ARCHIVED: Chemical and Biological Terrorism: The Threat According to the Open Literature

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Endnotes

(1) Berkowitz et al. are a little more conservative in their estimate, noting that "the adult LD₅₀ [the dose fatal to 50% of the exposed population] is of the order of a millionth of a gram, making this material two or three orders of magnitude more toxic than the V-agent nerve gases" (1972: VIII-41). Later, they write: "Most certainly, not more than a few micrograms-perhaps even a fraction of a microgram-of pure type A toxin is sufficient to produce at least serious illness and slow convalescense; more probably, death" (1972: VIII-43).[Return]

(2) Berkowitz et al. similarly note that "While the terrorist may be incapable of mounting continent-wide strategic attacks with BW agents, smaller attacks on cities are not impracticable" (1972: VIII-88).[Return]

(3) See also: Kupperman 1984: 77.[Return]

(4) See also McGeorge, who writes that "Political terrorists bent on destroying the existing social order have, with biological weapons, the capacity to kill more people than would be possible if they possessed a small tactical nuclear weapon" (1986: 57 and 1988: 20). Berkowitz et al. agree: "There is little doubt...that with a degree of technical expertise equivalent to that assumed for the INW [illicit nuclear weapon], the mortality levels resulting from a biological attack could exceed those from a nuclear attack" (1972: IX-7). Similarly, Ponte states (with considerable exaggeration) that "With germs as with nerve gas, a terrorist or fanatic acquires the capability to destroy whole cities. The possession of a vat of appropriate bacteria, the 'poor man's H-bomb,' gives a terrorist firepower comparable to that of any nuclear superpower" (1977: 79).[Return]

(5) According to Berkowitz et al.: "There are few if any reasons why complete secrecy cannot be maintained during the development of this capability" (1972: VIII-65).[Return]

(6) Of course, this characteristic may also work against terrorists by making it more difficult for them to claim responsibility for a particular incident (US House Armed Services Committee 1993: 26).[Return]

(7) Berkowitz et al. also make this point, elaborating somewhat further: "Unlike the INW [illicit nuclear weapon] case with its reasonable limitation to one or, at most, a few weapons and unlike the CW case with its dependence on fairly large delivery systems for a widespread attack, the biological pathogens are well adapted to demonstration attacks on small, isolated targets without significantly impairing the terrorist's capability for large-scale attack. Consequently, they seem to offer a unique effectiveness as the basis of a coercive threat or extortion plot" (1972: VIII-64). [Return]

(8) In the words of Berkowitz et al.: "...even limited or selective dissemination to a particular target group maintains the implicit potential for a widespread attack with its powerful psychological effect. Although the details and problems of BW are poorly understood by the general public, it elicits strongly negative attitudes. In light of the recent US renunciation of BW as an offensive military capability, these public attitudes have undoubtedly been reinforced, so that the threat of a terrorist BW attack would result in much sensationalism, exaggeration, and emotional distress" (1972: VIII-64).[Return]

(9) Cf. Berkowitz et al.: "The casualty producing effectiveness of a practicable biological threat is...frighteningly great and...require[s] a level of effort and resources at least an order of magnitude smaller than that of the INW [illicit nuclear weapon] threat" (Berkowitz et al. 1972: I-14).[Return]

(10) See also Harvard biochemist Matthew Meselson, as quoted in Marshall 1990: 372; and Harvey McGeorge: "Toxins or biological agents can be made with little trouble, working literally in a kitchen or garage. Manufacturing a lethal bacterial disease agent requires little more than chicken soup, a flat whiskey bottle and an available source of seed culture" (Roosevelt 1986: 40-41). Griffith appears to agree, asserting that "biological agents can be easily prepared in little more than a well-equipped kitchen....The growth medium for bacteria is not much more difficult to make than is Jello; chicken eggs are usually used for growing viruses." He goes on: "Incubation depends on an appropriate temperature range more than anything else but a homemade storage unit of plywood can be heated with light bulbs and made to serve the purpose. Harvest is probably the most difficult step for the amateur. First, at this stage he may contaminate himself. Secondly, he needs some skill at separating the organism 'crop' from the medium in or on which it has been growing. But a little practice will soon overcome these problems" (1975).[Return]

(11) See also David, who maintains that "the professional qualifications required for the production and storage of significant quantities of [BW] agents are more difficult to meet than in the case of chemical agents" (1985: 146); and Kupperman and Trent, who argue that, compared to CW, "there is limited commercial availability of deadly pathogens. Moreover, the growth, care, and dispersion of biological agents require more technological sophistication than does the dispensing of chemicals" (1979: 85). Douglass and Livingstone, however, hold the opposite view, that the use of chemical weapons is more technically demanding (1987: 23).[Return]

(12) Douglass and Livingstone cite a report by the BDM Corporation that "the 'ideal' requirements for manufacturing a fairly sophisticated biological weapon include one microbiologist with knowledge of disease processes; one engineer; one vegetative bacterial pathogen; a microbiology laboratory; a bottle production plant; sterilizer capacity for the bottle production plant; and shop space and equipment. In addition, accurate formulae, a dispersing device and a detailed plan of attack are needed." However, they go on: "Though even these requirements are not particularly formidable, knowledgeable experts say that a resourceful terrorist group could cut corners and build a 'no frills' weapon even more easily" (1987: 22).[Return]

(13) Berkowitz et al. judge that "An experimental microbiologist and a pathologist, or someone who combines these capabilities, would be crucial to the threat group. In fact, their presence would be largely determinant in directing the group toward the biological pathogens. Supplemented with a little help and advice from an aerosol physicist and a meteorologist, a completely adequate set of capabilities would be at hand. At that, the contribution expected of these latter two specialists is not particularly advanced, and could probably be provided by another scientifically trained team member....Should the terrorists' plan require larger than laboratory scale quantities of pathogens, someone with experience in the fermentation or vaccine industries would make a strong contribution to the group" (1972: VIII-65-66).[Return]

(14) Elsewhere in the same article, however, Root-Bernstein appears to contradict himself, writing: "To engage in bioterrorism requires only...a sophisticated understanding of the properties of various edible plants, medicinal herbs, toxins and venoms, and infectious and pharmaceutical agents" (1991: 48).[Return]

(15) See also: Jenkins and Rubin 1978: 226.[Return]

(16) Cf. Kupperman and Trent: "Although growing virulent biologicals is a hazardous activity for the amateur, and making large quantities takes considerable skill and judgment, many thousands of people are sufficiently trained to perform such tasks" (1979: 56-7). Elsewhere, Kupperman suggests that the manufacture of biological agents could be accomplished by "one Ph.D. and one MA level microbiologist with extensive training in the handling of pathogens," together with "a few brave or unknowing assistants" (1984: 77).[Return]

(17) On botulinal toxin, see also Kupperman and Trent, who state that it "is easily produced and there is a considerable literature on its anaerobic growth and care. Serologic typing for virulence is a standard task for the microbiologist; techniques of continuous culturing are well understood; and the separation and purification of the toxin are also widely known" (1979: 65). Berkowitz et al. concur with this judgment: "...the open technical literature dealing with identification, culture, spore formation, toxin production, and other properties of C. botulinum, and with the preparation of concentrated and purified toxin itself, is profuse....there is no dearth of open information regarding the technical requirements for developing a BTX threat" (1972: VIII-42). Later, they conclude: "...once a satisfactory seed culture is obtained and the necessary technique developed one person should be able to handle the set-up, cultivation, partial purification, and clean-up of two 3-gallon batches per week, producing about 350 mg of 66% pure BTX weekly. If a greater production rate is desired, parallel batches may be processed or continuous cultivation techniques used....To isolate the seed culture, a competent microbiologist and a small bacteriology laboratory are needed; the requisite equipment can be assembled for less than $3,000. Alternatively, access to an existing laboratory would be adequate for the early steps (acquiring and characterizing the seed culture), leaving only the production steps to be conducted clandestinely. Experimental animal requirements can be minimized if the terrorist is primarily interested in a practical, rather than a scientifically elegant, threat. (Berkowitz et al. 1972: VIII-50).[Return]

(18) Kupperman and Trent agree, stating: "Unfortunately, after having obtained a virulent strain, even a modestly trained microbiologist could continuously culture the organisms. The techniques for its preparation and care are well known" (1979: 68).[Return]

(19) See also the warning of Harvey McGeorge, in 1986, that "with the unfortunate poor economic health of the bio-tech industry, we can take it for granted that there is no lack of unemployed, highly skilled individuals, who, out of financial desperation might be willing to compromise their ethics in order to feed their families" (Roosevelt 1986: 42).[Return]

(20) Griffith points out that "Medical and military criteria for BW agents are less important for urban guerilla warfare than for large-scale military use because the situation is entirely different. For this reason many diseases are suitable BW agents even though they may not meet all the usual 'military' qualifications" (1975).[Return]

(21) Watkins is skeptical of the latter role, arguing that "Incapacitating agents such as those causing influenza and brucellosis do not fulfil the requirements of terrorist groups since they fail to terrorize. Furthermore, unlike a national military force, the terrorist has little need to enhance his ability to manoeuvre forces relative to an enemy, and therefore it seems much more likely that one of the small number of lethal agents would be employed by terrorists" (1987: 195). From a rather different perspective, in relation to attempted incapacitation, Berkowitz et al. caution that "While biological pathogens can be generally characterized as more or less severely incapacitating or lethal, statistical variations in age, sex, state of health, and resistance of the target population can result in significant mortality levels even when a nominally incapacitating agent is used" (1972: VIII-55). [Return]

