screening for government, terrorist entity listings and terrorist financing.
Another Service priority is the investigation of the threat posed by weapons of mass destruction and conventional arms, including the illicit use of otherwise legitimate technologies. CSIS worked through its Counter Proliferation Branch to gather information related to biological, chemical and nuclear weapons development programs undertaken by foreign governments. Service officers develop assessments of threats posed by potential weapons of mass destruction to Canada or Canadian interests and distribute these assessments to the broader security and intelligence community.
Other priorities include investigating the threats posed by espionage and foreign interference; transnational organized crime; protecting Canada's economic security; defending against cyberthreats to critical infrastructure; and safeguarding the confidential information of the Government of Canada from foreign governments and others that might threaten the security of Canadians.
In 2003, CSIS' Front End Screening program of refugee claimants to Canada was expanded. This program is proving to be successful in identifying and filtering potential security and criminal cases from the refugee claimant stream early in the determination process.
Managing the Service's human resources remains a key challenge. The need to attract skilled, well-trained and motivated staff is central to the ability of CSIS to carry out its mandate. The increase in budget announced following the events of 2001 has provided CSIS with financial relief to recruit new intelligence officers to handle the Service's increasing operational requirements. However, it will take some time before these new personnel can be trained and acquire the requisite experience to be fully functional.
The Service must continue to show flexibility in being able to adapt and concentrate resources on foremost threats. Our target base, while concentrated in large urban centres, is diffused across a broad geographical area. The war on terrorism will undoubtedly undergo many transformations as both sides in this conflict adapt to new world realities. While recent events have underscored the fact that Canada is not immune from acts of terrorism, CSIS will continue to maintain a forewarning capability to meet our country's evolving security intelligence needs.
The pages that follow give a more detailed description of the 2003 security environment and the response of CSIS.
Table of Contents
- Foreword
- Part I: Threats to Canadian Interests
- Part II: Threat Priorities
- Part III: Operational Activities
- Part IV: Human Resources
- Part V: Challenges
Part 1
Threats to Canadian Interests
The most significant threat to Canada is that posed by terrorism. As Canada continues to be an active player in the international struggle against terrorism, it will face increasing threats from transnational terrorist organizations. Globally, there is clearly an ongoing willingness by groups, individuals and states to use violence in support of political, religious, ideological and territorial agendas. Terrorist capabilities, modus operandi, and technology continue to evolve, creating increasing demands upon governments and security forces to ensure unrelenting vigilance, thorough threat analysis, and creative, cooperative responses. Safeguarding against the possibility of a terrorist attack occurring in, or originating from, Canada is the highest national security priority.
Current signs point to increased terrorist threats, particularly from Sunni Islamic extremists either directly aligned with or supporting of the ideology espoused by Al Qaeda. Osama Bin Laden has vowed to use Al Qaeda to strike the United States and its allies, including Canada.
Recent history has shown that few areas of the world are immune from the threat of Sunni Islamic extremism. Morocco, Turkey, Saudi Arabia and Indonesia have recently experienced attacks perpetrated by Sunni Islamic extremist groups. In addition, attempts to commit terrorist actions by such groups in the United Kingdom, France and Italy have been thwarted prior to taking place. Al Qaeda remains a potent global threat and more attacks are expected.
Emerging terrorist threats and tactics have become more lethal and intelligence failures could have catastrophic results. Despite terrorists' demonstrated preference for conventional explosive devices, the possibility that a weapon of mass destruction (chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear - [CBRN]) could be acquired and used by terrorist groups is now conceivable. Potential targets might include food sources and water supplies, heavily populated urban centres, and infrastructure critical to government and economic activity. Changing tactics, the potential use of chemical, biological, and radiological weapons, and threats to the infrastructure represent current realities in the fight against Al Qaeda and its adherents.
Successful enforcement initiatives, including arrests, removals from Canada and tracking terrorist financing, have reduced, but not eliminated, the threat posed by these groups. Responding to this menace will be the Service's top priority and a substantial portion of the Service's resources will continue to be devoted to this area.
In addition to the danger posed by terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction by a growing number of states poses a significant threat to international peace and stability, and therefore to Canada's own security. Canada is a signatory to several international agreements and treaties which are committed to prohibiting the development and transfer of such weapons.
