ARCHIVED: Chemical and Biological Terrorism: The Threat According to the Open Literature

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Conclusions

The preceding, fairly exhaustive examination of the open literature on the subject of CB terrorism may be summarized as follows:

• one of the principal advantages of CB weapons for terrorists is their extreme toxicity, which at least theoretically provides the capability for mass-destruction attacks using comparatively small quantities of agent. Certain biological agents are the most toxic of all, approximating the lethality of a nuclear explosion in terms of the potential number of casualties caused. An attack using chemical weapons, while generally less destructive, could still cause thousands of casualties. While one must be careful of extrapolating directly from individual lethal doses to estimates of mass casualties, given the difficulties encountered in effective dissemination of the agent, biological and chemical agents must still be considered as viable weapons of mass destruction, as well as being useful in "lesser" roles, for terrorists;

• a number of other factors are said to favour the acquisition of CB weapons by terrorists, particularly by comparison with nuclear weapons. Some of these are related to the toxicity issue just discussed. For example, the smaller quantities of agent needed on account of their lethality help reduce the costs and complexity of their production or other acquisition. This in turn eliminates the necessity for a large infrastructure of personnel and facilities, which in turn eases the problem of security and avoidance of detection;

• other advantages of CB weapons include their indetectability to traditional anti-terrorist sensor systems (and hence to conventional countermeasures); the time-lag (in many cases) between release of an agent and its perceived effects on humans, allowing the perpetrator(s) to escape; in at least some cases, the lack of an agent "signature," enabling an assassin, for example, to disguise the cause of death; their adaptability to small demonstration attacks as an indication of resolve and ability to carry out the threat of a much more devastating attack; their capacity-unobtainable by other means-to inflict heavy casualties on the military forces of a state or to seriously damage its economy; the degree of sheer terror (and hence societal disruption) that may be instilled in a target population, due to the particularly insidious nature (microscopic, colourless, and/or odourless) of the agents in question; and the relative ease and cheapness of their production or other acquisition, particularly in comparison with nuclear weapons. The latter in turn derives from the widespread availability of many of the materials and of the necessary technical knowledge, together with the fact that a single individual or small group with relatively limited expertise is capable of producing and employing such a weapon;

• the open sources do differ somewhat among themselves on the question of the precise level of expertise required to produce CB agents-whether it could be done by a high-school student or undergraduate, or would require a graduate student or small team of professional scientists, for example. There is also some disagreement over whether a single individual could adequately handle the task, including that of dissemination, or whether this, again, would require some teamwork-especially between those with a scientific bent and those with practical, operational terrorist experience;

• the number of different types of CB agents that potentially could be used by terrorists is staggering. However, those most likely to be used include, among the biologicals, anthrax, botulinal toxin, and ricin; and among the chemicals, various insecticides, hydrogen cyanide or mustard gases, and nerve agents such as tabun or VX. Even less toxic substances, such as off-the-shelf insecticides or household cleaning agents, could be used, however. Some authors also point to the danger of genetically-engineered organisms, but most consider these as too sophisticated and hence rather unlikely for terrorist use;

• apart from manufacturing it themselves, terrorist groups could acquire CB agents by (in some cases) purchasing them directly from legitimate suppliers; stealing them from research facilities or military installations (which are said to be less well-guarded than their nuclear counterparts); or receiving them from foreign state sponsors. Many hazardous substances suitable for use directly as chemical or biological weapons are commercially available with minimal, if any, restrictions. Most likely biological agents also occur naturally in the environment. Some state sponsors of terrorism have active CBW programmes, and many analysts speculate that terrorists could obtain such weapons directly in this way. However, others maintain that state sponsors would be unlikely to provide their clients with such weapons for fear of retribution, and that state sponsorship may therefore in fact act as a kind of brake on the use of CB agents by terrorists. Theft from the existing large stockpiles of chemical weapons worldwide, especially in the states of the former Soviet Union, is another possibility, of course;

• the effective dissemination of CB agents by terrorists is widely considered to be more difficult than their manufacture. CB agents could be delivered to their targets in a myriad of ways, but the most likely are through contamination of foodstuffs or liquids, or as vapour or via aerosol within a relatively enclosed area. Some authors also consider a wide-area attack using generators to be credible. However, the popular scenario involving the poisoning of the water supply of a major population centre does not appear to be feasible, given the large quantities of agent that would be required and the various filtering or purification measures already in place. On the other hand, the water supply for a discrete installation could be vulnerable, as would be the air conditioning or heating systems of even quite large public buildings or tunnel networks, such as subways. Similarly, domed sports stadiums have been described as "ideal" targets for a terrorist CB attack capable of killing tens of thousands of people;