(22) Compare McGeorge: "Manufacturing and storage are perhaps the greatest limiting factors in the preparation of a biological agent. The need for embryonated eggs as a growth medium for viral or rickettsial agents makes their use unlikely. Bacterial agents, on the other hand, can be readily produced in a bottle plant and tens of kilograms of suitable agents such as anthrax could be produced as a liquid slurry in a matter of weeks" (1986: 60).[Return]

(23) Berkowitz et al. point out that "For small-scale, direct contamination attacks in which the agent is brought directly into contact with the victim, thereby avoiding such stressful processes as desiccation or aerosolization, the resistance criterion is of little importance and delicate organisms such as that responsible for tularemia can be employed. If, on the other hand, a large-scale, aerosol cloud attack is contemplated, more resistant organisms would be preferred. Outstanding among these are the spore formers such as the anthrax bacterium and the fungi, but the viability of less rugged pathogens can be enhanced by various stabilizing processes" (1972: VIII-67).[Return]

(24) See also Watkins: "...anthrax has many characteristics which make it an ideal agent for use as a weapon. Anthrax cultures form spores which remain dormant for years, thus giving ordinance an extraordinary shelf-life. Spores most commonly cause serious skin lesions, but they are nearly 100 per cent fatal when inhaled or swallowed and antibiotics are only effective if administered before onset of symptoms. There is a preventive vaccination, but it is not widely used or readily available. There is no method for decontamination" (1987: 193).[Return]

(25) Watkins also notes that "Although these laboratories [in Atlanta and Moscow] are inspected periodically by the World Health Organisation to ensure microbiologic integrity, no serious attempt has been made to prevent forced intrusion" (1987: 197-8).[Return]

(26) See also the testimony of Law Professor Francis A. Boyle, who refers to the possibility of "'terrorist' states, groups, or individuals...contracting with U.S. genetic engineering firms for the production of biological weapons" (SCJ 1990: 103); Ketcham and McGeorge, who speculate about terrorist "use of a genetically modified bacterium to infect members of a specific ethnic group with a lethal disease" (1986: 32); McGeorge, who describes terrorist use of genetic engineering as "a strong possibility" (Roosevelt 1986: 41); and Ponte, who warns that "terrorists might acquire lethal germs custom-tailored by recombinant DNA technology" (1980: 52). See also: Louria 1981: 17-21.[Return]

(27) Berkowitz et al. similarly note that, although "Some BTX is produced by the pharmaceutical industry for the manufacture of protective toxoid and therapeutic anti-toxin," "Illicit attempts to acquire this material might arouse suspicion and possibly disclose a plot before it got very far" (1972: VIII-46).[Return]

(28) See also Simon 1989: 3; and Berkowitz et al., who speculate that "The publicity given the Army's destruction of biological agents notwithstanding, stockpiles of BTX may still exist. If so, they provide a possible source of supply for terrorists seeking this material" (1972: VIII-45-46).[Return]

(29) One exception is Mullins, who states that "The delivery of biological agents would be easy to accomplish" (1992: 103). Another is Watkins, who argues that "Because of their small size, simple dispersal and delayed effect, biological weapons are quite simple for a terrorist to employ" (1987: 191) and that "Biological agents can be employed as weapons using relatively primitive technology" (1987: 195). This view is evidently also shared by Phillip Karber of Georgetown University's Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), who is quoted by Ponte as warning that "it is possible for one individual to decimate the population of New York City by disseminating ten pounds of biological agents from the top of the Empire State Building at night" (1980: 53).[Return]

(30) See also Griffith, who posits as additional disincentives that "the guerillas will not be able to separate their people from the general population who drink the water" and that "getting into the water system at a suitable place is no easy matter" (1975).[Return]

(31) See also Ponte 1977: 79.[Return]

(32) See also Berkowitz et al.: "Considering the sheer terror that a group of terrorists could produce by indiscriminate, repeated, small scale distribution of BTX in places that provide food for consumption without cooking (injections into supermarket produce such as melons or apples, soda fountain ice cream supplies, dairy or bottling plant output, etc.), the potentialities appear quite awesome. But this would hardly be considered mass destruction" (1972: VIII-51).[Return]

(33) Berkowitz et al. go so far as to say that "Probably the most important aspect of a large-scale terrorist attack with biological pathogens is the practicability of employing aerosol dissemination....The repeated observation that these diseases are transmissible by airborne infection and the fact that the respiratory or pneumonic forms induced are their most acute and severe lead inescapably to the conclusion that if aerosol dissemination is a practicable terrorist capability, it must constitute a major civil threat. This is accentuated by the fact that for almost all these diseases artificial transmission via airborne pathogens is more effective than the process of natural spread" (1972: VIII-78-79).[Return]

(34) See also: Berkowitz et al. 1972: IX-9.[Return]

(35) See also McGeorge: "Another effective device would be a vehicle-mounted liquid sprayer similar to those used to dispense insecticides in residential areas. The right nozzle would help disseminate an agent like anthrax. Terrorists are likely to use this technique on more dispersed populations, including housing areas, or to create a cloud of agent that will drift undetected over a protected target" (1986: 60).[Return]

(36) See also: Kupperman and Smith 1989: 103.[Return]

(37) Berkowitz et al. also make reference to the effects of urban smog in attenuating microbial aerosols, adding: "It is a strange commentary on our culture that atmospheric pollution may provide a degree of protection against bacteriological attack whether of international or terrorist instigation" (1972: VIII-88).[Return]

(38) As Berkowitz et al. put it: "Large crowds which remain in enclosed spaces for moderate lengths of time are ideal targets" (1972: IX-9).[Return]

(39) Berkowitz et al. cite the 75,000-seat Houston Astrodome as an example of this type, noting that "Aerosolization of 15 ml of anthrax spore culture in this volume results in the inhalation of an infective dose in 30 minutes. Using the small Chicago atomizer, this culture volume can be aerosolized in 15 minutes with a primary air flow supplied by one 9" by 55" compressed nitrogen tank" (1972: IX-9).[Return]

(40) To his account of this incident, Watkins adds: "The Serratia marcesences bacterium used in this experiment is now recognized as a frequent cause of serious, sometimes fatal, hospital acquired infections. The San Francisco spraying might have been responsible for the rare outbreak of eleven cases of serratia pneumonia reported the following year in the Archives of Internal Medicine" (1987: 199, fn.3).[Return]

(41) The US Congressional Office of Technology Assessment notes that "Many threats have been made to poison municipal water supplies, food, and pharmaceuticals by terrorists with political, social, and religious motivations, as well as by criminals (extortionists), disgruntled employees, and (possibly) mentally disturbed individuals" (1992: 40). [Return]

(42) Cf. the testimony of Ronald K. Noble, US Deputy Assistant Attorney General, before the Senate Committee on the Judiciary in 1989: "...fortunately this country has apparently not experienced the deliberate use on US soil of biological toxins and weapons as a means of terrorist attack" (SCJ 1990: 47).[Return]

(43) The US House Committee on Armed Services uses identical language in its 1993 report on Countering the Chemical and Biological Weapons Threat in the Post-Soviet World, adding: "In a few isolated incidents terrorist groups have been caught with biological cultures, or biological or chemical agents in their possession" (25-26).[Return]

(44) See also the remarks of Harvey J. McGeorge: "There is ample recent and ongoing use of biological or toxin agents by terrorist groups with international connections" (Roosevelt 1986: 39).[Return]

(45) Cf. Kupperman and Kamen: "Terrorist and dissident groups have long evinced an interest in biologicals, even though the actual threats have thus far been extremely limited" (1989: 104).[Return]

(46) In his survey of historical incidents of CB terrorism, McGeorge proposes a more elaborate categorization scheme, as follows:

I. Use

• use-actions not accompanied by extortion demands that involves [sic] the actual release of agent material;
• extortion based on use-extortion demands accompanied by evidence of actual use/possession of CB agent;
• planned operation-operations involving CB agents which were either aborted or abandoned before execution.

II. Threats

• threat-threatened use of CB agents.
• extortion-extortion demands accompanied by threats of CB agent use without demonstration of an actual capability.

III. Acquisition

• purchase-peaceful acquisition of materials enabling or enhancing a capability to use CB agents.
• theft-acquisition of CB agents or materials which involves stealth or force.
• fabrication-growth or fabrication of CB agents, disseminators or related materials.