Threats to Canada's national security continue to emanate from international criminal organizations that undermine the integrity of public and private institutions. Other threats emanate from countries that dedicate significant resources to espionage aimed at acquiring information to meet their military, political and economic intelligence requirements through covert means. Indeed, additional concerns are related to the foreign-influenced activities of governments seeking to manipulate expatriate communities in Canada.
As well, public and private sectors in countries around the world are becoming increasingly dependent on computer-based networks to conduct their business and provide services to the public. The threat spectrum associated with technological change is continually evolving, as are the tools and techniques being developed to attack and exploit computer-based networks. The potential for physical interference or cyberattacks against Canada's critical infrastructure has become a reality. A large segment of Canada's critical infrastructure is directly linked with similar infrastructures globally, particularly with the United States. The August 2003 blackout demonstrated the economic, physical, and psychological impacts resulting from a critical infrastructure failure. The effects of a terrorist attack on the critical infrastructure of Canada, or an associated country, could have profound repercussions.
Part II
Threat Priorities
Terrorism
The initially promising geopolitical developments of the 1990s saw the end of superpower rivalry and led to fluctuating power and influence structures throughout much of the world. Together with ethnic and religious conflicts, they have produced instability and created a climate favourable to terrorism. So, although the last few years of the previous century saw a reduction in the number of terrorist incidents, the beginning of the new millennium witnessed an increase in deadly and indiscriminate terrorist attacks. Furthermore, the nature of terrorism itself has changed from that of even a few years ago and continues to evolve.
Terrorism can be broadly divided into four categories:
- Religious extremism, with Sunni Islamic extremism being the most serious threat at present;
- Secessionist violence, such as the actions of militaristic separatist movements in foreign countries;
- Domestic extremism, which includes, but is not limited to, violent elements of white supremacist or anti-globalization groups;
- State-sponsored terrorism.
A number of groups or individuals associated with international terrorist organizations have a presence, or are active, in Canada. Most of their Canadian activities support actions elsewhere and are often linked to homeland conflicts. Those activities include using Canada as a base for fundraising and lobbying through front organizations; providing support for terrorist operations; procurement activities; planning and organizing terrorist activities abroad; and coercing and manipulating immigrant communities.
Religious Extremism
Sunni Islamic extremism remains the primary focus of the CSIS Counter Terrorism program. Since the September 2001 attacks, the Sunni Islamic terrorists' pattern of multiple coordinated bomb attacks against civilian targets has become tragically familiar. Attacks in Turkey and Morocco, during 2003, indicate that the threat has not diminished and is extending to hitherto untouched countries.
The stated goal of many Sunni Islamic terrorist groups consists in eliminating Western influence and secular forms of government in Muslim countries, as well as establishing theocratic states following their interpretation of Islamic law. Al Qaeda is one such organization. Headed by Osama Bin Laden, it functions as an umbrella organization of Sunni Islamic terrorist groups, and has been described as a network. It has proven to be the most lethal terrorist entity and its brand of terrorism transcends national and organizational boundaries.
Secessionist Violence
Secessionist violence continues to rip apart various communities, and these conflicts often find their way into the multicultural fabric of Canadian society. In Sri Lanka, for example, a murderous civil war seems ready to flare up again into armed conflict, despite peace negotiations. The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), one of the warring parties in Sri Lanka, is a sophisticated organization that pioneered the use of human suicide bombers for terrorist operations. Its presence in Canada, as well as that of other terrorist entities of the same ilk, affects the life of new Canadians seeking to flee political turmoil.
Domestic Extremism
The potential for terrorist violence is not exclusively foreign-based. Domestically grown threats do exist. Violence can originate from any number of domestic radical groups ranging from the neo-Nazi movement to the violent fringe of any number of single-issue groups such as the ecological, animal-rights or anti-globalization movements. Canada is a diverse country, where democratic and open debates about political, linguistic, ethnic or religious issues are the norm. However, there remains a violence-prone margin of loosely attached persons who may resort to violence to achieve their goals. Throughout its existence, in accordance with the principles of the CSIS Act, the Service has been responsible for advising government regarding these attempts to resort to violence, without preventing the legitimate expression of political views, including ones dissenting from the majority of Canadian society.
State-sponsored Terrorism
There is an ongoing need for intelligence about the threats posed by states which, as a matter of national policy, support terrorism. Several states continue to provide various means of support for terrorist groups, including funding, training, or the provision of a safe haven.