• although some sources persist in maintaining that there have been no documented instances of the threat or use of CB agents by terrorists to date, this seems belied by the abundance of cases cited in the literature. It is important to distinguish here between threat and actual use, as well as between the use of such agents for purposes of mass destruction, and their use in smaller, more limited attacks. It is true that there are few reported cases of the use of CB agents by terrorists in mass-destruction attacks. However, there have been many reports of terrorist threats to use CB weapons in mass-destruction attacks, as well as both failed and successful attempts by them to acquire such agents, for whatever purpose. Such weapons have also been "successfully" used in some, relatively limited, instances (such as product contamination and individual assassinations). Among the most serious incidents reported to date are: a 1970s attempt by the Weather Underground to acquire biological agents from the US Army's biological weapons facility in Fort Detrick, Maryland; the 1980s discovery of a Red Army Faction "safe house" in Paris containing quantities of botulinal toxin; the contamination of restaurant food in Oregon with salmonella typhi, which resulted in the poisoning of 750 people (but no fatalities); a number of assassinations or attempted assassinations using ricin-tipped umbrellas; the "Alphabet Bomber"'s threat to kill the US President with nerve gas; the 1980 discovery of an RAF safe house in Germany containing several hundred kilograms of organophosphorous compounds; the 1975 theft of a large quantity of mustard gas from a US ammunition bunker in West Germany, followed by threats of its use by the Baader-Meinhof Gang against Stuttgart and possibly other cities; the 1970s contamination of Israeli citrus fruit exports to Europe with liquid mercury, resulting in severe economic losses to Israel; and similar threats of contamination of South African products, also resulting in their removal from the market;

• while the above-cited cases provide ample evidence of terrorist interest in acquiring CB weapons, as well as their occasional use in the past, the comparative infrequency of such use (and the virtually total absence of mass- destruction attacks of this kind) could be considered surprising, given the factors noted earlier. A number of authors have speculated about the possible reasons for this phenomenon. Among the most plausible are: fears engendered by the assumed uncontrollability of the agent, including the possibility of harm to the user; related to this, the unpredictability of the consequences of use-whether it will "work" at all, or only too well; political disutility, given the likelihood of alienating supporters or potential supporters on moral grounds; fear of the possibly unprecedented governmental retribution that might follow; the lack of a perceived need for such indiscriminate, high-casualty attacks in furthering the goals of a group; the lack of a precedent; and a general reluctance to experiment with unfamiliar weapons;

• despite the relatively low incidence in the past, many authors believe that the likelihood of future use is considerable and growing, given trends such as the following: increased security against traditional types of terrorist attacks; public indifference to the latter, requiring ever-more spectacular acts to attract attention; a recent increase in high-casualty, indiscriminate attacks; the growth of state-sponsored terrorism, combined with the proliferation of CB weaponry and materials worldwide; an increase in inter-ethnic and religiously-inspired violence, with fewer humanitarian inhibitions; and the availability of materials and weapons expertise from the former Soviet Union and its allies (including the growth in organized crime in such countries). Despite some disagreement as to the precise likelihood of the future use of CB weapons for mass destruction by terrorists, most authors agree that such an eventuality is more likely than that for nuclear weapons; that, given the magnitude of the possible consequences, the threat must be taken seriously and prepared for; and, finally, that the first actual occurrence is likely to spawn imitative attacks, thereby increasing the likelihood of subsequent use;

• the terrorist groups thought to be most predisposed to the use of CB weapons include those with vague, universalistic goals and undefined constituencies (such as the Japanese Red Army and Red Army Faction); those unconcerned with the effects on public opinion (such as neo-Nazi groups in Europe and North America); those with a history of high-casualty, indiscriminate attacks (such as the JRA, Sikh extremists, pro-Iranian Shiite fundamentalist groups such as Hizbollah, and extremists within the Palestinian movement such as the Abu Nidal Organization); those noted for their sophistication in weaponry or tactics (such as the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command); those with a demonstrated willingness to take risks; and those with state sponsors, especially where the latter are known to possess CB weapons themselves;

• defence against CB terrorist attack is quite problematic, for a host of reasons including the lack of early-warning systems; the large number of potential agents (including some that may be completely unknown to the defenders); the large number of potential targets; the dual-use nature of much of the equipment and agents themselves, making stricter regulation more difficult; the wide availability of such materials; their ease of concealment; the limitations of existing protective garb such as gas-masks; and so forth. Nevertheless, a number of measures have been proposed to help deter, or at least mitigate the consequences of, such attacks. These include: the development of better early-warning sensors; enhanced and more coordinated efforts at intelligence collection; tightening the regulations for acquisition and use of CB agents and/or the equipment needed for their manufacture; increased training of local police and law-enforcement officials; public education; research, development, and stockpiling of vaccines, antidotes, and antibiotics, etc.; filter mechanisms in large public buildings; denial of access to sensitive installations; development and wider availability of more "user-friendly" protective garb; and better contingency planning, including the creation of task forces analogous to the US Nuclear Emergency Search Team (NEST).

Historically, much less attention has been paid to the CB terrorist threat than to its nuclear counterpart, despite the cogency of the argument that the nuclear threat is less likely to be carried out than the CB one. Recently, a number of initiatives have been launched to improve government preparedness against the CB terrorist threat, including the creation of an interdepartmental Nuclear Biological Chemical (NBC) Working Group in the US, and internationally-coordinated research efforts and joint exercises. Not much is publicly known about these activities, for obvious security reasons. However, enough is known to suggest that much remains to be done, both nationally and internationally, in order to meet this apparently increasingly dangerous threat.

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