IV. Indirect

• sabotage-vandalism or destruction of a military CBW facility or CB related transportation element.
• occupation-trespass or occupation of a CBW related facility without the apparent intent to release, steal or sabotage agents or related materials. (1994: 12-13) [Return]

(47) See also Berkowitz et al.: "What little information is available indicates that RISE was poorly conceived. Not only was it discovered in time, but the choice of Salmonella typhi as the organism poses only a moderate threat; they are destroyed readily in water by the routine methods of chlorination" (Berkowitz et al. 1972: VI-6, citing Smith et al. 1960: 381).[Return]

(48) See also Kellett, who adds that the personal secretary of the Indian guru Bhagwan Shree Rajneesh had pleaded guilty to the act, and concludes that "While possibly not a politically-motivated act, nor one with international ramifications, this incident demonstrates the potential for biological terrorism" (1988: 56). Also in regard to this incident, McGeorge notes that "Additionally, efforts to develop a means to spread AIDS via aerosolized HIV contaminated blood were reported" (1994: 12).[Return]

(49) Harvey McGeorge provides the greatest detail on the Korczak case, and adds Col. Houari Boumedienne, the President of Algeria, to the list of alleged ricin victims (Roosevelt 1986: 39).[Return]

(50) McGeorge, in referring to the ricin-tipped umbrella weapon, also notes that "This weapon is similar in concept to an earlier U.S. dart gun that reportedly used saxitoxin as the contaminant" (1986: 61).[Return]

(51) See also the words of a UN study quoted by Berkowitz et al.: "Aside from its anti-personnel (animal, plant) character, the outstanding characteristic of biological pathogens 'is the variability, amounting under some circumstances to unpredictability, of their effects. Depending on environmental and meteorological conditions, and depending on the particular agent used, the effects might be devastating or negligible'" (1972: VIII-54, quoting UN 1970: para.10).[Return]

(52) Berkowitz et al. similarly note that the fact that "the exact target area and the long-range ecological consequences are very difficult and occasionally impossible to predict," together with the general "unpredictability and complicated consequences of BW," "appear to be desirable attributes from the terrorist's viewpoint" (1972: VIII-63).[Return]

(53) On this point, Berkowitz et al. quote at length from another study, reporting that "Despite elaborate safety measures,...two Detrick personnel contracted anthrax and died in the late 1950's and another caught Venezuelan equine encephalitis and died in 1964. The latter disease is one that is categorized by CBW officials as not a lethal but an incapacitating agent. An earlier accident with brucellosis took the life of a young woman working on the base." The source adds that there were "some 400 other cases over a 26 year period where the victims did not die" (1972: VIII-66-67, quoting McCarthy 1969: 28).[Return]

(54) In the words of Berkowitz et al., with respect to BTX: "The risks are primarily associated with accidental ingestion or inhalation of droplets of the material, and are normally guarded against by careful laboratory technique and the use of protective equipment such as masks and goggles. In addition, a technically sophisticated operation would include toxoid preparation for self-immunization" (1972: VIII-50). Berkowitz et al. later note that "vaccines which might be used to protect members of the terrorist team are available for anthrax, plague, tularemia and Rocky Mountain spotted fever. None of these have been extensively used for the population at large" (1972: VIII-68). However, they warn that "No immunological protection for cryptococcus infection is known; this organism would present a serious hazard to the attacker" (1972: VIII-73). [Return]

(55) Watkins agrees with this characterization of the population most at risk, adding that "disease is most likely to be spread in crowded and unsanitary living conditions" and that "Therefore it seems certain that the civilian community will bear the greatest brunt of a biological attack." However, he goes on to suggest that "This fact seems to be highly compatible with terrorist requirements since their acts are so frequently indiscriminate violence" (1987: 196).[Return]

(56) Bremer, however, argues that "As the targets originally preferred by terrorists have become 'harder,' that is to say better defended, terrorists have usually switched targets rather than turn to new technologies to penetrate defenses" (1988: 3).[Return]

(57) Cf. Douglass and Livingstone: "As violence in the modern world becomes more and more routinized and commonplace, terrorists may strive to reach ever greater heights of terror to capture headlines and television time, and ultimately to force governments to do their will" (1987: 15). Also: Roosevelt 1986:39.[Return]

(58) See also Roosevelt 1986: 39.[Return]

(59) Simon's use of the term "nationalistic" here is interesting, in that it appears to contradict Roberts' point referred to earlier that ethnic groups seeking to annihilate their traditional enemies may resort to BW in order to do so.[Return]

(60) Elsewhere, however, Wiener is less pessimistic, arguing: "...an air sampling device might serve to document an attack after exposure but before the onset of illness in a target population....Massive continuous air sampling using concentration methods, specific culture media, and sensitive and specific rapid identification tests should be capable of providing a postexposure warning for many of the agents" (Wiener 1991a: 131). See also OTA 1992: 41. For anthrax, the OTA states that "Use of Reynier or Anderson air samplers, containing bacterial culture plates, would allow detection of an attack prior to the onset of clinical illness in those exposed" (1992: 37). According to Karl-Heinz Karisch: "The fastest currently available tests require between 30 minutes and one hour to prove the use of bacteriological weapons" (1991).[Return]

(61) Earlier in the same article, however, Watkins states flatly that "unlike nuclear weapons, there is no way to restrict the availability of biological agents....wide availability of natural disease agents and the inherent ability of micro-organisms to reproduce make it impossible to regulate possession and production of biological weapons" (1987: 191).[Return]

(62) See also OTA 1992: 42-3; and McGeorge, quoted in Roosevelt 1986: 42.[Return]

(63) The OTA, however, apparently does not consider this to be much of a problem, noting that "Since there will most likely be no sign of an attack for 1 or 2 days, most bacterial agents remaining in the environment will already have been inactivated or diluted. A safe approach is use of soap and water and a change of clothing after an attack has been documented" (1992: 43).[Return]

(64) Mullen, however, cautions: "the organophosphates....would appear to possess, on a weight-for-weight basis, an inherent advantage over the fluoroacetates in their capacity to cause fatalities. On balance, that is indeed the case. There are, however, so many variables associated with effective delivery of a chemical for mass destruction purposes, as to make a straightforward comparison between the potential lethalities of fluoroacetates and organophosphates a most difficult proposition" (Mullen 1978: 72).[Return]

(65) See also Mullen 1978: 70 and Kupperman and Trent 1979: 64.[Return]

(66) Compare Mullen: "The toxicity of VX by the respiratory route is estimated to be approximately 15 times that of Sarin, or about 0.001 mg/kg....it has been stated that 6 mg applied to the skin is lethal; which makes VX about 300 times more lethal than Sarin by this route" (1978: 71).[Return]

(67) See also Kupperman and Kamen 1989: 101.[Return]

(68) Mullins also maintains that "millions of casualties could result in a single [sic] producing or using chemicals" (1992:116).[Return]

(69) See also Mengel 1976: 446. Elsewhere, Berkowitz et al. explain that "Because of delivery problems and quantities required, chemical poisons are limited to much smaller scale attacks than is the INW [illicit nuclear weapon]" (Berkowitz et al. 1972: I-12). A little later, they insist that "Under the most ideal circumstances,...effective exposure of more than a few thousand target individuals is impossible with the quantities a small threat group could handle" (Berkowitz et al. 1972: I-14 - I-15).[Return]

(70) Berkowitz et al. estimate the costs of producing Sarin as follows: "The cost of reagent grade materials-purchased in the smallest, hence most expensive quantities-for a one mole batch preparation...is $6.83; this produces 0.5 mole or 70 g of Sarin. Five iterations of a 3 mole preparation would provide over a kilogram of Sarin; even at small quantity prices the materials would cost less than $100. If a laboratory were not available to the terrorist-chemist, a total investment of $600 would suffice for the necessary equipment" (Berkowitz et al. 1972: VIII-34-35). As for VX, Ponte quotes an unidentified article in Science magazine that a quart of VX "costs about $5 to manufacture and contains several million man-lethal doses" (1980: 53)![Return]

(71) See also Mullins, who notes that "As with biological agents, the ability of the terrorist to synthesize, store, and use chemical agents would be virtually undetectable by intelligence agencies and law enforcement authorities until it was too late. Very few people would have to be involved and no sophisticated facilities would be needed. Most chemical agents could be made in the kitchen or garage. Only by being unlucky would the terrorist get caught" (1992: 109).[Return]

(72) Berkowitz et al. might take issue with this particular assessment of the comparative advantages of CW agents. In discussing the preparation of BW agents, they note that "For attacks in which the material can be produced within about two weeks, simply separating the cells or spores from the culture broth by centrifugation, washing them, and resuspending them in a stabilizing medium will generally permit storage at refrigerator temperatures without significant loss of viability or virulence. For dry agents from sporulating organisms, the spores are separated from the growth medium, washed, dried by desiccation, and stored in sealed vials kept in the dark. Spore stability allows storage under these conditions for periods of months to years without loss of virulence, so small installations are sufficient to produce large quantities of these agents given enough time" (1972: VIII-76-77).[Return]

(73) In contrasting CB with nuclear attacks in regard to the provision of warning by terrorists, Berkowitz et al. note that "In a CB, anti-personnel attack, issuing a warning is counterproductive, unless the attacker's real interest lies in forcing the target group away from its normal location, either for harassment or to prevent some action from being taken. Even for these reasons, the situation would have to be highly specialized since the effects of chemical and biological agents are both temporary and subject to neutralization" (1972: IX-15). [Return]

(74) Mullins similarly maintains that "Chemical agents would be easy...to obtain or manufacture" (1992: 116).[Return]

(75) Without comparing them in this respect to nuclear or biological weapons, Thornton adds: "chemical weapons, by virtue of their use in World War I and elsewhere, enjoy a fearsome reputation. Any hint, threat, or minor use of chemicals is absolutely certain to create a huge public outcry and an immediate government reaction" (1987: 6).[Return]

(76) As Lowell Ponte puts it: "...a terrorist with a tiny vial or glass tube of VX could walk unmolested through the most elaborate systems of bomb and gun detectors at airports or elsewhere" (1977: 79).[Return]

(77) See also Jenkins and Rubin, who write that "only primitive facilities are required to carry out some threats....No technical sophistication at all is required to purchase and use these toxins" (1978: 223-4).[Return]