State sponsorship of terrorism threatens security interests in Canada and abroad. A number of terrorist groups that are known to be supported by national governments, such as the Hizballah, have some presence in Canada. In addition, a number of Canadian citizens and Canadian organizations are present in parts of the world where they could be the targets of state-sponsored terrorist groups. The Service continues to monitor the activities of countries that support terrorism and of terrorist groups that receive their support.
Disturbing Trends
Over the years, the Service has seen the changing face of terrorism and is responsible for recognizing different trends in order to forewarn and help protect Canada and Canadians from such threats. The political terrorism of the 1980s, as exemplified in Europe by groups such as the Rote Armee Fraktion (Red Army Faction) or the Cellules communistes combattantes, and in Canada by Direct Action, was political in ideology. Today, religion is often used to justify terrorist violence. And while at one time the majority of operatives were long-time political activists from the middle class, today's terrorist operatives come from all classes and sectors of society. Ahmed Ressam, as a case in point, had no political aspirations and it is religious extremism that guided him in his attempt to commit a terrorist attack against the Los Angeles airport in 1999.
While in the past the Service often faced highly disciplined, centralized organizations, today's terrorism is complex and fluid. While some terrorist groups have retained a rigid organization, others operate without a formalized structure. Some terrorist groups do not hesitate to forge alliances of convenience with other factions, or even with rivals, in pursuit of their objectives.
An increasing number of terrorist groups have taken advantage of opportunities derived from advances in the fields of technology, communication and transportation. Wireless communication, the Internet, encryption and financial wire transfers are some of the means used by terrorist organizations to covertly communicate and maintain relationships, all of which present challenges to those charged with investigating the activities of such organizations.
Terrorists are also considering new means of inflicting casualties, seeking to maximize death and destruction. These means of inflicting massive casualties need not be the use of biological, chemical or nuclear weapons and could just as easily be the use of improvised radiological (high explosives combined with radioactive material to contaminate the explosion site and its surrounding area) or thermobaric weapons (high-energy explosives combined with incendiary material to produce intense heat and a bigger blast for destructive effect). While just a decade ago terrorists committed acts of violence for an audience, today's terrorist will not hesitate to kill his audience to achieve his goal.
The war on terrorism will continue and undergo continuous transformation as both sides in this conflict adapt to new world realities. In the coming year, it is expected that Al Qaeda will continue to conduct sporadic, coordinated, multiple suicide bombing attacks, with the aim of inflicting sizeable destruction and fatalities.
Canada is not immune from acts of terrorism. As Canada continues to be an active player in the international struggle against terrorism, it will face increasing threats from transnational terrorist organizations. CSIS will continue working with partner agencies toward countering terrorist operations, disrupting terrorist financing networks in Canada, and denying refuge in this country to members of terrorist entities.
Proliferation
The threat posed by the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) - nuclear, chemical and biological weapons and their means of delivery - is complex and global, undermining both Canadian national security and global stability.
Efforts by a growing number of state and non-state actors to develop and produce weapons of mass destruction have accelerated. States seeking to develop WMD often lack the indigenous capability to develop and produce them, and try to procure critical components, technology and expertise for their WMD programs from abroad, including from Canada. To counter this threat, the Service collects information, maintains close relationships with other government departments and with foreign services, and advises the Government of Canada on the doctrines of various states and terrorist groups and on efforts to acquire materiel for such weapons.
In the 1980s and early 1990s, the Service's analysis of proliferation and technology transfer issues concluded that Canada's high-technology sectors were systematically being targeted by some countries and that a small core of leading-edge Canadian companies were the focus of targeting by hostile intelligence services. At the time, there was evidence that some foreign governments were also sending students and scientists to Canada to procure expertise and technology related to the development of WMD.
Today, the proliferation of WMD and their delivery systems poses a significant threat to international peace and stability, as proliferation of these weapons is taking centre stage among the world's geopolitical tensions. Many of the same countries attempting to acquire or develop WMD also continue to support terrorism as an instrument of national policy. The changing face of terrorism has made the potential use of CBRN weapons in terrorist attacks much more likely. CBRN attacks, if successfully executed, could have devastating consequences. Al Qaeda, for example, is known to have shown a strong interest in the development of CBRN weapons.