(78) See also Thornton: "...the ability to manufacture chemical weapons is practically a given. Rudimentary chlorine gas, of sufficient toxicity to kill, can be produced in virtually any household from cleaning solutions. Such chlorine products do, in fact, cause a number of accidental deaths in the home in this country. This same type of solution introduced into the air filtration system of an office building or military command post could have disastrous results" (1987: 6-7).[Return]

(79) According to Berkowitz et al.: "...the holder of an M.S. degree in chemistry, with organic chemistry as his specialty, has received the training necessary to comprehend and perform the operations described with no particular difficulty; and further,...anyone with aptitude for the task could train himself to carry out this process in a relatively short period of time, say 2-3 months" (Berkowitz et al. 1972: VIII-15).[Return]

(80) They go on, however, to say that "A greater threat...lies in the ease with which the more toxic OPAs can be synthesized in the laboratory" (Berkowitz et al. 1972: VIII-32).[Return]

(81) See also Griffiths: "The few pounds of these agents which might be acquired by terrorists for their illegal use is but a drop in the ocean against the amounts of CBW materials in the world now" (1992: 221). Ketcham and McGeorge similarly refer to a likely source of chemical agents for terrorists as being "leftover war materials" (1986: 31).[Return]

(82) Writing in 1990, however, Joyner expressed the view that "While the Soviet Union has certainly trained, financed, and armed certain terrorist groups over the past two decades, it seems reasonable to infer that the Soviets would be highly reluctant to hand over chemical weapons to terrorist organizations. Too much of the positive image, diplomatic good will, and international prestige that has been carefully cultivated and crafted in the era of Glasnost would be swept away with the terrorists' cloud of poison gas. Clearly, tremendous political costs would outweigh any conceivable gains of chemoterrorist complicity for the Soviets at this point" (1990: 139).[Return]

(83) Exceptions include Mullins, who maintains that "dispersal is easy and widespread" (1992: 116); Douglass and Livingstone, who also refer to the "ease of...dispersal" of chemical agents (1987: 13); Barnaby, who states that "the technology for dispersal is not difficult" (1992: 86); and Alexander, who argues that "their delivery systems are manageable, and their dispersal techniques are efficient" (1983: 229). Ponte maintains that "a pitcherful of VX tossed off the observation deck of the Empire State Building could kill half the people in Manhattan, and an even higher portion could be killed if the same amount of VX were dumped from a small private airplane into a favorable wind" (1977: 79). In Thornton's estimation: "Terrorists do not need a sophisticated delivery system to use this new type of weapon....Simply dropping a container of agent from an aircraft over a city, or even throwing the container into an embassy compound from a speeding car assures the attack will immediately take on historic proportions" (1987: 7).[Return]

(84) Similarly, Berkowitz et al. write that "these compounds have no characteristic taste or odor, so their presence in liquid or solid foodstuffs would not be evident. They are, however, hydrolyzed in water, especially under basic conditions, and would be ineffectively administered by this route unless the poisoned drink were consumed quite rapidly" (1972: VIII-40). Berkowitz et al. later discuss the possible use of psychochemicals in a water-supply attack, noting that "Both the military agent BZ and the well-known hallucinogen LSD are effective against humans in doses of a few tens of micrograms." However, they dismiss this "threat" on the grounds that "If an effective dose of LSD cost only $.25, if the reservoir-to-ingestion dilution factor were no larger than 106, and if only a thousand people were to be affected, $250 million worth of LSD would be needed. This is a rather large investment for producing a 6 to 24 hour period of bizarre and unpredictable behavior in a small community" (1972: IX-14).[Return]

(85) An almost identical calculation is reported by Mullen, with reference to a 1.8 billion-gallon reservoir serving a population of 10,000. Assuming that each person drinks a single quart of water per day, he writes: "To contaminate 10,000 quarts of water to a lethal level using 8-fluoroctanol, a fluoroacetate related to a common rodenticide that is relatively easily synthesized, highly toxic, and fairly stable in water, would require 300 metric tons of the substance. Thus, the volume of dilution in even small reservoirs drastically affects the amount of material to contaminate to such significant levels" (1987: 243, citing Berkowitz et al. 1972).[Return]

(86) See, e.g., Berkowitz et al.: "To avoid the requirement for large quantities and major delivery systems, effective chemical attacks by terrorists would probably be limited to confined groups such as the occupants of a building, passenger terminal, auditorium, banquet room, convention center, etc." (1972" VIII-40). An exception to this line of thought is Joyner, who maintains that "A primary means of attack possibly might come from disseminating a cloud of fine particles (i.e., an aerosol). Chemical weapon attacks consequently would be effective over large areas, especially since an aerosol can penetrate buildings and seek out victims indiscriminately" (1990: 136).[Return]

(87) According to Ponte: "The Army's amazing admission of this simulated assassination was reported in a tiny story on page 14 of the New York Times, March 16, 1977" (1980: 52, fn.1). As in the case of biological agents discussed earlier, the US military also tested the use of chemical agents against North American cities in the 1950s. For example, during July and August 1953, the cities of Winnipeg, St. Louis, and Minneapolis were sprayed with zinc cadmium sulphide, then considered a "harmless fluorescent powder," but which has since been linked to various cancers (Roberts 1994). Another source maintains that "In 1957 and 1958, a cargo plane criss-crossed the country releasing tons of zinc cadmium sulfide. According to one army report, 'The test covered the United States from the Rockies to the Atlantic, from Canada to the Gulf of Mexico'" (Cole 1994: 5).[Return]

(88) This is despite the assertion of Joyner that "no terrorist organization has yet demonstrated either a known proclivity or capability to use chemical weapons" (1990: 139).[Return]

(89) Livingstone simply notes that "German authorities expressed concern that Baader-Meinhof terrorists were behind the theft" (1982: 111).[Return]

(90) Joyner is another author who emphasizes this aspect, noting that "Concern about the likelihood of chemoterrorism remains intimately linked to chemical weapons and the disturbing prominence they have recently acquired. Four developments over the past decade substantiate the legitimacy for this concern. First, since 1980 states have seen fit to use chemical weapons more frequently, with impunity, in flagrant violation of international law. Second, erosion in respect for the law has been accompanied by a proliferation in chemical weapons capabilities among states, especially in politically unstable regions of the world. Third, a growing perception has arisen, particularly among developing countries, that chemical weapons possess a significant military utility-one that can supply a decisive advantage during regional conflict, as clearly demonstrated in Iraq's dominance in the outcome of the Gulf War with Iran. Fourth, the very threat to use chemical weapons has become sufficiently credible so as to be wielded to demoralize enemy forces and to instill fear in defenseless civilian populations" (1990: 135-6). Elsewhere, Joyner summarizes his concern that "an accelerated erosion of respect for international norms against the unlawful use of chemical weapons....has fostered the notion that chemical weapons are militarily, economically and psychologically useful" (1990: 142).[Return]

(91) See, for example, Post: "The barriers against mass casualties are diminishing. An act which would have attracted world attention years ago now barely gets a yawn from a jaded public, so there is a momentum arguing for 'bigger and better' terrorist events to capture attention" (1990: 167). Arguing along the same lines, McGeorge adds, rather ominously: "Circumstances suggest an evolution beyond explosives-based violence is both necessary for terrorists and perhaps currently underway" (1988: 22).[Return]

(92) Milbank believes that terrorists would not have to go even this far. In his view: "Credibility poses few problems, for a small sample of the agent delivered by mail or left at some designated pick-up point should quickly dispel any doubts on this score" (1976: 31).[Return]

(93) Luchaire apparently believes that chemical and biological weapons lack the degree of shock value of nuclear weapons. He argues that "Although other methods of mass destruction-such as the poisoning of a city's drinking water sources-are undoubtedly easier to put into operation, they would appear not to have the same psychological impact" (1984: 119).[Return]

(94) Mengel, however, contrasts CB with nuclear weapons in this regard, arguing that the former "types of new technologies offer less of an opportunity for panic. Authorities would have time to respond to chemical and biological attacks by providing avoidance guidance and countermeasure instructions" (1976: 449).[Return]

(95) Nevertheless, in their detailed study of the subject, with reference to mass destruction, Berkowitz et al. conclude "that chemical poisons represent a relatively ineffectual threat, but that the nuclear weapon and the biological pathogens constitute threats of comparable seriousness with the latter the more practicable of the two" (1972: VIII-89).[Return]

(96) Berkowitz et al. believe that, unlike the case of nuclear weapons: "Given the necessary skills and resources, one or two mentally or emotionally imbalanced individuals could mount a chemical or biological superviolent threat" (Berkowitz et al. 1972: I-6).[Return]

(97) Berkowitz et al., however, contend that "the laboratory operations involved in heroin production...are simpler, easier, and less demanding of resources than are those involved in...fluoroaliphatic compound syntheses" (1972: VIII-14).[Return]

(98) In this regard, Griffiths notes the potential availability of a "considerable number of professional scientists and engineers, formerly employed on CBW development in the former Soviet Union, who are now not required by the new states and who can consequently only command salaries which are a mere pittance." He goes on: "Clearly, some of these experts might be persuaded to assist subversive organizations, if sufficient reward is available" (221). The same could perhaps be said, to a lesser degree, of chemical and biological warfare specialists throughout the world (hopefully) being put out of business by the Biological and Toxin Weapons and Chemical Weapons Conventions. [Return]

(99) Without attempting to specify the precise level of requirements, McGeorge lists the following "factors" as having "a significant impact on a would-be adversary's capability, and therefore threat posed": "access to information; dedication/ discipline; logistics capability; number of personnel; financial strength; planning ability; gadgeteering ability; technical knowledge; load carrying ability; tactical and security ability; [and] specialized equipment access" (1994: 13).[Return]

(100) See also Hurwitz: "it appears from the available evidence that it is entirely feasible for a terrorist group of even modest resources to acquire and effectively use C/B weapons" (1982: 36).[Return]

(101) See also McGeorge 1986: 57-8. He writes: "The range of CB agents that could be supplied by a patron state includes any of the toxic industrial gases, standard chemical or biological warfare agents, and unique compounds such as colchicine or toxiferine dichloride." However, he goes on: "...the most likely candidates for in-house manufacture or patron supply are the standard nerve agents, botulin or staphylococcal enterotoxin, and anthrax. These agents have been produced in bulk, their effects are well-known and dissemination schemes abound" (1986: 60).[Return]

(102) While not discussing its feasibility, Jenkins and Rubin, writing in 1978, state simply that "Terrorists....have not interfered with water supplies" (268).[Return]

(103) For example, while noting that "gas release from pressurized cylinders...calls for the least technical skill" and hence is the most likely to be used by "Level I" capability groups, McGeorge acknowledges that "This form of delivery is not likely to be effective in open air unless massive quantities of agent are dispersed" (1986: 60).[Return]

(104) As in, for example, Douglass and Livingstone (1987), pp. 183-7.[Return]

(105) He would also apparently include "actions that just threatened use," "actions directed against CB related facilities," and "those actions which were limited to the theft, purchase or fabrication of an agent, dissemination device or related material" (1994: 12).[Return]

(106) See also Hoffman, who quotes Brian Jenkins to the effect that "Terrorists....find it unnecessary to kill many, as long as killing a few suffices for their purposes" and adds: "Terrorists have demonstrated repeatedly that their goals and objectives can be accomplished by using the same tactics and 'off-the-shelf weapons'...that they have traditionally relied upon....terrorists have yet to reach their killing potential using even 'off-the-shelf' weapons....the terrorists' traditional arsenal of the bomb and the gun still suffice to exact or win from governments the concessions that terrorists typically seek" (1993: 22-3). Lt. Gen. James Clapper, Director of the US Defense Intelligence Agency, has also listed as one of the "two reasons why there have been no [NBC] incidents so far," that "terrorist groups may feel they can achieve their objectives with conventional weapons" (Starr 1994: 10) (the other reason, in his view, being the reluctance of state sponsors to provide weapons of mass destruction). Mullen, although he may have since been overtaken by events, also maintains that "the munitions types employed by terrorists have remained somewhat static over the decades....the level of terrorist violence has remained over the years relatively static; only the frequency of incidents has increased in the past decade" (1978: 87).[Return]

(107) See also Hoffman: "There are few realistic demands that terrorists could make by threatening the use of such indiscriminate weapons....Terrorists...have generally kept their threats 'realistic' (in the sense that they can and will carry these threats out if denied their objectives) and approximately commensurate with the demands made" (1993: 23). Clutterbuck also judges that, for terrorists, NBC threats would be "far less credible and less effective as a bargaining counter" than traditional threats (1994: 53).[Return]

(108) Berkowitz et al. add that "Although extortion (the profit-motivated, criminal analogue of coercion) is not uncommon, there are very few examples of large-scale attempts at coercion of governments by conspiratorial groups" (1972: IX-9).[Return]

(109) Similarly, Harvey McGeorge produces a lengthy list of terrorist "objectives" and "goals" that could be accomplished through the use of CB agents, the former including "attention to demands, revenge, extortion, disruption, and financial gain"; and the latter encompassing "radical change to an existing system, vengeful punishment, creation of a separate homeland or state, destruction of an existing social order, change in strategic policy, and psychological satisfaction" (1986: 57). In regard to the latter "goals," McGeorge warns that "chemical or biological agents may be perceived as being significantly more able than high explosives to accomplish them" (McGeorge 1988: 20).[Return]

(110) See also Hoffman, who quotes Brian Jenkins to the effect that "simply killing a lot of people has seldom been one terrorist objective....Terrorists operate on the principle of the minimum force necessary" (1993: 23). Joyner notes that "Less than 1 percent of the thousands of terrorist incidents between 1965 and 1985 have produced more than 10 fatalities" (1990: 137).[Return]

(111) Compare the remarks of an un-named participant in a recent discussion of the subject: "[Terrorists] are afraid that for all the foregoing reasons, their operations will provoke considerable debate and dissension within the ranks of the terrorist organization itself. This would increase the risk not only of betrayal of the operation, but also betrayal of the organization" (David 1985: 153). Such reasoning may explain why, according to Hoffman, "the internal dynamics and decision-making processes of terrorist groups tend to inhibit sudden escalations or changes in either tactics or level of violence" (1993: 23).[Return]

(112) Along the same lines, they later conclude that "the technical capability for superviolence is not new; had the motive and intent existed, the event would have occurred. We believe that those who perceive a real superviolent threat must offer more than a catalogue of opportunities for trouble-making based on scientific and technical feasibility if their warnings are to be heeded" (1972: IX-57).[Return]

(113) See also Bremer: "...some terrorist groups are already showing little aversion to inflicting large numbers of casualties" (1988: 12).[Return]

(114) Elsewhere, however, Jenkins suggests the direct influence of moral considerations on terrorists when he writes that "Despite the popular view of them, terrorists, for the most part, are not wanton killers" (1975: 11)[Return].

(115) See also Buck, who writes: "The terrorist who is ideologically motivated may be unconcerned about...the type of mass destruction the use of biological, chemical, and nuclear weapons can have" (1989: 434).[Return]

(116) Similarly, Jenkins observes that "Most terrorists have operated on their own territory and have had to take some care not to totally alienate the local population. Indiscriminate violence can be dangerous, especially if you have to live among your victims" (1975: 12).[Return]

(117) Compare Mullen: "The indiscriminate effects of a mass destruction weapon would, it seems, in and of itself discourage its use for all but highly parochial and discrete targets" (1978: 88).[Return]

(118) Compare Jenkins and Rubin: "As a threat, chemical and biological weapons believed to be in the hands of terrorists would have considerable value. The actual use of such weapons might be politically counterproductive" (1978: 227; see also: Jenkins 1975: 12). Post suggests that "We need...to broaden our concept of superterrorism to include plausible threats as well as the act itself. The constraints against mass casualties are not present against plausible threats" (1990: 168). This last statement may not be entirely true, however, insofar as it may be difficult to (or there is a limit to the extent to which one can) generate plausible threats involving acts that are not in themselves plausible. In regard to biological weapons in particular, Watkins discounts the utility of mere threats: "Although terrorists frequently attain some of their goals such as publicity or spreading fear by the mere threat of an act of violence, it seems unlikely that biological weapons could be useful to the terrorist unless actually employed. The absence of any tactical control over the effects of an attack and the simplicity of construction make it unlikely that an organization could blackmail the public simply by threat of attack since we already know most terrorist groups have both the ability to build such a weapon and the resolve to use it. It therefore seems likely that the first indication of a terrorist biological threat will be an outbreak of disease following an actual attack" (1987: 196). Berkowitz et al. would apparently disagree with this analysis, as they note that "Providing samples of stable, virulent materials and drawings or photographs of effective dissemination devices to the authorities would make such a threat highly credible" (1972: VIII-64).[Return]

(119) See, for example, Kupperman and Woolsey: "State sponsorship, coupled with the diffusion of technology worldwide, offers today's terrorist access to chemists, microbiologists, physicists and engineers" (1988: 3); and Hoffman: "State sponsorship, in particular, could provide terrorists with the incentives, capabilities, and resources they previously lacked for undertaking an ambitious operation in any of these [chemical, biological, or nuclear] domains" (1993: 24). See also Buck 1989: 434.[Return]

(120) Thornton explains further: "Most of all, these nations are concerned that an overreaction on the part of the US to a terrorist provocation could seriously jeopardize the stability of the Western alliance. They even foresee a threat to the premier position of the US as a leader and champion of world political morality and democracy" (1987: 2).[Return]

(121) See also Jenkins: "As we deal effectively with certain tactics, certain weapons, the terrorists do innovate just enough to obviate our security measures. They either switch to softer targets, or they may innovate tactically or they may innovate with weapons" (quoted in Marshall 1990: 373).[Return]

(122) A more recent exponent of this view is Clutterbuck, who writes: "Clearly we should not be complacent about nuclear, biological and chemical weapons, both because of the need to evaluate hoax calls (there have been quite a lot of these, but none credible) and because all of them would be feasible for a group which was both desperate and suicidal. But the threat is far less, and would in many ways be easier to handle because of its lack of credibility, than the terrorist actions to which we are accustomed" (1994: 53-54).[Return]

(123) Kupperman and Trent also emphasize the difficulty in attempting to predict events in this sphere: "No amount of theorizing can decided whether incidents of mass destruction will or will not occur. We tend to extrapolate easily to near safety or doom from scant data even though the social and physical processes governing longer-run terrorist tactics are highly complex and unpredictable" (1979: 52).[Return]