Espionage and Foreign-influenced Activities
When CSIS was first established in 1984, countering espionage and foreign-influenced activities were its primary focus. During the Cold War, when the United States and the Soviet Union were pitted against each other in a nuclear arms race, Soviet bloc nations sought to gain advantage over Western nations through sophisticated espionage activities focussing on political and military information. The counter-intelligence threat environment has changed since the disintegration of the Soviet bloc and the fall of the Iron Curtain, and while espionage is still a very serious threat, technological developments and increasing global economic competition have brought other threats to prominence as well, such as those from economic espionage, information operations and transnational criminal activity.
Espionage and Foreign Interference
Since the end of the Cold War, the threat posed by traditional espionage and foreign interference has changed, but has not diminished. While some of the perpetrators are different, and some former adversaries have become allies, many foreign governments continue to target Canada through such activities. The arrest in 1996, after a CSIS investigation of two Russian espionage agents posing as Canadian citizens, demonstrated the continued threat that espionage poses.
Intelligence services of foreign governments continue to seek information related to Canada's scientific and technological developments, critical economic and information infrastructures, military and other classified government information, putting at risk Canada's national security. Adversaries are utilizing new skills, specialized knowledge and cutting-edge technology to acquire their intelligence, challenging the Service to find new and innovative ways to counter these threats. Certain countries also continue to use intelligence services to monitor, manipulate, threaten or exploit expatriates who reside in Canada, despite strong warnings from the Canadian government. Investigating traditional intelligence-gathering and foreign-influenced activities is subtle by nature and consequently resource-intensive, and the Service continues to dedicate substantial resources to countering this threat.
Economic Security
Attempting to enhance their economic competitiveness and improve their standards of living, some foreign governments resort to economic espionage against technologically and industrially advanced nations such as Canada. Economic espionage can be described as illegal, clandestine or coercive activity by a foreign government in order to gain unauthorized access to economic intelligence, such as proprietary information or technology, for economic advantage. Several sectors of the Canadian economy are considered sensitive and likely targets of foreign interest, including: aerospace, biotechnology, chemicals, communications, information technology, mining and metallurgy, nuclear energy, oil and gas, and environmental technologies. Certain foreign governments direct their departments, state-owned corporations and intelligence services to engage in economic espionage against Canada. Visiting foreign students and scientists, exchange personnel, delegations, business persons and members of émigré communities in Canada can be used for this purpose. The Service's Liaison Awareness Program is intended to raise awareness within industry and government departments so as to limit the loss of economic information.
The mandate of CSIS relative to economic espionage is to investigate clandestine activities by foreign governments that are potentially detrimental to Canada's economic, commercial and foreign policy interests. The Service seeks to forewarn government when the otherwise level playing field of free market competition is deliberately tilted against Canadian industry.
Information Operations
Advances in communications and information technology over the past several decades have revolutionized the efficiency with which goods and services can be produced and delivered. However, a growing dependence on computer networks has also brought with it new vulnerabilities. Canada's critical infrastructure is largely operated through the use of computer networks, which makes protecting these networks increasingly a matter of national security concern. Some adversaries might consider a nation's critical information infrastructure as attractive a target as its physical assets. Foreign countries, terrorists with political, ideological or religious beliefs and hackers with no cause except a determination to create mischief, all represent potential perpetrators of cyberattacks, and geography serves as no barrier. The recent proliferation of high-profile viruses and worms transmitted via the Internet and e-mail has garnered the attention of the media and raised the public's awareness of the importance of information protection and the destruction that such attacks can cause. The Service identified this threat many years ago and continues to focus on this growing risk, working with other government departments and allied intelligence services to advise government on the potential threat posed by information operations.
Transnational Criminal Activity
Transnational criminal activity is a growing international problem. Transnational crime involves the globalization of organized criminal activity such as drug trafficking, migrant smuggling, corruption, arms dealing and money laundering. Technological advances have made borders irrelevant to telecommunications and financial transactions, reducing the obstacles to organized criminal activities. Transnational crime organizations threaten law and order and attack the very fabric of life in a democratic, law-abiding society like Canada, directly affecting people's sense of security, trust, order and community. Transnational crime also poses a serious threat to the economic security of the nation since its basic activities serve to undermine the workings of a free-market economy. Many of the world's major transnational criminal organizations, from all parts of the globe, are represented in Canada.