(124) Berkowitz et al. put it somewhat differently, concluding that "Threats of superviolence involving chemical or biological weapons are more likely than those involving nuclear weapons" (emphasis added). They also maintain that, while "the probability of an INW [illicit nuclear weapon] start is much greater than the probability of its successful completion," "the probability of successfully concluding a CB effort, given a serious start, is greater than 0.5" (Berkowitz et al. 1972: I-17 and IX-56).[Return]

(125) Another measure that does not fall neatly into any one of the above categories is the proposal by Berkowitz et al. for "legislation making conspiracy, threat to use, or actual use of nuclear devices or biological pathogens-other than with Presidential authority-a Federal offense." They go on to suggest that "provisions regarding chemical weapons depend on establishing a legal definition which excludes the poisoning of one or a few individuals" (1972: X-20).[Return]

(126) As Berkowitz et al. put it: "...the only promising method of control depends on the awareness of investigative and law enforcement agencies regarding the possibilities for superviolence. The control facilities exist; what is needed is the training and coordination that will enable them to maintain surveillance, utilize informants, and follow up potential indicators of danger" (1972: X-37).[Return]

(127) Mullins takes exception to some of these proposed measures, arguing that "some are too draconian to seriously consider. Even faced with the serious threat of NBC terrorism, the American public is not going to give up the civil liberties and freedoms gained over two centuries, as some of the solutions Douglass and Livingstone propose would require...." (1992: 116). Ponte, on the other hand, takes a more apocalyptic view, declaring: "We must either abandon the civil liberties that give terrorists freedom to travel, plan, and plot, or we must reshape our technology and society in ways that reduce our vulnerability" (1980: 54).

On a related matter (also dealing with national legislation), it was reported in August 1994 that the US Congress had passed a Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act, one section of which provides the death-penalty for those convicted of "causing death by use of weapons of mass destruction, including biological weapons and poison gas" (Chemical Weapons Convention Bulletin 1994).[Return]

(128) In a related proposal, Berkowitz et al. call for "the use of scientifically qualified, special investigators posing as potential terrorists in an effort to absorb whatever intent for superviolence may exist" (1972: X-37).[Return]

(129) Interestingly, psychological profiles of terrorist individuals likely to engage in CB activities are not to be found among the measures proposed in the open literature consulted for this report. According to Berkowitz et al.: "The number of individuals who, because of mental illness or personality make-up, might become involved in superviolence is not inconsequential. The psychiatrists and sociologists interviewed invariably feel that the intent and psychological capability underlying the threat is real and that control of the physical capability for superviolence is more effective than attempts to profile and screen potential perpetrators" (1972: I-7). For his part, McGeorge refers to "the differences between the adversaries who have or intend to employ chemical agents versus those inclined toward biological agents," maintaining that "there is a significant difference between these adversaries that may impact the approach taken in combating them." He also states that "CB terrorism may represent a significant threat and will be difficult to counter because the profile of the adversary appears to differ very significantly from the profile of adversaries who employ firearms and explosives" (1994: 13). It is unclear, however, if he is referring here to psychological profiles of individuals, or merely to the differing capabilities of groups.[Return]

(130) Mengel's proposal in this area is even more far-ranging, calling for the "establishment of specialized State, Federal, and regional units trained in high-technology terrorism countermeasures, including negotiations" (1976: 470). Further on, he calls for the creation of "Federal reaction teams" which "would offer locales a relatively timely response capability, while preserving local resources for the more important tasks of planning, negotiation, and establishing basic detection systems" (1976: 472). McGeorge calls simply for "the formation of a maximum capability national or international quick-response team patterned after the highly successful NEST in the U.S." (1986: 61).[Return]

(131) According to Mengel: "The planning process itself must be either a comprehensive multiagency effort across jurisdictional and authority lines, or a series of single-agency plans that are integrated and coordinated with all potentially involved agencies" (1976: 465).[Return]

(132) According to one source, the devices were "disguised as lunch boxes and soft-drink containers" (Strasser et al. 1995: 36); another reported that "discovered containers range from glass and plastic bottles to what looked like two aluminium lunch boxes" (Moosa 1995a). Later, police sources revealed that a total of 11, 20 cm2 plastic pouches containing traces of liquid sarin had been found among five packages wrapped in newspaper and left on the subway trains. In one case, witnesses saw a man use a needle-tipped umbrella to poke a package wrapped in newspaper, thereby mixing and releasing the gas (Daily Yomiuri 1995d). [Return]

(133) According to one source, "only two bombs released sarin at the government [Kasumigaseki] station; three others were discovered either before or after their trains had reached the target area" (Strasser et al. 1995: 37).[Return]

(134) In a book published by the Aum Shinri Kyu sect (which became the prime suspect) on 2 March 1995, a member of the group's "chemical division" reportedly had explained "that nerve gas must be made immediately before its release because it is so toxic it will begin to kill instantly" (T.Watanabe 1995).[Return]

(135) Supporting this theory, one newspaper reported that the gas had been placed in cars that stopped near Kasumigaseki Station exits for the NPA, district and high courts and the public prosecutor's office specifically (Daily Yomiuri 1995e).[Return]

(136) See, e.g., the remarks of Professor Susumu Oda of the University of Tsukuba, as broadcast on ABC News: "I don't see any political motive in this. The people responsible seem to have done it just to create chaos" (ABC 1995: 2). As The Economist put it: "...this attack really has struck terror in Tokyo: because it was entirely unexpected, because Japan has no experience of random violence (previous urban guerrillas have stuck to government targets) and because nobody is sure who did it or why" (1995: 37).[Return]

(137) Similarly, Kathleen Bailey was quoted as saying: "Either it's a wacko who wants to scare the hell out of everybody, or it's someone getting ready to deliver a very heavy blackmail threat" (Toronto Star 1995: A14).[Return]

(138) See also the reference in the section on "Aum Shinri Kyo" below to speculation that the attack may have been a "pre-emptive strike."[Return]

(139) It is, of course, true that a relatively small number of people were killed, but it was nevertheless characteristic of a chemical attack in that a very large number of people were affected. As The Economist put it: "Bombs might have killed more people, but even five bombs (the number of packages recovered) would have been hard put to injure so many" (1995: 37).[Return]

(140) Similarly, another report speculated that "if it had been delivered differently or on a hot afternoon when it would have evaporated more quickly the casualties might have been much greater" (Kristof 1995a).[Return]

(141) According to one report, "Japanese experts examining the evidence said they believed the sarin used in the subways had been diluted in order to make it less likely to kill the terrorists." However: "U.S. observers speculated that whoever made the sarin failed to purify it or kept it stored too long" (Strasser et al. 1995: 37).[Return]

(142) However, it was later reported that, on 23 April, police had "retracted their previous announcement that they had detected acetonitril in sarin residue found in the subways" (Daily Yomiuri 1995j).[Return]

(143) The Economist noted that "Shinrikyo rushed out a press release denying involvement with almost pre-emptive speed. No one had formally accused it of complicity..." (1995: 37-8). Indeed, not all observers were initially drawn to the Aum. James Adams, the Washington bureau chief of the Sunday Times of London, at first agreed with an ABC news commentator that the Japanese Red Army was most likely responsible. In his words, the JRA were "certainly the logical suspects....this is the kind of very ruthless act that they have a history of carrying out, so it could well be them." Adams went on to discuss the Aum Shinri Kyo, noting that it had been suspected in the Matsumoto attack but that "There's no actual evidence." He was also skeptical of Aum's possible involvement in the Tokyo subway incident, being quite dismissive of their capabilities: "It seems a convenient scapegoat. This is a very sophisticated attack. It's taken a lot of planning, and is clearly beyond the normal bounds of a bunch of lunatic fringe folk just trying to make a point" (ABC 1995: 4-5).[Return]

(144) See, e.g., Time magazine's judgment: "In Tokyo the police had a wealth of signals that a major nerve-gas attack might be in the making but were still caught off guard when it came" (Nelan 1995: 29).[Return]

(145) Spurgeon Keeny notes that "A puzzling aspect of the Tokyo affair was the apparent hesitation of the police to act before the event despite the plethora of incriminating evidence involving Aum Shinrikyo. The lack of police action has been attributed to political considerations the fear of interfering with an approved religious sect and the fact there was no law prohibiting the possession of nerve gas" (Keeny 1995: 2).[Return]

(146) A much later report, attributed to police sources, similarly characterized the sarin used in the Matsumoto attack as "a test product." According to this report, police analysis suggested that "the chemicals used were impure apparently because the manufacturer had an inferior production technique" (Kyodo 1995m).[Return]

(147) Much later, it was reported that residents of Matsumoto had seen two people dressed in what looked like "space suits" on the night of the attack, and that the perpetrators might "have used a car equipped with a gas-spraying device" (Sakurai 1995). Interestingly, according to a story that appeared immediately after the Tokyo subway attack, a 1991 novel by the British author Gordon Thomas entitled Deadly Perfume, reportedly a "best-seller" in Japan, had "described how terrorists obtained...sarin and tested it in a small town before planning to release it in the subway system of a major city." Thomas was quoted as remarking that "What happened today [in Tokyo] very closely mimics what happened in my book. The similarities are quite significant...the subway system, the method of delivery, the placing of devices" (Reuters 1995t).[Return]

(148) According to another source, more than 231 people in seven towns in Nara Prefecture were affected in this case (JT 1995c).[Return]

(149) According to the Daily Yomiuri, "three devices resembling ultrasonic humidifiers....were in briefcases,...left inside the ticket gate area, 10 meters apart. The vinyl briefcases were 30 centimeters wide and tall, and 50 centimeters long. Three or four pipes, which contained polyvinyl chloride, measured 15 centimeters long and 5 centimeters in diameter. The pipes were affixed inside the briefcases along with a motorized fan and ultrasonic vibrator. Switches on the outside of the briefcases were designed to cause the vaporization of the liquid inside the tubes when turned on" (1995e). In characterizing this incident, Fukunaga notes that the briefcases "were considered suspicious enough to prompt a police response even in a country that until then had almost no experience with domestic terrorism. As it turned out, the cases contained no explosives or chemicals, only ultrasonic devices that gave off steam. Odd, but not dangerous, police thought. In hindsight, however, this incident looks very much like a dry run for the March 20 strike" (Fukunaga 1995: 4). Also appearing after the 20 March attack, in referring to this 15 March incident, The Economist speculated that "Whatever happened, it seems to have persuaded the perpetrators that mechanical aids were unreliable" (1995: 38).[Return]

(150) According to other sources, the sarin byproducts were discovered in Kamikuishiki in December 1994 (Greve 1995; AP 1995c). The most detailed account of this incident is found in Shukan Asahi 1995. According to it, the soil samples were collected and analyzed by the Nagano Prefectural Police in collaboration with the NPA's "science police research lab" in September 1994 (20). Another source reports that the NPA's National Research Institute of Police Science submitted a written "statement of opinion" in mid-November 1994 identifying the residue as "phosphorothioate diisoprophl ether," the same substance as that detected in Matsumoto, and that the police thereafter had focused on Aum as the likely culprit. In December 1994, they reportedly discovered that a chemical company in Shizuoka managed by an Aum member had purchased "a large quantity of sarin raw material, samenkarin, in the unit of tons, between January and February" (Nakagawa 1995: 13).[Return]

(151) Another source dates this incident at 4 January, noting that Aum had "accuse[d] a company president of spreading sarin into its facilities in Kamikuishiki" (Greve 1995). The company in question was apparently a local fertiliser maker. After police had searched its factories and found no evidence of sarin, the firm in turn sued Aum for defamation (Moffett 1995j).[Return]

(152) According to a newspaper report on 1 April, about 40 experts from the Japanese Ground Self Defence Force (GSDF) Chemical School in Omiya were dispatched to the Asaka Camp in Tokyo's Nerima Ward on 19 March "to instruct riot police in the use of chemical protective gear to prepare for" the 22 March raids (JT 1995f). Another source confirms that "Since the beginning of this year, things had been narrowed down to the time, place, and evidence needed to conduct a forced search directed against Aum....The police had been making concrete preparations since about 15 March, being in contact with the Criminal Investigation Bureau director and assistant director of the Tokyo District Public Procurator's Office, and also requesting Self-Defense Force cooperation." This source specifies that no fewer than 500 sets of gas masks and protective clothing were loaned to the police on 19 March (Nakagawa 1995: 11).[Return]

(153) According to another report, the police seized 50 drums of isopropyl alcohol and "about 2,000 bags of fluorine-related agents, including sodium fluoride" (Kyodo 1995e).[Return]

(154) A later estimate on 3 April, however, was much lower: "650 drums and 2,050 bags containing chemical ingredients of sarin, enough to produce almost 6 tonnes of the gas" (Lloyd-Parry 1995a).[Return]

(155) One Tokyo newspaper, linking the March investigation of Kamikuishiki with the June Matsumoto attack but without specifying the compounds found, reported that "Three types of residue were detected during the investigation. The first residue is an intermediate product that can be produced before the formation of sarin, the second is a byproduct produced during the formation of sarin, and the third is a residue produced as a result of sarin reacting to water after it is released into the atmosphere" (NKS 1995: 1).[Return]

(156) A foul odor was said to have been reported near this building in July and August 1994 (JT 1995e). According to one report: "Local residents complained...that a yellow liquid with an offensive smell was leaking from the site through pipes and the wall of a building onto an adjoining public road" (Mainichi Daily News 1995c).[Return]

(157) A later newspaper account, at the end of May, referred to the helicopter purchase but reported that the craft had "crashed during flights to test their ability to carry enough gas to sicken, and perhaps kill, thousands." The test-flights had reportedly been ordered by Aum's "Science and Technology Minister," Hideo Murai (later assassinated) (Ottawa Citizen 1995e).

Jane's Defence Weekly also reported in early May that the NPA had released details of an Aum attempt to lease a Mil Mi-26 transport helicopter (the largest in the world) from a Russian company in Vladivostok. According to the report, the police thought it "likely" that the sect would have attempted to fit the craft with spraying gear, and were planning to "overfly key cities on Honshu," Japan's main island. This report also referred to the cult's previous purchase of an Mi-17 medium-lift transport helicopter, and "two remotely-piloted helicopters, believed to be surplus US Navy Dash drones" (JDW 1995: 18).[Return]

(158) According to the Mainichi Daily News, this amount could kill no fewer than 9.3 billion people! (1995f).[Return]

(159) Another source reported the discovery of 160 metal drums of peptone, each having a capacity of 18 liters (Kyodo 1995d). By comparison, university research classes were said typically to use only about one liter of the chemical per year (JT 1995b).[Return]

(160) According to another report, Aum "purchased Botulinus bacillus in large quantities," but it does not say from whom (Mainichi Shimbun 1995b).[Return]

(161) Nevertheless, officials in Kamikuishiki on 24 March reportedly received an anonymous telephone call threatening to kill all villagers with poison gas unless the searches were stopped (T.Watanabe 1995). [Return]

(162) Interestingly, Aum had campaigned for election in 1990 on a platform that, in part, called for banning the use of agricultural chemicals on the grounds of their long-term health hazard! (Daily Yomiuri 1995l). See also Egawa, who maintains that "not only does Aum not have farm lands, it also has no agricultural technicians" (1995: 28). Egawa also quotes a former disciple who did have a farm as saying that Aum insisted that "even in the pursuit of agriculture not one bug should be killed nor should any grass be cut. They said that all insecticides, herbicides, and chemical fertilizers were forbidden" (1995: 29).[Return]

(163) A group video is also reported to have claimed "that the US has masterminded a number of past disasters and tragedies including the global spread of the AIDS virus" (Reuters 1995l). According to another report, Asahara first claimed in a speech on 11 March 1994 that the Kamikuishiki complex had been attacked by Yperite or mustard gas, as well as an unspecified nerve gas (Kyodo 1995g). In a sermon in Tokyo on 27 April 1994 he alleged that, since 1988, Aum had been sprayed with poison gas by helicopters and other aircraft "wherever we go" (Shukan Asahi 1995: 20).[Return]

(164) Masami Tsuchiya, holder of a master's degree in organic chemistry and later described as Aum's "chief chemist," was said, after abandoning his doctoral studies at Tsukuba University, to have told others that "there's more equipment to work with [at the cult] than at the university" (Shirouzu and Hamilton 1995).[Return]

(165) According to another account, Asahara and his aides began buying "complex chemical equipment" as early as 1989, just two years after the sect's founding, while Aum firms "began stockpiling chemicals for sarin" in 1993 (Asiaweek 1995: 31). Yet another source reports that a senior member of Aum purchased 21 high-performance gas masks with air cylinders, 30 masks with filters, and 37 full body suits from a manufacturer in Tokyo in April 1990 when the sect began to build the Kamikuishiki complex. The same source also reveals that the cult had purchased over 1,000 filters for the gas masks from a company in Shizuoka Prefecture over the previous 12 months, including 600 in July 1994 alone (Mainichi Daily News 1995e). Finally, Kyodo News Service reported on 6 May 1995 that Aum had begun "increasing its purchases of chemicals, including all substances necessary to produce sarin," after November 1993, coinciding with a "sharp" increase in travel by its senior members to Russia (Kyodo 1995j).[Return]

(166) According to a later report, Aum used four companies set up between April 1993 and March 1994 Hasegawa Chemical, Bell Epoch, Beck, and Shimomura Chemical to purchase a large amount of raw materials for sarin, such as phosphorous trichloride, ostensibly for agricultural purposes (Daily Yomiuri 1995i). Still another account maintained that "the sect used proxies registered as authorized dealers in toxic chemicals to purchase large quantities of [phosphorous trichloride] in units of 10 tons in December 1993 but in such a way that sellers could not deduce that the sect itself is the end user. The sect let the proxy companies cancel their registrations as authorized dealers in toxic chemicals after receiving the shipments, and also cancelled a contract to rent a warehouse used to store the chemical" (Kyodo 1995i). [Return]

(167) One source identified the instrument as the "GSP11." According to it: "Operation...is simple by nonprofessionals, but a drawback is that you do not know the degree of contamination and kind of gas. Such devices are laying about in Russia, and one probably costs several ten thousand yen" (Kato et al. 1995: 14). Early on in the investigation, there was also "speculation that some sarin might have been brought in from Russia, where it had been stockpiled and might have reached the black market" (Kristof 1995e). According to another source, Aum's Moscow branch included as members "several soldiers from Russian military chemical units" (Kato et al. 1995: 15). Tokyo's Shukan Asahi also maintains that, in Russia, "members of antiradioactivity and antichemical and biological weapons units, as well as chemists, were invited to become Aum members, and accepted." In addition, the sect "attempted to establish relations with research organizations specializing in chemistry" (1995: 33).[Return]