The Service contributes to the broader governmental effort in fighting the threat posed by organized crime; it provides the Government of Canada with strategic intelligence about the extent and nature of threats to the security of Canada, and generates tactical information to appropriate law enforcement agencies. The liaison relationships which the Service maintains with foreign intelligence agencies help CSIS investigate and analyze this worldwide problem.
Part III
Operational Activities
Intelligence Collection
Intelligence collection is the preliminary phase of the Service's advisory role to government. Information from members of the public, foreign governments and technical interception of telecommunications are combined with information from open sources including newspapers, periodicals, academic journals, foreign and domestic broadcasts, official documents and other published material.
The Service uses a variety of collection methods to investigate individuals or groups whose activities are suspected of constituting a threat to national security. Through such investigations, the Service can identify individuals with suspected connections to terrorism, proliferators of WMD, persons operating in Canada on behalf of hostile intelligence services as well as those involved in transnational criminal activities. In addition to these activities, the Service is required to inform the government of foreign-influenced activities that are detrimental to the interests of Canada, are clandestine or deceptive, or involve a threat to any Canadian.
In planning an investigation, care is taken to ensure an appropriate balance between the degree of intrusiveness of an investigation and concern for the rights and freedoms of those being investigated. Investigations which may call for the use of more intrusive techniques, such as the interception of telecommunications, are subject to a rigorous process of challenge and controls, including a review by senior management committees chaired by the CSIS Director (with representation from the departments of Justice and Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness), followed by ministerial approval. The CSIS Act also requires that judicial authorization, in the form of a Federal Court warrant, must be obtained before certain intrusive techniques are used. A Federal Court judge must be satisfied, after examining a warrant and accompanying affidavit presented by the Service, that there are reasonable grounds to justify issuing such a warrant.
Operations Abroad
In keeping with the more complex threat environment, the Service must deal with the challenges posed by the increasingly international and transnational nature of the threat. In response to this trend, CSIS has been required to make operations abroad a more integral part of its work. Foreign sources of threat-related information have become predominant and security intelligence investigations which begin in Canada cannot simply cease at the Canadian border.
While CSIS has been conducting operations abroad for many years, the complexity of the operations has evolved, and will continue to evolve, as the Service acquires experience and develops new skills.
Intelligence Analysis
The primary mandate of CSIS is to collect and analyse information, and to report to and advise the government on threats to the security of Canada. Analysts in all of the Service's operational programs use their knowledge of regional, national and global trends to assess the quality of all types of information gathered, and organize it into useful security intelligence, serving the role of value-added intermediaries between the collection of intelligence and its dissemination to the federal government and law enforcement authorities. CSIS approaches its responsibilities for intelligence analysis from three perspectives: strategic, tactical, and open source.
Strategically, CSIS monitors, assesses and reports on emerging trends and issues which could affect the security of Canada. These strategic assessments focus on thematic, global and potential threats, and usually serve policy and strategic decision-makers.
Tactically, the Service analyzes, publishes and disseminates intelligence products which address current threats to the security of Canada. Tactical analysis tends to concentrate on case-specific or country-specific threats, and supports a specific client or purpose. The continued monitoring by subject-matter experts allows for timely tactical products and is also part of the strategic analysis process.
CSIS produces open-source material, such as the Commentary, Perspectives and Backgrounder series, which are posted on the CSIS Web site. These products use existing open-source information on security issues and distill it into a concise discussion of value to intelligence professionals, clients in other departments and to the general public.
As a result of the events of September 11, 2001, the Anti-terrorism Act was brought into force on December 24, 2001. Among other powers, this Act authorizes the government to create a list of individuals and groups which are referred to, for the purpose of the Act, as terrorist entities.
CSIS contributes to the listing process by preparing Security Intelligence Reports which assist the Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness in making a recommendation to the Governor-in-Council to place an entity on the list.
Specifically, under the provisions of the Criminal Code, the Governor-in-Council may, on the recommendation of the Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness, establish a list of entities. By the end of 2003, the Government had listed some 34 entities under the Anti-terrorism Act.
Government Liaison
The CSIS Act designates the Government of Canada as the main recipient of CSIS intelligence. Under Section 19 of the CSIS Act, the Service distributes diverse reports to various departments of the federal government and law enforcement authorities.