(168) See also Fukumaga, who writes that the three injured judges were "sleeping in a dormitory only a short distance from where the gas was released" and that the attack "struck the night before the three judges were to render their verdict, resulting in a postponement of the case" (1995: 4).[Return]

(169) As another account put it: "The ramifications of the Aum Shinrikyo episode go far beyond simple questions of personal safety. As some commentators warned, it may have permanently punctured Japan's image of itself as a harmonious and homogenous society in which 99% of the people share an interest in maintaining the status quo. Indeed, the fact that such a cult could grow so large and powerful in Japan suggests some fundamental problems inside the world's most affluent society" (C. Smith 1995b: 14).[Return]

(170) On 5 June, police were quoted as saying that arrested Aum members had admitted the sect's responsibility for this attack (Reuters 1995ah).[Return]

(171) The bill, passed by Parliament on 19 April, provided for a prison term of up to life for those convicted of using sarin or other lethal chemicals, and up to seven years for production or possession of such substances (Reuters 1995t). In addition, "collecting materials or offering funds for the purpose of making such poisons" would be punishable with a prison term of up to three years, while "anyone currently in possession of sarin must report it to police and hand over the substance before the start of the application or be punishable with a prison term of up to one year" (Kyodo 1995h).[Return]

(172) After the indictment of Asahara, on 9 June, Justice Minister Isao Maeda announced that Aum would be "stripped of its religious legal status and disbanded 'as soon as possible'" (AP 1995g).[Return]

(173) Such a law widening police investigative powers was reportedly passed on 12 June (Reuters 1995ai).[Return]

(174) See, for example, C. Smith 1995: 22.[Return]

(175) The Defence Agency was even reported to be proposing a revision of its strategy away from "repelling limited, small-scale aggression" to "quick mobilization against various kinds of dangers" such as chemical attacks by terrorists (NKS 1995b). According to another report: "The concept of 'airborne mobile brigades,' which is a key point in the Ground SDF's reorganization, is aimed at gaining the capability to move troops promptly in such contingencies as urban terrorist acts like the recent sarin subway attack" (NKS 1995c: 40).[Return]

(176) The Defence Agency denied, however, a report in the magazine Shukan Bunshun in May alleging that two officers of the SDF's chemical research school, including one who had participated in the police training on 19 March, were members of Aum (JTW 1995f).[Return]

(177) One Ground Self Defence Force (GSDF) first lieutenant was to be "severely punished" for having given Aum "Intelligence Minister" Yoshihiro Inoue the previous autumn a "textbook on protection against poison gas, radioactivity and biological weapons" (Kyodo 1995m: 33).[Return]

(178) According to a media survey reported on 14 May, "private television networks had in the past fortnight shown more than 46 hours of Aum coverage per week, while no other news topic got more than six minutes of attention" (Eckert 1995d)![Return]

(179) For details of Aum's alleged Russian connections, see: Kato et al. 1995.[Return]

(180) A story in the Daily Yomiuri of 22 April detailed the method police believed Aum to have used as follows: "Aum started with phosphorus trichloride, made an intermediate substance by mixing it with methanol and methyl iodide, and mixed the product with phosphorus trichloride again and with chlorine to produce methyl-phosphon acid dichloride....In the next stage, Aum added sodium fluoride and isopropyl alcohol in that order to methylphosphon acid dichloride." The story cited "chemical experts in the Defense Agency" to the effect that "the production method using phosphorus trichloride mixed with chlorine, without using thionyl chloride or phosphorus pentachloride, both sold in Japan, is exactly the way the Russian military manufactures sarin as a chemical weapon. In other countries possessing chemical weapons, a chloric chemical is used" (Daily Yomiuri 1995g).[Return]

(181) According to another source: "A former lieutenant in Russian military intelligence reportedly trained four members to fly a Russian MIL-17 helicopter, one of which the cult owns" (Asiaweek 1995c). Tokyo's Shukan Asahi reported that Aum "Construction Minister" Kiyohide Hayakawa had purchased the "Mir 17" via Austria, and then "sent two Aum members to the No. 3 Aviation Club in Moscow for a month, where they were taught how to fly the helicopters" (1995: 33).[Return]

(182) The first of these was embodied in a "Comprehensive Terrorism Prevention Act" passed by the US Senate, by a vote of 91-8, on 7 June 1995. Senate Republicans had initially resisted this aspect of the bill but a Democratic amendment had restored it (Green 1995 and AP 1995k). A similar House of Representatives bill, awaiting action at the time this study went to press, reportedly "would permit the military to give technical and logistical assistance in cases involving biological and chemical weapons, while continuing to bar it from participation in apprehension and arrest of suspects" (Dewar and Cooper 1995).

Un-named "senior military officials" reportedly had also been "vehemently opposed to" the original Clinton proposal, on the grounds that "search and seizure and arrest activities" were "not part of their warfighting mission." Nevertheless, according to the report, in the aftermath of the Tokyo gas attack as well as the Oklahoma City bombing, "defence technology response groups" sponsored by the US Defense Nuclear Agency henceforth would "take on a greater role in responding to chemical and biological incidents. This would involve using military forces in analyzing and disarming devices in the USA" (Starr 1995: 5).[Return]

(183) Similarly, Asiaweek magazine quoted Kyle Olson as saying that "The taboo about using chemical weapons [for terrorism] may have been completely shattered," and "There probably is someone out there who is considering the success this attack has had, in terms of the small expense involved to produce such terror on a massive scale" (Asiaweek 1995: 31).[Return]

(184) In the immediate aftermath of the subway attack, the Japanese Diet passed such legislation on 30 March 1995. The House of Councillors went on to ratify the CWC on 28 April (Kyodo 1995l).[Return]

(185) On 20 May, police were reported to have found evidence linking Aum to this abortive attack, in the form of plastic fragments found at a cult facility that matched those used in the Shinjuku device (Toronto Globe and Mail 1995c). And on 13 June, it was reported that a "senior member" of Aum, among those already indicted for the 20 March attack, had admitted the sect's responsibility for the Shinjuku attempt as well (Ueno 1995e).[Return]

(186) One possible exception may have been an incident reported in Maclean's Magazine, when, just three days after the Tokyo attack, four teenagers sprayed mace onto a crowded Manhattan subway train, injuring nine passengers (Bilski 1995: 30).[Return]

(187) According to another report: "Agents learned of the plot when Disney officials called them to report that the company had received a letter and a videotape warning that something was going to happen....The tape showed a man from the chest down, wearing rubber gloves and apparently mixing chemicals....The letter or tape threatened that 'guests will die.' An FBI behavioral psychologist in Quantico, Virginia, analyzed the tape and said he thought the threats were serious" (JT 1995d).[Return]

(188) See also Intelligence Newsletter 1995, which reported that both US Army and Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) personnel had been "secretly deployed" over the Easter weekend in response to the threat.[Return]

(189) The newspaper cited police to the effect that "confiscated bags from the compound...were made with a special film and glued in the same pattern as the 11 bags found in Tokyo." As for the packaging device: "The fully automated device could measure a chemical substance in milligrams and insert it into a bag. The device could be operated through remote control. It was connected to equipment believed to be in the last stage of synthesizing a chemical product in the plant located in Satian No.7" (Daily Yomiuri 1995h). According to a later report, "one of two lamination machines seized by police produced items with edges and patterns identical to those of the bags used in the subway attack" (Daily Yomiuri 1995p).[Return]

(190) A Japanese newspaper had earlier reported that "After analysis of deposits inside piping," Japanese Ground Self Defence Force chemical warfare specialists had "concluded the sarin factory was completed by last June [1994] and has been producing nerve gas continuously" (Mainichi Shimbun 1995).[Return]

(191) He did, however, appear to implicate his followers, telling his lawyer: "I am white (innocent), my disciples are black (guilty). I am devoting myself to practising religion to prepare for when I have to shoulder the sins of my disciples" (Moffett 1995k).[Return]

(192) Japanese newspapers on 2 June reported that investigators had identified Asahara and ten of his followers as being responsible for the Matsumoto attack, which had been intended to kill two judges, both of whom were said to be "still in hospital for treatment for sarin poisoning." Hideo Murai reportedly had ordered the production of the sarin used, while Endo, Tsuchiya, and four others had carried out the actual attack (Sakurai 1995).[Return]

(193) The sect was also reported to have actually tested biological agents on its own "wayward" members at special dinners organized by Asahara, by serving food laced with plague and botulism germs. According to Japanese news sources: "The last such meal was served in January [1995],...but it was not clear how many times the cult served them. Soon after the supper in January, some followers complained of skin rashes and sore throats while at least one of them disappeared" (Reuters 1995ak).[Return]

(194) According to Tsuchiya's testimony to police, a total of 12 remote-control helicopters were to have been used in this attack, planned for November (Asiaweek 1995d).[Return]

(195) However, another account cited officials as saying that "the cult is believed to have destroyed its stocks of the nerve gas to hide evidence" (AP 1995h). One report cited Masami Tsuchiya as having told police that 10 kg of sarin had been used in the Tokyo attack, while another 20 kg had been "disposed of" (AP 1995j). Another report cited investigators as suspecting that sarin had been "turned over" to "several" Aum members. It went on: "Tsuchiya told police that he disposed of all the sarin in his possession and that he does not know what happened to stocks kept by other members....Police are trying to identify the other members who took possession of the sarin and to confirm whether they have disposed of their stocks" (JTW 1995h).[Return]

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