One of the Service's key challenges is to fully understand the intelligence requirements of its departmental and agency clients. The Service has established a Government Liaison Unit which is responsible for maintaining regular contact with departments in order to obtain their security intelligence requirements, enabling the Service to tailor distribution of its information to a department's specific requirements. Client liaison officers meet with security officials and program officers in other departments or agencies to ensure that individual security intelligence requirements are met and to maintain an ongoing exchange of information between the Service and its major departmental clients. The Government Liaison Unit supports the Service's commitment to client-focussed service and the provision of timely, value-added security intelligence advice to other parts of government.
Threat assessments are a key product of the Service. The RCMP depends on threat assessments to determine the level of security required to protect foreign diplomatic missions and Canadian VIPs. The Department of Foreign Affairs uses these threat assessments to determine the proper level of protection required for Canadian missions and personnel overseas. Transport Canada uses the assessments when considering security concerns for the travelling public.
Under the Government Security Policy, CSIS also assists government institutions in preparing departmental threat and risk assessments (TRAs) at their request. The demand for the production of TRAs has increased dramatically since the events of September 11, 2001, increasing pressures on the Service's resources.
Since the Fall of 2001, CSIS has been examining ways to ensure that the information it shares with other government agencies and other levels of government in Canada can be delivered more broadly and in the most effective way possible. The Integrated National Security Assessment Centre (INSAC) was established at CSIS in 2003 to facilitate sharing of all-source intelligence. Located at CSIS headquarters, the Centre draws personnel seconded from other elements of the Canadian intelligence community, allowing them to share the intelligence insights of their home organizations in a collaborative environment. INSAC products are designed to be used by the Government of Canada to warn provincial and territorial partners of current threats, which can sharpen anticipatory and response reflexes at local levels.
Foreign Liaison
The nature of the current threats to Canada's national security has meant that the Service's relationships with foreign intelligence and security agencies have become even more important. Indeed, effective responses to these threats increasingly require joint operations, information-sharing and operational cooperation, both in Canada and abroad. This trend is expected to continue and intensify.
Under Section 17 of the CSIS Act, the Service is authorized, with ministerial approval, to enter into cooperative agreements and relationships. CSIS maintains cooperative relationships with over 240 foreign agencies in some 140 countries. Over the last 20 years, CSIS has substantially increased the number of relationships it maintains with foreign agencies, putting CSIS in a unique position of access to information that might otherwise be unavailable to Canada's intelligence community.
Security Screening
Security screening is a vital component of the Government of Canada's security regime and is one of the most visible functions undertaken by CSIS. The goals of the program are to prevent non-Canadians who pose security concerns, or risks, from entering Canada or receiving permanent resident status or citizenship, and to prevent anyone of security concern from gaining access to sensitive government assets, locations or information.
Over the years, the Government of Canada has undertaken a number of legislative and policy initiatives to address the safety concerns of Canadians, considerably increasing demand for security screening services in both the government and immigration screening programs.
The Service has met these increased demands and adapted to the changing threat and technological environment. Processing delays have been reduced through the adoption of a largely automated, state-of-the-art processing system, replacing the previous manual, paper- based system.
The Shared Border Accord in 1995 and the Smart Border Declaration in 2002 attest to the Canadian and American governments commitment to facilitating the legitimate flow of people and goods across the border while addressing the security imperatives of both countries. The Free and Secure Trade (FAST) program, emanating from the Smart Border Declaration, involves a pre-approved security process for importers, carriers and truck drivers in order to expedite their clearance through Canada/US land-border crossings. While the Canada Border Services Agency (CBSA) is responsible for the FAST program, the Service will provide security assessments to the Border Agency on applicants for FAST passes.
Immigration and Citizenship Screening
The Immigration Screening and Citizenship Screening programs are founded on the security- related criteria contained in the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (IRPA) and the Citizenship Act, and aim to prevent persons who are deemed inadmissible from entering or gaining status in Canada. There are four essential components: the screening of refugee claimants, the screening of applicants for permanent residence, the screening of visitors from countries of terrorist concern and the screening of applicants for Canadian citizenship. Section 14 of the CSIS Act authorizes the Service to provide security-related advice in screening applicants through the various immigration and citizenship processes.
The Service's responsibilities in this area have expanded in recent years, reflecting the Government of Canada's commitment to counter imported threats to Canadian security and substantive revisions of Canada's immigration legislation. The screening of higher-risk overseas applicants and Front End Screening of refugee applicants have been added to the duties of CSIS.
The Front End Screening Program is a government initiative instituted to ensure that all refugee claimants arriving in Canada are checked against CSIS and RCMP records at the beginning of their refugee protection determination process. This program, carried out in cooperation with Citizenship and Immigration Canada (CIC) and the CBSA, was implemented to identify and filter potential security cases from the refugee claimant stream as early as possible in the determination process.
A second distinct, yet complementary, program assists in identifying visitors and refugee claimants who are inadmissible for security reasons at Canadian ports of entry. This program, known as the Port of Entry Interdiction Program, also seeks to prevent persons who are inadmissible under the IRPA from entering or gaining status in Canada. Should a front-line CBSA officer posted at a port of entry have security concerns about an individual's admissibility to Canada, a CSIS officer may be requested to conduct a joint interview of the individual and to provide security-related advice. The Service continues to have a presence at selected Canadian border crossings and international airports.
The Service conducts security screening of immigrants and refugees who apply for permanent residence status both from within and outside Canada. The Service has sole responsibility for the security screening of immigrants who apply for permanent residence from within Canada. Applications that originate outside Canada are managed by the Overseas Immigration Screening Program under which the Service shares responsibility for security screening with CBSA officials based abroad. Generally, CSIS only becomes involved in the overseas screening process either upon request from CBSA or upon receipt of adverse information about a case from established sources, allowing the Service to concentrate on higher-risk cases.
The purpose of the Service's Visa Vetting program is to identify and stop terrorists from entering Canada. The program applies to nationals or current residents of a number of countries suspected of assisting terrorists, condoning or endorsing terrorist activities, or serving as potential bases for launching terrorist operations. Applicants from those countries are vetted through the Service for inadmissibility under the security provisions of Section 34 of the IRPA, before a visa is issued.
The Service also provides CIC with security assessments on applicants for Canadian citizenship. Under this process, CIC forwards all applications for citizenship to CSIS for review. The Service advises if any security concerns relating to a particular application surfaced in the course of its checks and provides CIC with relevant security advice.
While the Service provides CIC with security assessments on visitors as well as applicants for permanent residence and Canadian citizenship, it is the Minister of Citizenship and Immigration who ultimately determines the merits of an application. As of the end of 2003, CSIS processed over 204,000 cases under the Immigration and Citizenship Screening program.
Government Screening
The Government's screening program provides security assessments for all government departments and institutions with the exception of the RCMP, which continues to conduct its own investigations. The Service also provides security assessments for site access programs at airports, Parliamentary precincts and nuclear power stations, for special events and for some provincial security clearance programs. These programs assist in enhancing security and reducing the potential threat from terrorist groups and foreign governments which seek advantage from gaining access to classified information or other assets and material.
The majority of CSIS Government Screening resources are devoted to federal government departments. Under the Government Security Policy (GSP), federal employees, members of the Armed Forces or persons under contract to a government department who in the performance of their duties have access to classified government assets or information, are required to hold security clearances. While the Service assists the originating department by providing an assessment of an individual's loyalty, and reliability in relation thereto, to Canada, all departments have exclusive authority under the GSP to grant or deny security clearances.
During the past two decades, the Government Screening Program has expanded in terms of numbers of clearance requests, the size of the client base and the number of site access programs authorized by statute or regulation (the Airport Restricted Area Access Clearance Program under the Aerodrome Security Regulations and site access clearance for nuclear sites under the Nuclear Safety Control Act). The Service has also expanded its Government Screening Program by entering into agreements with non-federal clients.
The average time required to process government security applications ranged from six days for Level I (Confidential) applications to 72 days for Level III (Top Secret) applications. In 2003, the Service processed over 79,000 requests under the Government Screening Program.
Foreign Screening
CSIS has reciprocal screening agreements with the governments of some foreign states, foreign agencies and international organizations under which it provides them with security assessments. All persons affected by this procedure provide their agreement in advance. Requests for foreign screening typically fall within two categories: database checks and enquiries on Canadian residents wishing to take up residence in another country; or checks and enquiries on former and current Canadian residents who are being considered for classified access in another country. In 2003, the Service was asked to process over 1,200 cases in this program.
Part IV
Human Resources
CSIS has developed a workforce capable of meeting the demands that today's threat environment presents. The Service has undertaken recruitment programs to hire experienced, educated and well-rounded individuals in a variety of disciplines, whose travels and diversity have acquainted them with foreign countries and languages.
As a result, the Service's workforce is more representative of the Canadian population than at any time since 1984, when CSIS was formed. For example, seven per cent of intelligence officers were female in 1984, compared to 36 per cent in 2003. Today, English is the first official language of 63 per cent of CSIS employees while French is the first language of the remaining 37 per cent. All new recruits to intelligence officer positions must be bilingual to qualify. The Service offers language training to people who need it before they become full members of the organization.
In 2003, 8.2 per cent of CSIS employees are visible minorities of various ethnic background, and one-third of intelligence officers speak a non-official foreign language. In addition to their travel and post-graduate work experience, one-quarter of intelligence officers have more than one university degree.
This diversity of backgrounds, knowledge and skills has been helpful as the Service continues to shift its operational resources to the areas of greatest priority.
The charts that follow illustrate the financial and human resources that CSIS is putting to work to address Canada's national security threats. The increases in resources for Public Safety and Anti-terrorism, beginning in 2001-2002, reflect budgetary increases provided through the December 2001 federal budget. Further to those resources, the Service has also received additional funding to cover operational requirements related to the Marine Security and the Smart Borders Declaration.
View a full screen version of the chart.
View a full screen version of the chart.
Part V
Challenges
While the fundamentals of the CSIS Act have not changed in the nearly 20 years of its existence, the challenges to the Service have. Nevertheless, the Act's design has provided CSIS with the flexibility to adapt to a more diverse and complicated global threat environment and increased demand for the services that it provides.
The Changing Threat Environment
In the early days of CSIS, the majority of its operational resources were dedicated to threats from espionage, clandestine foreign interference and subversion. Over time, however, CSIS has shifted its operational priorities to meet requirements related to public safety, most notably exemplified by the growing threats of international terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. The bombing of Air India in 1985, the 1993 attack against the World Trade Center in New York, the Ahmed Ressam case in 1999 and the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks in the United States have all been watersheds in the Service's evolution.
In 2003, the global security environment was characterized by a level of instability not seen in years. There is a clearly demonstrated willingness by individuals, groups and states to use violence in support of political, religious, ideological and territorial agendas. In particular, the actions of Islamic terrorists operating under Al Qaeda auspices have put Western security resources, including those of CSIS, under considerable pressure. Preferred target venues include locations that could yield maximum destruction and casualties, and the potential for use of weapons of mass destruction remains of primary concern.
Given that virtually all current threats to the security of Canada either have their origins abroad or are manifested across international borders, CSIS has had to increasingly look outside Canada's borders, both to understand the threat and to build strong cooperative relationships with intelligence services around the world. These progressively more complex and resource- intensive operations continue to challenge the Service.
Yet another challenge is the Service's ability to keep pace with the rapid development, growth and availability of technological and communications advances that increasingly offer potential threat perpetrators the ability to further their aims and cover their tracks. The increasingly diffuse nature of the threats has resulted in a wider variety of targets, with varied technical capabilities, vulnerabilities and communication tradecraft. The Service endeavours to meet this challenge through collaboration with domestic and foreign allies and must continually work to upgrade its capacity to lawfully intercept the communications of its targets.
Changes in the threat environment have also created an increasing number of demands from the Service's client departments. In few areas is this more evident than in security screening. Since the events of September 11, 2001, CSIS has been tasked with additional duties in the areas of front-end screening of refugee claimants, the Port of Entry Interdiction Program and the FAST program, and has received an increased number of requests for screening from previously non- traditional clients, such as provincial governments.
The Service continues to attempt to build capacity to meet the increasing challenges presented and the resultant increased demand for its services, but its resources are strained. Increased budget allocations provided after September 11, 2001, have allowed the Service to bring some additional resources to bear in dealing with these demands, but these resources are not yet fully operational.
The Service continues to rely on risk management and flexibility to concentrate its resources on the most significant threats, while ensuring its capability to respond to emerging issues. While the recent addition of resources expands the Service's capacity, in the long term, managing the operational needs of the Service will continue to be a challenge in light of ever-increasing demands.
Public Contact
For more information, please contact:
Candian Security Intelligence Service
Communications Branch
P.O. Box 9732
Postal Station T
Ottawa, Ontario
K1G 4G4
613-231-0100 (Communications)
Cat No. JS71-2/2003-1E-HTML
ISBN 0-662-35925-9